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Introduction
Game Theory is a mathematical theory which deals with conflict and coo-
peration situations between (at least two) intelligent and rational decision-
makers and provides mathematical models of them. The subjects of study
for game theorists are not merely play activities as the term “ game” erro-
neously suggests. “Conflict analysis” or “interactive decision theory ” might
be names more suitable to describe this theory.
A conflict or cooperation situation (game) is a strategic interaction bet-
ween two 1 or more individuals (players), which jointly determine the out-
come. Each player partially controls the game, but usually no player has
full control.
It is convenient to be more precise about the assumptions of intelligence
and rationality. With the first hypothesis, we assume that the decision mak-
ers have unlimited capacities of deduction, computation, and analysis of the
situation. With the second hypothesis, we assume that the decision maker
is able to make a choice between various available options. The rationality
of the decision maker lies in having preferences on the consequences of his
choice, in the consistency with these preferences, and in choosing the avail-
able action whose consequence he prefers. The keyword “rationality” is a
term inherited from Neoclassic Economics and Decision Theory from which
Game Theory derives.
A game is not only made up of players and of choices available to the
players, but also of preferences of the players over the set of possible out-
comes of the games. Thus, each player strives to obtain the most profitable
outcome for him. Often it is assumed that these preferences are described
by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, hence with each player
there is associated a numerical function whose expected value he tries to
maximize.
1The case of one player usually falls under the heading of “Decision Theory”.
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So Game Theory is not only an empiric theory, but also a normative
theory, since it prescribes what action each player should choose in a game
in order to promote his interests optimally, that is, which strategy each
player should play to obtain the best benefits with only his partial influence
on the situation.
The aim of Game Theory, as stated in Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944), is to find the mathematically complete and perfectly general princi-
ples which define “rational behavior” for the players in a game and to derive
from them the characteristics of that behavior. While the principles ought
to be perfectly general, that is, valid in all situations, the solution can be
found only in some special characteristic cases and it varies with the change
of conditions.
Game Theory is a relatively recent science. Its beginnig dates back to the
20th century with the works of Zermelo (1913), Borel (1921), von Neumann
(1928) 2. But the theory was considered only after the publication of the
book by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), followed by many articles
addressed to developments of this theory. We remember, for example, John
F.Nash Jr. (1950), in which the author introduced the Equilibria-bargaining
threat.
Many studies of Game Theory were completed during World War II
at Princeton, in the same cultural circle where many theoretical physicists
were also working (see Morgenstern (1976)). According to the opinion of
Myerson (1991), this propinquity does not seem coincidental, however the
purpose of the two groups proved different. The physicists have developed
the nuclear studies which have threatened the world peace, the game theo-
rists have created social systems for moderating human behavior in conflict.
Thus, it might be desiderable that the improvements of social systems were
able to study the situation and to outguess the consequences of the physical
science. This convinction has moved mathematicians and social scientists
to work in Game Theory during the past few years, although there is lack of
collaboration between the various disciplines. For example, the production
of bio-diesel, extracted from sunflower oil or colza oil, has been a positive en-
vironmental impact, but it has created problems of famine to poor countries
whose economy was based on primary sectors.
Game Theory actually has proved to be versatile since used in many
fields. It has been applied in Military Strategies (Cold War, Gulf War), in
Economics (Oligopolies, Monopolies), in Marketing (Coca-Cola), in Finance
2von Neumann (1928) introduced the Minimax theorem.
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(Firm’s Control), in Politics (Electoral Systems), in Club Games (Bridge,
Poker, Chess), in Sports (Attack-Defence Strategies), in Sociology (Migra-
tion), in Medicine (Neurons), Genetics/Biomedicine (Microarray Games), in
Psychology (Prisoner’s Dilemma), in Biology (Evolution), in Environment
(Pollution).
The importance of developments achieved in Game Theory is supported
and affirmed by the assignment of Nobel prizes in Economics. In fact, re-
cently, eight game theorists shared the Nobel prize in economics. They
were: in 1994 John F.Nash Jr., John Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten; in
2005 Y.Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling; in 2007 Roger My-
erson, Leonid Hurwicz, and Eric Maskin. Nash defined the notion of a
noncooperative (or Nash) equilibrium, and proved its existence in mixed
strategies. Selten refined this notion to the recursive notion of subgame per-
fect equilibrium and the closely related notion of trembling hand perfection.
Harsanyi defined the notions of a game with incomplete information and
of a Bayesian equilibrium, in which players’ lack of information about the
game they are playing is encapsulated in a player’s ”type.” These ideas have
been influential in the study of games by economists during the 1980s. Four
major areas in which this impact has been felt are in the study of bargaining,
reputation and repeated games, signalling, and mechanism design.
Traditionally, the mathematical models of strategic interactions are di-
vided into two classes: cooperative games and non-cooperative games. A
cooperative game is a game in which the players can subscribe binding agree-
ments. A non-cooperative game is one in which there are no possibilities
for communication, correlation or (pre)commitment, except for those that
are explicitly allowed by the game rules. Hence, all relevant aspects should
be captured by the rules of the game. In this work, we restrict ourselves to
noncooperative games.
A solution for a non-cooperative game is a set of recommendations, which
tell each player how to behave in every situation that may arise. We request
that solution be consistent, i.e. no player should have an incentive to deviate
from the prescriptions of solution. Hence, a solution must be self-enforcing.
A possible reading of this term is the following. It is as if, by pre-play
communication, the players have agreed, in a not binding way, to play the
prescriptions of this solution and no player has incentive to unilaterally
deviate from strategy combination, since his reward will not increase with
such an action, on the understanding that the other players do not deviate.
In game theoristic terminology, this means that the solution should be a
Nash equilibrium (Nash (1950), (1951)).
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The concept of Nash equilibrium is a concept relevant and increased in
value solution, not only for the idea of stability of non-binding agreements,
but also since it plays on the assumptions of intelligence and rationality of
players and it does not request the players to communicate to each other
before strategic interaction. However, it has its drawbacks. Given a game,
various problems can arise, from problems of existence of equilibria to pro-
blems of choice of an equilibrium that brings to an efficient outcome. For
example, a game so simple as Matching Pennies is without Nash equilibria.
Otherwise, we might have two or more possible choices for the players: the
Coordination game has two Nash equilibria with the same payoffs, while the
Battle of the Sexes has two Nash equilibria, each of them is preferred only
by one player. Or, again, there are games with inefficient Nash equilibria,
as it happens for Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The intervention of Game Theory lies in providing the players with dif-
ferent kinds of solutions of the game. For example the study of refine-
ments of Nash equilibria is one of the knottiest problems in Game Theory.
Among the proposed refinements, we can mention trembling hand perfect
equilibrium (Selten (1975)), proper equilibrium (Myerson (1978)), sequential
equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson (1982)), stable equilibrium (Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986)), and virtual subgame perfect equilibrium (Garc´ıa-Jurado
and Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2006)).
As stated at the beginning, Game Theory makes models and studies
hypothetical examples in order to understand conflict and cooperation in-
teractions. On one side, the symplicity of the model, obtained by ignoring
the details of reality, allows to analyze the essence and the nature of these
strategic interactions. On the other hand, it provides examples, sometimes
unrealistic, because they do not correspond to the initial real situation. This
is not strictly negative, since in this way we can identify which details, at
first sight trifling, are the X-factor of the model. For example, game theory
has represented the tragedy of the commons via the strategic actions of play-
ers (individuals or countries) which, in order to protect a common, decide
whether to cooperate or not. The game was been represented by a Priso-
ner Dilemma, which provides, for the equilibrium, that both players defect:
so, no agreement can be signed by all the countries. The latest literature,
inspired by concrete facts, has proved that model is unsuitable for repre-
sent it, since some agreements are indeed reached. The inadequacy of the
Prisoner Dilemma equilibrium can be interpreted either as a critique of the
choice of the model or as a sign that the complete-information model omits
some important features. In repeated games, where the reputation effects
are significant, small amounts of certain kinds of incomplete information
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lead to cooperative equilibria. In the example of the Tragedy of the Com-
mons, despite the pessimistic theoretical predictions about cooperation, a
lot of partial agreements are signed by a subset of countries trading. Thus,
it emerged that man is a social being, which spontaneously cooperates. But
the cooperation is partial, not global. The final goal becomes to find how
the global cooperation is reached.
Again, let us consider the case of public goods. If a public good is
local, then in order to conserve it from over-exploitation a local authority is
sufficient. But in case of international public goods, this is not possible, then
there are international negotiations and contracts signed by a part the of
countries interested in cooperation. Comparing the theoretical results with
concrete facts, there is a paradox. That is, there is not always the over-
exploitation of public good, as predicted by theory. In fact, more than 120
international environmental agreements are signed. At this point, the game
theory intervenes in order to emerge cooperation between all the countries or
among a greater and greater number of individuals. The environment is, for
example, one of the international public goods. In the global environmental
problems a target to reach is the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
All the countries are actively and passively concerned in this problem, in
fact they regulate the threshold of their own gas emissions and they suffer
the consequence also from the economic point of view of greenhouse effect:
melt of glaciers and rising water level cause damage to agriproducts. World
emergency requires an international coordination between countries aiming
at signing agreements to reduce gas emissions, but, in practice, the signers
are a small number. Even Game Theory confirms this behaviour. Carraro
and Marchiori (2003), for example, show a model where, at the equilibrium,
the signatories are fewer in number and the grand coalition is not achieved.
We prove the same results in Section 3.6. The seriousness of the problem
needs all the countries to sign agreements and reduce their gas emissions.
The Thesis consists of four parts: the first part contains opening notes,
while the others refer to three different problems: the analysis of a binary
symmetric game, a modified version of Unilateral Commitments Game, and
the essentializing of different equilibrium concepts.
The first part of the Thesis is made up of Chapters 1 and 2 , and contains
definitions and notations. It would like to be a ushering into Game Theory
of the readers not familiar with mainly standard game theoretic notions. In
Chapter 1 we introduce the basic concepts of Game Theory and the solution
concepts used in this thesis. The content of Chapter develops through the
three forms, in which we can represent a game: the strategic form, the exten-
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sive form, and the coalitional form. First, we introduce games in strategic
form, the dominated strategies , the concept of Nash equilibrium, and some
games quoted in this work, such as Matching Pennies, Coordination Game,
Battle of the Sexes, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Rock Paper Scissors. Then,
we present games in extensive form with perfect recall, followed by games in
coalitional form and, in particular we recall the definition of TUIC-games,
since the model analyzed in Chapter 3 derives from them. In the conclu-
sive Section of Chapter 1, we present those refinements of Nash equilibria,
which we have essentialized in Chapter 5 , not based on beliefs, like Sub-
game Perfect Equilibrium (SPE), and Perfect Equilibrium (PE), and based
on beliefs, like Sequential Rationality (SR), Sequential Equilibrium (SE),
and Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE).
In Chapter 2, we present the concept of potential, and its relations with
symmetric games. The Section 2.5 is the core of Chapter 2 and provides
our results. The first result establishes a symmetric game with only two
strategies is a potential game and then it has a pure Nash Equilibrium. The
originality of the result lies in beying such a game a potential game, since
Cheng and other (2004) has already showed that a symmetric game with
only two strategies has a pure Nash equilibrium. The second one provides
how all the NE of a symmetric, binary game are deduced from its potential
function.
The second part of the Thesis is Chapter 3, where we present two models
of binary games. We consider the problem of sharing the cost of facilities
among the possible users. An easy way to divide costs is to divide them
evenly among all of the players. But this way violates fairness, and, it
would be reasonable to take into account whether a member uses or not a
given facility. In order to be able to enforce the payment, we assume to have
a way to make verifiable to a third part who are the users, but, to make
it verifiable, an additional cost is to be added. We propose two ways, in
which players reach such a decision. In the first model, the naming game,
each player names the machine for which he asks for verifing. In the second
model, the majority decision game, the checking is made only if the given
quorum is reached. Each model has been examined first in the case with
only one machine and then with different ones. Since a binary symmetric
game is a potential game and, then, it has a pure Nash Equilibrium, we can
model a special case of environmental game via naming game, that is via a
potential or congestion game, result processed in Section 3.6.
The third part of the Thesis (Chapter 4), analyzes the model of Quality
Unilateral Commitments, i.e. unilateral commitments where, in the first
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stage, each player declares that he will pay a penalty if he will not play, in
the second stage, the restricted strategies. Adding a self-punishing scheme
to this simple sequential game structure makes self-enforcing the Nash equi-
libria of the constituent game, if any. In particular, we embed a two player
game into a two stage game, in which players can restrict their strategy
spaces in the first stage. In the second stage, if player chooses a strategy
from his restricted strategy space, he obtains the same payoff as in the ba-
sic game, otherwise he pays a penalty dependent on the square of distance
from his restricted strategy space. Since a commitment is a binding of an
individual to the others, it measures an attitude to the sense of altruism,
compliance, identification and loyalty towards the group. It is no accident
we have called our model as quality commitments instead of penalty com-
mitments. In this years, the Corporate Social Responsability (briefly, CSR)
is developping. A CSR is an enterprise, which not only produces wealth, but
also is dealing with business within the competence of State, Church, civil
society, and family. In order to favour the cooperation in a game, usually
we implement an efficient disciplinary system, extern to the parts involved
in the game. Instead, the CSR develops on civic virtue: the virtue cannot
be negotiated, like penalty is settled by contract, but it is a product of free
will. The same it happens in our model of QUC, since the sanctions is self
declared by the players, then it is internal to the game.
The fourth part of the Thesis (Chapter 5) is an annotated rewrite of the
paper Essentializing Equilibrium Concepts, together with Gonza´lez-Dı´az ,
Garc´ıa-Jurado, and Patrone (see Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2009)). The essen-
tializing process is a tool to identify what information about a game may be
neglected, in order to check whether a specific profile correspond to an equi-
librium outcome or not. Given an extensive game, an equilibrium concept
selects a set of strategy profiles (empty too) satisfying well-defined condi-
tions testing on the all game tree We characterize the essential collections
for the most used equilibrium concepts, based or not on beliefs, such as SR,
WPBE, SE or NE, SPE, PE. The possible applications of our analysis is to
check the robustness of a concept, to analize a partially-specified game, and,
finally, to study the concept of Virtual Equilibrium.
The three problems studied in the Thesis are not entirely unrelated. In
Chapter 3, we analize the equilibria set of a simple non cooperative model
using two different criteria (’Naming game’ and ’Majority decision’), Since
the found equilibria are unfair, we give fair nature to solutions without
recourse to cooperative games, which tools for building equity criteria. So
we look for normative prescriptions by emphasizing and focusing on the
ethical behaviour of players. A possible solution is provided by Quality
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Unilateral Commitments (Chapter 4). This game is a one-shot game, since
we try to obtain a cooperative and efficient outcome without resorting to
repeated games but using only anticipative declarations of good behaviour.
Since, with the unilateral commitment amplification, the extensive form of
the game has grown exponentially, it is necessary to locate which parts of
the game are relevant to check if the outcome of the strategy profile is an
equilibrium outcome: from here the Essentializing Equilibrium Concepts
(Chapter 5).
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Chapter 1
Preliminaries
In this Chapter we define the basic concepts of Game Theory, fundamental
for this work, and set up standard terminology and notations. First, we
introduce games in strategic form (Section 1.1), dominated strategies (Sub-
section 1.1.2), the concept of Nash equilibrium (Subsection 1.1.3), and some
games quoted in this work (Subsection 1.1.4), then games in extensive form
(Section 1.2), followed by games in coalitional form (Section 1.3, and, in
particular we recall the definition of TUIC-games (Subsection 1.3.1), since
we quote them in Chapter 3. In the conclusive Section 1.4, we present
some refinements of Nash equilibria, not based on beliefs (Subsection 1.4.1),
like Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE), and Perfect Equilibrium (PE), and
based on beliefs (Subsection 1.4.2), like Sequential Rationality (SR), Sequen-
tial Equilibrium (SE), and Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE).
As we have reminded in the Introduction, Game Theory copes with
strategic interaction between at least two decisioners, called players, and
makes mathematical models of it. The players (or else sets of players),
intelligent and rational, interact with each other in situations of conflict
and cooperation. Each player masters partially the end result of the game
1 through his actions. This way, we have identified the constituents of a
game.
Definition 1. A game G is composed of at least two players, the choices
at disposal of players, and the preferences of players compared to game out-
comes.
We assume that the players are rational and intelligent, and the model
1A game is made up of players (at least two), of choices at disposal of the players, and
preferences of the players for outcomes of the games.
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is common knowledge (Lewis (1969). We say rational the player able to
make a choice between various available options, and intelligent the decision
maker with unlimited capacities of deduction, calculus, and analysis of the
situation. The structure of the game is common knowledge when we assume
that all players know the structure of the strategic form, and know that their
opponents know it, and know that their opponents know that they know,
and so on ad infinitum.
The games are divided into cooperative games, if players can sign binding
agreements, and non-cooperative games, otherwise.
A game can be described in several ways, the principal forms are three:
the strategic form, the extensive form, and the coalitional form. The first
two classes belong to non cooperative games theory, the third class to coo-
perative games theory. A game in strategic form is represented by listing
all the strategies (complete plan of action) available to each player, together
with the payoffs associated with the various strategy combinations. The
strategic form, or s.f., is recomended for games with simultaneous and in-
dependent actions. A game in extensive form is given by the rules of the
game indicating the choices available to each player, the information of a
player when it is his turn to move, and the payoffs each player receives at
the end of the game. The extensive form, or e.f., is suitable for games with
alternate moves. A game in coalitional form is described by the utility that
each set of players can gain if they form a coalition, excluding the other
players. The characteristic form, or c.f., is used for cooperative games. A
game in extensive form can be transformed into strategic form (von Neu-
mann (1928)). The possibility of reducing to strategic form also a game with
non-simultaneous moves makes the strategic form very important, even if
some essential information of extensive form is lost during the change to
strategic form.
1.1 Games in Strategic Form and Dominance
1.1.1 Strategic Game
Definition 2. A game form Γ in strategic form is
〈X1, . . . , Xn, E, φ〉
where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players, Xi is the non-empty pure
strategy set of player i ∈ N , E is the set of possible final outcomes, and
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φ :
∏
k∈N
Xk −→ E maps the set of pure strategies into the corresponding
outcome.
Definition 3. A game G in strategic form is
〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉
where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players, Xi is the non-empty pure
strategy set of player i ∈ N , ui :
∏
k∈N
Xk −→ R is the payoff function for
player i.
The payoff function ui gives von Neumann-Morgenstern utility ui(x1, . . . , xn)
of player i for each strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn).
Definition 4. A game 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 in strategic form is a finite
game if Xi is a finite set for all i ∈ N .
Definition 5. A game is a binary choice game if each player has only two
pure strategies.
Definition 6. Given a game 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉, the game
〈X1, . . . , Xn, c1, . . . , cn〉,
where ci = −ui for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is a cost game. ci is called cost
function.
For S ⊆ A, we denote −S the set A\S and XS the product set
∏
i∈S
Xi.
As a particular case, with abuse of notation, we denote X−i the product set∏
k 6=i
Xk. Then x−i indicates an element of X−i, and (y, x−i) the element of∏
k∈N
Xk obtained from (x1, . . . , xn) by replacing the i-th strategy xi by y,
that is (y, x−i) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, xn).
Let 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 be a finite game, where mi .= |Xi|, for each
i ∈ N . A mixed strategy pi of player i is a probability distribution on Xi,
which asssigns to the pure strategy xij of player i the probability pij .
Definition 7. A mixed strategy of player i is pi ∈ ∆(Xi), where
∆(Xi) = {pi = (pi1, . . . , pimi) ∈ Rmi : pij > 0,
mi∑
j=1
pij = 1}
is the probability simplex on Xi.
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Really, a mixed strategy is
mi∑
j=1
pijxij ,
where (pij)j ∈ ∆(Xi) and xij ∈ Xi for each j = 1, . . . ,mi are the pure
strategies of player i, but we represent with p = (pij)
mi
j=1, that is, an element
p = (pij)
mi
j=1 ∈ ∆(Xi) corresponds to the strategy “ play strategy xij with
probability pij , for each j = 1, . . . ,mi”.
1.1.2 Dominance
Definition 8. Given a strategic game (X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un), the strategy
xi ∈ Xi strongly dominates the strategy yi ∈ Xi for player i ∈ N , if ∀x−i ∈
X−i
ui(xi, x−i) > ui(yi, x−i).
The strategy xi ∈ Xi weakly dominates the strategy yi ∈ Xi for player i, if
∀x−i ∈ X−i
ui(xi, x−i) > ui(yi, x−i).
The strategy xi ∈ Xi strictly dominates the strategy yi ∈ Xi for player i, if
xi weakly dominates yi ∈ Xi and ∃x¯−i ∈ X−i such that
ui(xi, x¯−i) > ui(yi, x¯−i).
The strategy xi ∈ Xi is a strongly dominant strategy for player i, if xi
strongly dominates every other strategy yi ∈ Xi with xi 6= yi, while the
strategy xi ∈ Xi is a strongly dominated strategy if there exists a strategy yi
which strongly dominates it 2.
Obviously, all the dominance relations are reversed for a cost game.
1.1.3 Nash Equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium is the most important equilibrium concept in Game
Theory. It was introduced by Nash ((1950), (1951)). A Nash equilibrium
is a profile of strategies such that the strategy of each player is the optimal
response to the strategies of the opponents. Nash equilibria are consistent
2To avoid misunderstandings, the terminology we use about dominances is not aligned
with the ’dominant’ usage in Game Theory literature.
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predictions of how the game will be played, in the sense that if all players
predict that a particular Nash equilibrium occurs, then no player has an
incentive to play differently.
Definition 9. A strategy profile is (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
∏
i∈N
Xi.
Definition 10. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn) such
that ∀i ∈ N and ∀yi ∈ Xi
ui(xi, x−i) > ui(yi, x−i).
Hence, a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn) is a Nash equilibrium (briefly: NE)
if no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from (x1, . . . , xn), since
with a NE each player maximizes his payoff if the strategies of the others
are held fixed. In this sense, the strategy of each player is said optimal
against those of the opponents.
Remark 1. When we assume that the strategy sets are subset of an Eu-
clidean space and the payoff function are continuous, the criterion in Defini-
tion 10 for a NE can be expressed by equating n pairs of continuous functions
on the space of n-uples. Then the NE obviously form a closed subset of this
space. This subset is composed of a number of pieces of algebraic varieties,
cut out by other algebraic varieties.
1.1.4 Example of Games in Strategic Form
Not all games have NE in pure strategies, like it happens in Matching Pen-
nies Games. Sometimes there are games with multiply NE: two well known
examples are the Coordination Games, where the NE are the same for each
player, and the Battle of the Sexes, where each NE is preferred only by one
player. Therefore, the following problem arises: given a game with more
than one NE and without possibility to make binding agreements, which
one of these NE should be chosen as the solution of the game? Again, some
NE are better qualified to be chosen as the solution than others, and not
every NE has the property to be self-enforcing. The tool of eliminating
the equilibria not self-enforcing (or unreasonable or non-sensible) is called
refinement of NE.
Matching Pennies
A simple example of non-existence of Nash equilibria is the Matching Pennies
Games, in Figure 1.1. In Matching Pennies, two players simultaneously
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announce heads (H) or tails (T). If the announces match, player I wins and
player II looses, otherwise player I looses and player II wins. Neither of
the pure strategy profile constitute an equilibrium. The unique equilibrium
of MP is in mixed strategies, when each player randomizes between his two
pure strategies, assigning equal probability to each.
I
\
\II H T
H 1 0 0 1
T 0 1 1 0
Figure 1.1: Matching Pennies Game.
Coordination Game
An easy example of a game with multiple equilibria is the Coordination
Game3, illustrated by Figure 1.2. Each player receives 1 when the players
I
\
\II L R
T 1 1 0 0
B 0 0 1 1
Figure 1.2: Coordination Game.
choose the same strategies and 0 otherwise. The game has two Nash equi-
libria in pure strategies, and a third in mixed strategies, when each player
randomizes between his two pure strategies, assigning equal probability to
each. The problems derive from the fact that there are two optimal choices
for the players and the strategies are choosen simultaneously, so the players
cannot effectively coordinate themselves.
Battle of the Sexes
One well-known example of a game with multiple equilibria is the Battle
of the Sexes, illustrated by Figure 1.3. Two players wish to go to an event
together, but disagree about whether to go to a football game or to the
3The Coordination Game is an example of a game described by Definition 41.
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I
\
\II F B
F 2 1 0 0
B 0 0 1 2
Figure 1.3: Battle of the Sexes.
ballet. Each player gets a utility of 2 if both go to his (or to her) preferred
event, a utility of 1 if both go the other’s preferred event, and a utility of 0
if the two are unable to agree and stay at home or go out individually. The
game has three equilibria: two in pure strategies, (F, F ) and (B,B), and
one in mixed: player I plays F with probability 23 (and B with probability
1
3), and player II plays F with probability
1
3 (and B with probability
2
3).
If two players have not played the battle of sexes before, there is no
obvious way for the players to coordinate their expectations. However, the
theory of focal points of Schelling (1960) suggests that in some real-life
situations, players may be able to coordinate on a particular equilibrium
using information abstracted away by the strategic form.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, two suspects of a crime are put into se-
parate cells. If both confess (strategy B and R, respectively) each will be
sentenced to 2. If only one of them confesses, he will be freed and used
as a witness against the other person, who will be sentenced to 3 years in
prison. If both do not confess (strategy T and L, respectively), they will
both be punished for a minor offense and spend 1 year in jail. Payoffs are
represented by 3 minus the number of years spent in prison.
I
\
\II L R
T 2 2 0 3
B 3 0 1 1
Figure 1.4: Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Changing the perspective, we define as Prisoner’s Dilemma each sym-
metric binary game with two players such that each player has a dominant
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strategy and the NE is not efficient. From here the interest reserved to Pri-
soner’s Dilemma follows, since a reader might expect an efficient outcome,
on account of rationality assumption of players. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
repetion allows to draw up the paradox. As the game perpetuates, the play-
ers are urged to cooperate (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Kreps et al.
(1982).
Rock Paper Scissors
Rock Paper Scissors, depicted in the Figure 1.5 is a two player game. Each
player has three strategies: rock, paper, and scissors. Rock breaks scissors,
paper folds rock, and scissors cut paper. None of the pure strategy profiles
constitute an equilibrium. The game has a unique symmetric equilibrium
in mixed strategies: player I plays R with probability 13 , S with probability
1
3 , and P with probability
1
3 , and player II the same mixed strategy.
I
\
\II R P S
R 0 0 −1 1 1 −1
P 1 −1 0 0 −1 1
S −1 1 1 −1 0 0
Figure 1.5: Rock Paper Scissors.
RSP is a three player game with no pure strategy equilibria.
1.2 Games in Extensive Form
The extensive form is a fundamental concept in Game Theory. In this work,
the words extensive game will always refer to a finite game in extensive form.
We follow the representation of an extensive game given in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991a), representation equivalent to the classic one given by Kuhn
(1953) and further developed in Selten (1975) and Kreps and Wilson (1982).
The extensive form is a more detailed description of a game. It tells exactly
which players should move, when, what are the choice, the outcomes, the
information of the players at every stage, and so on. The order of moves
(i.e., who moves when) is represented by a game tree ( a non-oriented graph,
connected, and without simple cycles) finite and with root. The probability
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distributions over any exogenous events is represented by moves of Nature,
eventually. In the following Sub-section we transfer, for completeness, the
formal definition, some details of which are not essential for the rest of the
work.
1.2.1 Extensive Game with Perfect Recall
We now formally define a finite game form in extensive form.
Definition 11. (Kuhn (1953)) A finite extensive game form is
Γ = (V,D, r,N,P,U ,M, E, φ, (4k)k∈N ),
where:
1. (V,D, r) is a finite tree4 (V,D) with root r.
V denotes the tree node (or vertex) set, D the tree branch set, Z the
terminal node set, and e X = V \Z the decisional node set.
2. N = {0, 1, . . . , n} is the finite player set. 0 represents Nature. We
assume that the random player can move only in r.
3. P = (Pk)k∈N∗ is a subdivision in disjoint subsets of X, also empty.
Pk are the set of pertinent nodes to player k, that is the nodes in which
k has to move.
4. U = (Uk,j)k∈N∗,j∈Jk is, for each player k, a partition of Pk in a family
of sets Uk,j, Jk is a set of indices.
Uk,j are the nodes pertinent to player k, such that, when the player is
one of them, who is not able to distinguish in which node he is.
5. A is, for k 6= 0, a family of sets Ak,j, one for each of Uk,j.
In correspondence with a node of an information set Uk,j, player k has
to choose an action between those contained in Ak,j.
6. E is the set of possible final outcomes of the game.
7. φ : Z −→ E associates to each terminal node an outcome.
8. (4k)k∈N represents a family of total preorder on E which represent the
preferences for final outcomes of the game.
4A tree is a non oriented, connected graph made of simplex cycles.
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From here onwards, Γ denotes a game form, U(Γ) a partition of X(Γ), i.e.
each terminal node is also an information set, Ai(Γ) the actions available
to player i, A(u) the action available to him in information set u, that is in
A(u) ⊆ Ai, Ui(Γ) the information sets belonging to a player i ∈ N , (Γ, h) a
game in extensive form, and G(Γ) the set of games with game form Γ.
Definition 12. An information set u is a class of pertinence nodes of a
player such that
• all nodes in u have the same number of outgoing branches, and there is
a given one-to-one correspondence between the sets of outgoing branches
of different nodes in u;
• every directed path in the tree from the root to a terminal node can
cross each u at most once.
Grafically the dashed line connects the nodes belonging to the same infor-
mation set.
Definition 13. A game is of perfect information if all the information sets
are singletons.
In a game of perfect information, there are no simultaneous moves, and at
each decision point the player knows which choice has previously been made.
The Figure 1.6 depicts a game with perfect information and a game without
perfect information.
In Figure 1.7 is depicted a game in extensive form where two players
are involved: player I and player II. The game starts at the root of the
tree, depicted in the figure by ◦, where player I has to move. He can choose
between T or B. If player I has choosen T , then player II has to move.
After he has observed the move of his opponent, he can decide to go left L
or right R. If player I has choosen B, the player II has not to move. We
have hung the end results on the endpoints of the tree. The upper number
is the payoff to player I, the lower to player II. So, for example, if player
I chooses B, then player I receives 1 and player II receives 2. The game
is played just once. The game has two NE, (T, L) and (B,R), with payoff
(2, 1) and (1, 2), respectively. The strategy profile (B,R) is NE since, given
the choice of player II, it is optimal for the player I choosing B at the
beginning of the game ( if he chooses T , then, given the choice R of player
II, he gets 0 instead of 1), and, given the choice of player I, it is optimal
for the player II to choose L, since his choice is indifferent to the outcome.
Similarly, the strategy profile (T, L) is a NE.
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Figure 1.6: Games in extensive form with and without perfect information.
Almost all games in economics literature are games of perfect recall.
Definition 14. A game is of perfect recall if no player ever forgets any
information he once knew, and all players know the actions they have chosen
previously.
In the Figure 1.8 the player I moves first, but when he has to move again,
he has forgotten his previous choice. The player is not able to distinguish
between the sequence of action (L, r), (R, l), and (R, r). That is, player I
does not remember whether he has chosen L or R. While, it is reasonable
that he cannot distinguish between r and l since this move is choosen by
player II and is not revealed to player I.
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Figure 1.7: Game in extensive form.
In the Figure 1.9, player I makes his choice knowing the initial node, chosen
by Nature (When a game involves Nature, the exogenous probabilities are
displayed in brackets). If player I chooses d and player II chooses D, player
I has to move again in the information set {x, y}, but he has forgotten the
Natura choice, information he had at his disposal.
1.2.2 Behavior strategy profile
A pure strategy of a player is a complete plan for his choices in all possible
contingencies in the game, that is at all his information sets. A mixed
strategy means that the player chooses, before the beginning of the game,
one such comprehensive plan at random, according to a certain probability
distribution. An alternative method of randomization for the player is to
make an independent random choice at each one of his information sets.
That is, rather than selecting, for each information set, one definitive choice,
as in a pure strategy, he specifies instead a probability distribution over the
set of choices there. Moreover, the choices at different information sets are
(stochastically) independent. These randomization procedures are called
behavior strategies.
Definition 15. A behavioral strategy profile is b = (bi)i∈N , where the be-
havioral strategy bi for the player i ∈ N prescribes, for each information
set u ∈ Ui(Γ), a probability distribution on the actions available to him in
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Figure 1.8: Game of non-perfect recall.
information set u, that is in A(u) ⊆ Ai
bi : Ai −→ [0, 1] s.t.
∑
a∈A(u)
bi(a) = 1, u ∈ Ui
.
We denote B(Γ) =
n∏
i=1
Bi(Γ) the set of behavior strategy profiles of a game G
or a game form Γ, and, with a slight abuse of notation, hi(b) the (expected)
payoff to player i when b ∈ B(Γ) is played.
Definition 16. A behavioral strategy profile b ∈ B(Γ) is completely mixed
if at each information set all the choices are taken with positive probability.
Thus the beliefs associated with a completely mixed strategy profile are
completely determined by Bayes rule (see Section 1.4.3).
1.3 Games in Coalitional Form
For a finite set N of players, we denote its power set, i.e. the collection of
all its subsets, by 2N and its number of elements by |N |. A subset S ⊆ N
is called a coalition.
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Figure 1.9: Game of non-perfect recall.
Definition 17. A cooperative n-person game in coalitional form is an or-
dered pair
〈N, v〉
where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, and v : 2N −→ R is a map,
which assigns to each coalition S ∈ 2N a real number, such that v(∅) = 0.
v is called the characteristic function of the game and v(S) the value or the
worth of coalition S.
A game in coalitional form (or characteristic function) may represent very
different situations, for example it can model a simple voting game where
v associates to a winning coalition the value 1 and to a losing coalition the
value 0, or an economic market that generates a cooperative game.
Example 1. (Glove game) Let N = {1, . . . , n} be divided into two disjunct
subsets L and R. Members of L possess a left hand glove, members of R a
right hand glove. A single glove is worth nothing, a right-left pair of gloves
1. This situation can be modeled by an n-person game 〈N, v〉, where, for
each S ∈ 2N ,
v(S)
.
= min{|L ∩ S|, |R ∩ S|}.
There are two special classes of games:
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• Transferable utility games (TU) (also called Games with Side Pay-
ments). The members of a coalition S can arbitrarily divide among
themselves the amount v(S) which S can get. So a TU-game is of the
form
v(S) = {(xi)i∈S such that
∑
i∈S
xi 6 v(S)}.
• Non-transferable utility games (NTU), the games without transferable
utility.
But these questions are not within our terms of references.
For completeness, we recall the Pure Bargaining games (PB). In these
games only the grand coalition matters. Here, for all S 6= N ,
v(S) = {(xi)i∈S such that xi 6 0 , ∀i ∈ S}.
But these questions are not within our terms of references.
1.3.1 TUIC games
The TUIC games represent a simple model which allows embedding a coo-
perative game of cost allocation in a richer structure, so that it is possible to
take in account that cost information is expensive to get. In this structure,
we can discuss how to balance on one hand the costs imposed by information
requirements, on the other the loss of fairness when one tries to reduce these
costs to the minimum. A TUIC-game is a family of TU -game, indexed by
a parameter t ∈ T , with information costs χt, and ordered by a transitive
and irreflexive relation ≺ on T . In addition to the function ct of TU -game
Gt, there is an extra cost χt bringing the necessary information on the cost
to get ct. For example χt is the additional cost to pass from a model t1 ∈ T
to another t2 ∈ T or to choose the function ct. Moreover t1 ≺ t2 means the
model t2 has more information w.r.t. model t1 and ct2 approaches better
the cost function than ct1 .
Definition 18. A TUIC game is
〈N,T, (ct)t∈T , (χt)t∈T ,≺〉,
where N is a finite set of players, T is a set of parameters (models), whose
elements provide the needed information to have a TU game, ct : P(N) −→
R is a (cost) TU game, χt ∈ [0,+∞) is the cost to get ct, ≺ is a transitive
and irreflexive relation on T .
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1.4 Special classes of equilibria
1.4.1 Non-belief-based equilibria
The classic equilibrium concepts not based on beliefs are the Nash equi-
librium and some of its refinements, such as the subgame perfect equili-
brium (Selten (1965)), the perfect equilibrium (Selten (1975)), the proper
equilibrium (Myerson (1978)), the persistent equilibrium (Kalai and Samet
(1984)), the essential equilibrium (Wu Wen-Tsu¨n and Jiahg Jia-He (1962)),
and the regular equilibrium (Harsanyi (1973)). We have also defined the
NE in Subsection 1.1.3. Here, we introduce only the subgame perfect equi-
librium in Subsubsection 1.4.1 and the perfect equilibrium in Subsubsection
1.4.1, since the others wander off the matter of this thesis.
Selten (1965), in order to discard those NE, possible if some players
give credit to irrational (that is, non-maximizing) plan of the others, intro-
duced the subgame perfect equilibrium, that is a NE which induces a NE
in each subgame. But a subgame perfect equilibrium may also be non sen-
sible, in the sense that it prescribes a choice non-maximizing the expected
payoff. Selten (1975), to eliminate unreasonable subgame perfect equilib-
ria, assumes that there is always a small probability that a player will take
a choice by mistake, with the consequence that every choice will be taken
with a positive probability. Therefore, in an extensive game with mistakes
(a so called perturbed game), every information set will be reached with a
positive probability. Then, an equilibrium of this game will prescribe ratio-
nal behavior at every information set. Assuming that mistakes occur only
with a very small probability leads to define a perfect equilibrium, that is
an equilibrium obtained as a limit point of a sequence of disturbed games in
which the mistake probabilities go to zero. Hence, an equilibrium is perfect
if the equilibrium strategy of each player is not only optimal against the
equilibrium strategies of his opponent, but if it is also optimal against some
slight perturbations of these strategies.
Subgame Perfect Equilibria
The subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten (1965)), or SPE, is the most im-
portant equilibrium concept within the class of extensive games. The sub-
game perfect equilibrium discards those NE which are only possible if some
players give credit to irrational plans of others. That is, a SPE is a Nash
equilibrium which induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
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We consider the game due to Selten (1975) in Figure 1.10. It is an
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Figure 1.10: Selten game.
extensive game with perfect information. In order to identify the Nash
equilibria, it is more convenient to analize the Selten game in strategic form,
see Figure 1.11. The game has two NE (T, L) and (B,R), with payoff (2, 1)
I
\
\II L R
T (2, 1) (0, 0)
B (1, 2) (1, 2)
Figure 1.11: Selten game in strategic form.
and (1, 2), respectively. The equilibrium (B,R) is not self-enforcing, while
(T, L) is enforcing. Let us make ourselves clear. Let suppose the players
have agreed to play (B,R). If player I considers that player II will fulfil the
agreement, then it is optimal for him to play B. But I cannot expect that
II will fulfil the agreement. In fact, if the node x is reached, the strategy L
gives to II a higher payoff than R. So, the II will play L, if he has to move.
Therefore, it is better for player I to play T , and so he will also violate
the agreement. From here, the Nash equilibrium (B,R) is not enforcing.
The equilibrium (B,R) can be interpreted as a threat equilibrium on part
of player II. Player II threats player I that he will punish him by playing
R, if he does not play B ( which gives II the best possible result). This
way, II will punish also himself: the choice R is not optimal for II, which
gets a better payoff playing L. Why does a Nash equilbrium predict for a
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player a sub-optimal choice? The equilibrium (B,R) does not predict that
II plays R, since the choice B concludes the game and II has not to move.
In general, a Nash equilbrium can predict non optimal choices on part of
players in nodes of the tree not reached, if the equibrium profile is played.
Again, the threat is not credible since if I disregards the threat and plays T ,
then II will play L, following his rationality. So, using the extensive form,
we have shown that not all the Nash equilibria are the same. This leads to
the definition of subgame perfect equilibrium or SPE by Selten (1965).
The argument used to exclude the equilibrium (B,R) in the Selten game
in Figure 1.10 generalizes to all games with perfect information. Since in
a non-cooperative game there are no possibilities for commitment, once the
decision point x is reached, the part of the game tree which does not come
after x has become strategically irrelevant and, therefore, the decision at x
should be based only on the part of the tree which comes after x. This implies
that for games with perfect information only those equilibria which can be
found by inductively working backwards in the game tree, are sensible, i.e.
self-enforcing. Using the backward induction principle, we get all the SPE
of an extensive game.
Sequential rationality and subgame-perfectness are backward induction
principles for the analysis of games in extensive form, because they require
that any predictions that can be made about the behavior of players at the
end of a game are supposed to be anticipated by the players earlier in the
game.
Perfect Equilibria
The Perfect Equilibrium or Trembling-Hand Perfect equilibrium is a refine-
ment of Nash equilibrium, introduced in Selten (1975). It is very closely
related to the concept of sequential equilibrium. The basic idea behind the
perfectness concept is that each player makes mistakes with a small pro-
bability, therefore every pure strategy is chosen with a positive (although
possibly small) probability. Mathematically, this idea is modelled via a per-
turbed game, that is a game in which each player is only allowed to use
completely mixed strategies. The distinction with sequential equilibrium is
thus that strategies must be in equilibrium along the converging subsequence
and not only in the limit. In the definition, Selten requires that a strategy
profile b be the limit of a sequence of totally mixed profiles b and that bi
be a best response to the opponents’ perturbed strategies b−i.
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Definition 19. Let G = (Γ, h) be an extensive game. Let ε be a function
ε : Ai −→ (0, 1]
which assigns to every choice a in G a positive number ε(a) such that, for
every information set u ∈ Ui, ∑
a∈A(u)
ε(a) < 1.
The perturbed game Gε ∈ G(Γ) is the extensive game G in which every player
i ∈ N is only allowed to use behavior strategies bi which satisfy
(bi)u > ε(a),
for all u ∈ Ui and a ∈ A(u).
Let Gε be a perturbed game and let Bε be the set of admissible strategy
profiles in Gε. An equilibrium of Gε is an admissible strategy profile b ∈ Bε
which prescribes a best reply at every information set, i.e.
hi(bu) = max
b
′
i∈Bεi
hi(b−i, b
′
i)u,
for each i ∈ N and each u ∈ Ui. An equilibrium of Gε is perfect if it is still
sensible to play this equilibrium if slight mistakes are taken into account.
Definition 20. Let G be a game in extensive form. A behavioral strategy
profile b is a perfect equilibrium of G if
b −→ b, as → 0,
that is, b is a limit point of a sequence of equilibria of perturbed game Gε.
In the game of Figure 1.12, only the equilibrium (R, r) is perfect. In a
perturbed game associated with this game, player I will take the choices M
and R with a positive probability (if only by mistake) and, therefore, the
information set of player II will actually be reached, which forces player II
to play r.
Theorem 1. (Selten (1975)) Every finite game possesses at least one perfect
equilibrium.
Theorem 2. (Kreps and Wilson (1982)) Every perfect equilibrium is se-
quential, but the converse is not true.
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Figure 1.12: G.
To illustrate the difference between the two concepts, let us consider
the game G′, in Figure 1.13, obtained with a slight modification of game G
in Figure 1.12. As before, player II has to play r. For player I, both R
and L are the best replies against r. Therefore, in a sequential equilibrium,
player I can play any combination of R and L. The only perfect equilibrium,
however, is (L, r), since if player I plays L, he is sure of getting 3, whereas
if he plays R, he can expect only slightly less than 3 since player 2 with a
small probability will make a mistake and play l.
1.4.2 Belief-based equilibria
In this subsection, we extend the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium
to extensive game with imperfect information. We focus on the concept
of Sequential Rationality, and some of its refinements, such as Sequential
Equilibrium and Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrim.
We recall that a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of an extensive game with
perfect information is a strategy profile for which the strategy of each player,
given the strategies of the others, is optimal at any contingency in which it
is his turn to take an action, also in tree nodes not reached by game. The
natural extension of this idea to extensive games with imperfect information
leads to the following requirement.
(?) The strategy of each player, given the strategies of the others, is
optimal at each of his information sets (reached or not by the game).
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Figure 1.13: G′.
In the extensive game G with imperfect information in Figure 1.14, the
requirement that each player’s strategy be optimal at every information set
eliminates a NE.
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Figure 1.14: G.
This simple example is due to Selten (1975). In this game player I has
tree strategies: L, M , and R. If he plays L, the game ends with payoff
(2, 2). If plays M or R, then player II must choose between l or r, but
he does not know what action has been choosen by I. If player I chooses
M and player II l, the payoffs are (0, 0), and so on. The game G has
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two NE: (L, r) and (M, l), both of which are subgame perfect. If player I
adheres to equilibrium (L, r), then the information set of player II is not
reached. However, if it is reached (player I chooses M or L), the strategy r
is dominated by strategy l. For any specification of player II’s beliefs about
the probability of M and R when player I deviates and does not play L, the
optimal strategy of player II is to play r. Then (L, r) does not satisfy the
condition of the extension, while the equilibrium (M, l) does. The extensive
game with imperfect information G′ in Figure 1.16 has a NE (L, r) that is
not ruled out by an implementation (?), since optimal strategy of player
II in the event that his information set is reached depends on his beliefs
about the history that has occurred. The strategy r is optimal if II assigns
probability of at most 12 to the history M , while l is optimal if he assigns
probability at most 12 to this history. His belief cannot be derived from the
equilibrium strategy, since (L, r) assigns probability zero to his information
set being reached.
The solution for the extensive games studied in this section consists of
two components: a strategy profile and a belief system.
Definition 21. A system of beliefs µ over X(Γ)\Z(Γ) is a function
µ : X(Γ)\Z(Γ) −→ [0, 1]
such that, for each u ∈ U(Γ), ∑
x∈u
µ(x) = 1.
That is, a belief system consists of a collection of probability measures, one
for each information set of the game.
Definition 22. An assessment in an extensive game is a pair
(b, µ),
where b = (bi)i∈N is a behavioral strategy profile, and µ a system of beliefs .
1.4.3 Bayes Rule
We first recall some concepts of probability. Let Ω be a finite sample space.
We call events the subsets of sample space, that is E,F ⊆ Ω, so the set
of events is the set of the parts 2Ω. If m is the cardinality of Ω, then the
cardinality of 2Ω is 2m.
Unilateral Commitments 23
Definition 23. A probability measure on Ω is a function
P : 2Ω −→ [0, 1],
such that
i)P (∅) = 0, , ii)P (Ω) = 1 , and
iii) for eachE, F ∈ Ω s.t. E ∩ F = ∅ , P (E ∪ F ) = P (E) + P (F ).
Definition 24. The conditioned probability of the event E given the event
F is
P (E|F ) .= P (E ∩ F )
P (F )
.
In plain words, we restrict the sample space to F and then we calculate the
probability of event E.
Since P (F ) ∈ [0, 1],
P (E|F ) > P (E ∩ F ).
Theorem 3. Let E,F be two events. Then,
P (E ∪ F ) + P (E ∩ F ) = P (E) + P (F ).
Theorem 4. Let F1, . . . , Fm be mutually disjoint and complementary events,
that is, Fi∩Fj = ∅ for each i, j = 1, . . . ,m with i 6= j, and F1∪ . . .∪Fm = Ω.
Then, for each event E,
P (E) = P (E|F1)P (F1) + . . . P (E|Fm)P (Fm).
Theorem 5 (Bayes theorem). Let E,F be events, then
P (E|F )P (F ) = P (F |E)P (E).
Corollary 1 (Bayes rule). Let F1, . . . , Fn be mutually exclusive and ex-
austive events and let E be an arbitrary events of sample space such that
P (E) 6= 0, then
P (F1|E) = P (F1)P (E|F1)
P (F1)P (E|F1) + . . .+ P (Fm)P (E|Fm) .
We consider the game in Figure 1.15 and we assume player I chooses T
with probability 13 and B with
2
3 , and player II chooses t with probability
1
4 , and d with
3
4 . During the game, the node x of information set of player
III is reached with probability a priori 23 , while the node y with probability
a priori 14 . A priori 1 − P (Tt) = 1 − 13 14 = 1 − 112 = 1112 is the probability
which III has to move and 112 the probability with which a priori that the
game finishes. Using Bayes rule, the belief of III, when he has to move,
gives to him the probability of (23)/(
11
12) =
8
11 to the possibility of being in
node x and (14)/(
11
12) =
3
11 to the possibility of being in node y.
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Figure 1.15: Bayes rule application.
Sequential Rationality
Definition 25. An assessment (b, µ) is consistent if
(b, µ) = lim
n−→∞(b
n, µn),
that is, it is the limit of a sequence of assessments (bn, µn)n∈N such that each
bn is completely mixed, each µn results from bn using Bayes rule.
The idea for consistent condition is that the probability of the events, con-
ditioned on events with probability zero, approximates probabilities raised
by strategies which assign positive probability to each actions.
Definition 26. An assessment (b, µ) is sequentially rational if, for each
player i ∈ N and each information set u ∈ Ui(Γ) the strategy bi of the
player i who has to move is the best replay, assegned his beliefs and the
strategies of his opponents.
Sequential Equilibrium
Definition 27. An assessment (b, µ) is a sequential equilibrium of a finite
game in extensive form with perfect recall if it is sequentially rational and
consistent.
Let consider the game G in Figure 1.17.
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Figure 1.16: G’.
The assessment (b, µ) where
b = (b1, b2) , b1 = L , b2 = r , µ(x) = α , µ(y) = 1− α , ∀α ∈ (0, 1)
is consistent since
(b, µ) = lim
n−→∞(b
n, µn),
where
bn1 = (1−
1
n
, α
1
n
, (1− α) 1
n
) , bn2 = (
1
n
, 1− 1
n
) , µ(x) = α , µ(y) = 1− α , ∀n.
If α ≥ 12 , then (b, µ) is sequentially rational, since 2α+1(1−α) ≥ α+2(1−α).
So (b, µ) is a sequential equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Each finite extensive game, with perfect recall, has a se-
quential equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If (b, µ) is a sequential equilibrium, then b is a Nash equi-
librium.
Proposition 3. In an extensive game with perfect recall, (b, µ) is a sequen-
tial equilibrium if and only if b is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Definition 28. Let G = (Γ, h) be an extensive game. An assessment (b, µ)
is weakly consistent with Bayes rule if µ is derived using Bayesian updating
in the path of b.
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Definition 29. Let G = (Γ, h) be an extensive game. A Weak Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (or, briefly, WPBE) is an assessment (b, µ) sequen-
tially rational and weakly consistent with Bayes rule.
Unilateral Commitments 27
Ic
L

 M R
HHHHHHHHHHx s
A
A
A
A
A
AU





ys
A
A
A
A
A
AU





l r l r
IIs
2
2
s
3
1
s
0
2
s
0
2
s
1
1
Gand (b, µ)
Ic
1− 1n

 α
1
n (1− α) 1n
HHHHHHHHHHα s
A
A
A
A
A
AU





1− αs
A
A
A
A
A
AU





1
n 1− 1n 1n 1− 1n
IIs
2
2
s
3
1
s
0
2
s
0
2
s
1
1
Gand (bn, µn)
Figure 1.17: The assesment (b, µ) is the limit of the sequence (bn, µn).
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Chapter 2
Potential game
2.1 Introduction
Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduced, for games in strategic form, three
nested classes of potential games: the ordinal potential games, the weighted
potential games, and the exact potential games (or in short potential games).
The basic point of these classes is the existence of a real-valued function P ,
called potential function, on the strategy space, which measures alone the
incentive of each player to deviate from a strategy. In the case of ordinal
potential games, P gives only indications whether the deviation increases
or decreases the payoff, while P for a weighted potential games values the
weighted gap of the deviation, and P for an exact potential game measures
the exact gap of the deviation. In this work, we will mainly deal with last
class, that is with exact potential games (or in short potential games).
The potential function is not only an useful tool to analyze equilibrium
properties of potential games, since the incentives of all players are mapped
into only one function, but also P provides the necessary information for
the determination of the Nash equilibria: a strategy profile is a NE if every
unilateral deviation from it decreases the value of the potential function. We
consider, for example, the Prisoner Dilemma G and the function P depicted
in Figure 2.1. The payoff change of a player, which unilaterally deviates,
exactly matches the change in function P . For example, if player II deviates
from (T, L) to (T,R), his payoff increases by 3−2 = 1 as well as P increases
by 1− 0 = 1. For this reason P is called an exact potential of the game G.
We underline that P is not the unique potential of G. Another potential for
G is P ′, illustrated in Figure 2.2. In fact, the exact potential games enjoy
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Figure 2.1: Game and Potential.
L R
T 2 3
B 3 4
P ′
Figure 2.2: P’.
the property that two potentials are different in a constant. Again, (B,R) is
the NE since every unilateral deviation from this strategy profile decreases
the value of the potential function. Thus, the information concerning pure
NE accrues to a potential function.
Moreover, if strategy spaces are finite, the potential game has at least an
equilibrium in pure strategies. A point of maximum for P , which exists since
the product of finite space strategies is finite, is also a point of equilibrium
for G.
There are various analogies with the physical concept of potential not
only in the term and in the possibility of replacing n payoff functions (a
vector field) with one potential function (a scalar field), but also in the fact
that, if strategy spaces are finite, the “discret” circulation is always zero.
If the strategy spaces are, instead, intervals of real numbers and each pay-
off function is twice continuously differentiable, then the Schwarz theorem
applies to potential P and moreover, P is expressed by the integral of the
partial derivatives of each payoff (see Monderer and Shapley (1996)).
Historically, the first to use potential functions for strategic games was
Rosenthal (1973). Rosenthal introduced the class of congestion games and
proved, by explicitly constructing a potential function, that every congestion
game has a pure Nash equilibrium. A congestion game is a game where
players have to choose their strategy from a finite set of alternatives and
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their payoff depends on the number of players choosing the same alternative.
Moreover, Monderer and Shapley (1996) showed that the class of congestion
games coincides, up to an isomorphism, with the class of finite potential
games.
This Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce po-
tential functions, potential games, and the relative properties. In Section
2.4 we study the characterization of exact potential games by splitting them
into coordination games and dummy games. In Section 2.3, we intorduce
congestion game in order to have the formula of potential function. Finally,
in Section 2.5, we investigate symmetric games and we present our results.
The first result establishes a symmetric game with only two strategies is a
potential game and then it has a pure Nash Equilibrium. The originality lies
in being a potential game, since Cheng and other (2004) has already showed
that a symmetric game with only two strategies has a pure Nash equilibrium.
The second one provides how all the NE of a symmetric, binary game are
deduced from its potential function.
2.2 Potential game and potential function
This section defines ordinal potential game, exact potential games, surveys
some simple results, and provides two characterizations of exact potential
games.
Let G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 be a n-person strategy game.
Definition 30. [Monderer and Shapley (1996)] An ordinal potential for G
is a function P :
n∏
i=1
Xi → R such that, for all i ∈ N , x−i ∈ X−i, and
xi, yi ∈ Xi,
sgn (ui(xi, x−i)− ui(yi, x−i)) = sgn (P (xi, x−i)− P (yi, x−i)) .
sgn(x) denotes the sign of x, namely +1,−1 or 0.
Definition 31. An exact potential (or, briefly, a potential) for G is a func-
tion P :
n∏
i=1
Xi → R such that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, x−i ∈ X−i, and
xi, yi ∈ Xi,
ui(xi, x−i)− ui(yi, x−i) = P (xi, x−i)− P (yi, x−i).
The gap in the payoff for a unilaterally deviating player is exactly equal to
the corresponding gap in the value of P .
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Definition 32. A game admitting an ordinal or an exact potential function
is called an ordinal or an exact potential game respectively (or, briefly, a
potential game).
It is clear that the class of exact potential games is a proper subset of the
class of ordinal potential games.
Again, a function may be a potential function or an ordinal potential one.
For example, P is a potential for the Prisoner’s Dilemma G and at the same
time it is an ordinal potential for the game G′ described in Figure 2.3.
I
\
\II L R
T 2 3
B 3 4
P
I
\
\II L R
T 2 2 0 3
B 3 0 1 1
I
\
\II L R
T 2 2 0 3
B 3 0 1 1
G G′
Figure 2.3: P is a potential for G and an ordinal potential for G′.
The next lemma characterizes the equilibrium set of an ordinal potential
game.
Lemma 1. Let P be an ordinal potential for G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉.
Then the equilibrium set of G coincides with the equilibrium set of the game
〈X1, . . . , Xn, P, . . . , P 〉. That is,
(x1, . . . , xn) is a NE for G⇔ P(xi, x−i) > P(y, x−i) ∀i ∈ N , ∀y ∈ Xi.
Consequently, if P admits a maximal value in
n∏
i=1
Xi, then G has a pure
strategy equilibrium.
Corollary 2. Every finite ordinal potential game G has at least one pure
Nash equilibrium.
Each ordinal potential game has many ordinal potentials, instead all the
exact potentials of the same game differ in a constant.
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Lemma 2. Let P1 and P2 be potentials for the game G. Then there is a
real constant c such that
P1(x1, . . . , xn)− P2(x1, . . . , xn) = c ∀(x1, . . . , xn) ∈
n∏
i=1
Xi.
The following theorem 6 characterizes potential game via a physical ap-
proach, cyclicity on a simple closed path of length 4.
Definition 33. A path in
n∏
i=1
Xi is a sequence of strategy profiles
(xk1, . . . , x
k
n)k∈N,
such that, for every k = 1, 2, . . ., the strategies (xk1, . . . , x
k
n)k and (x
k−1
1 , . . . , x
k−1
n )k,
differ in exactly one, say the ith, coordinate, i.e., there is a unique player
i ∈ N such that
(xki , x
k
−i) = (y, x
k−1
−i ) for some y ∈ Xi \ {xki }.
(x01, . . . , x
0
n) is called the initial point of path, and, if the sequence is finite,
its last element (xl1, . . . , x
l
n) is called the terminal point of path, and the path
is called finite.
Definition 34. A finite path is closed if (x01, . . . , x
0
n) = (x
l
1, . . . , x
l
n).
Definition 35. A closed path is simple if, in addition, (xj1, . . . , x
j
n) 6=
(xk1, . . . , x
k
n), for every 0 ≤ j 6= k ≤ l − 1, that is, the strategy profiles
are all distinct.
Definition 36. The length of a simple closed path is the number of distinct
vertices in it.
That is, the length of the simple closed path (xk1, . . . , x
k
n)
l
k=1 is l.
Definition 37. Let G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 be a game and pi = (xk1, . . . , xkn)k∈N
be a finite path. We set
I(pi, u1, . . . , un)
.
=
∑
k∈N
uik(x
k
1, . . . , x
k
n)− uik(xk−11 , . . . , xk−1n ),
where ik is the unique deviator at step k, that is x
k
ik
6= xk−1ik .
Theorem 6. Let G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 be a strategic game. Then,
the following claims are equivalent:
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i) G is a potential game.
ii) I(pi, u1, . . . , un) = 0, for every finite closed path pi.
iii) I(pi, u1, . . . , un) = 0, for every finite simple closed path pi.
iv) I(pi, u1, . . . , un) = 0, for every finite simple closed path piof length 4.
Corollary 3. G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 is a potential game if and only
if
ui(xi, xj , x−{i,j})− ui(yi, xj , x−{i,j}) + uj(yi, xj , x−{i,j})+
−uj(yi, yj , x−{i,j}) + ui(yi, yj , x−{i,j})− ui(xi, yj , x−{i,j})+
+uj(xi, yj , x−{i,j})− uj(xi, xj , x−{i,j}) = 0,
where i, j are the active players, x−{i,j} ∈ X−{i,j} is a fixed strategy profile
of the other players, xi, yj ∈ Xi and xj , yj ∈ Xj.
A typical simple closed path of length 4 is described in Figure 2.4.
uA u D
uB u C
ﬀ
-
?
6
Figure 2.4: Simple closed path of length 4.
2.3 Congestion games
In this section we present the congestion mode, since we may extract the
expression of potential from the construction (Rosenthal (1973)) of an exact
potential function for a congestion game.
In a congestion model, players use a set of facilities (also called ma-
chines) from a common group. The costs or the benefits of a player, derived
from the use of a facility, depend only on the number of players choosing
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the same facility. The payoff to a player is the sum of the costs or ben-
efits associated with each facility in his strategy choice, given the choice
of the other players. By constructing a potential function for such conges-
tion game, Rosenthal proved the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Moreover, Monderer and Shapley (1996) showed every finite potential games
is isomorphic to a congestion game.
Before formalizing the definitions, we introduce a very simple example
where two players I and II are involved.
uA u B
uD u C
-
c1(1) c1(2)
-
c4(1) c4(2)
?c3(1)
c3(2)
?c2(1)
c2(2)
Player I has to go from point A to point C and player II has to go from
point B to point D. Player I can travel via B or via D and player II via
A or via C. The cost of using a segment depends on the number of users.
We call 1 the segment AB, 2 the segment BC, 3 the segment AD and 4 the
segment DC, cj(1) denotes the cost of segment j for a single user, and cj(2)
the cost of j for each users if both use segment j, where j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. The
associated congestion game is given by
I
\
\II L R
T (c1(2) + c2(1)) (c1(2) + c3(1)) (c2(2) + c1(1)) (c2(2) + c4(1))
B (c3(2) + c4(1)) (c3(2) + c1(1)) (c4(2) + c3(1)) (c4(2) + c2(1))
It is straightforward to see that this symmetric game is a potential game
and so it has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. A potential is given by:
I
\
\II L R
T c1(1) + c1(2) + c2(1) + c3(1) c2(1) + c2(2) + c1(1) + c4(1)
B c3(1) + c3(2) + c4(1) + c4(1) c4(1) + c4(2) + c3(1) + c2(1)
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Definition 38. A congestion model is described as a 4-tuple
〈N,F, (Xi)i∈N , (cf )f∈F 〉
where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, F is the set of facilities
{1, 2, . . . , f} involved, Xi ∈ P(F ) is the set of pure strategies of player i,
Xi 6= ∅, cf : N → R is the cost function of facility f so defined: for each
k ∈ N , cf (k) denotes the costs to each user of facility f with precisely k
users.
Definition 39. The congestion game corresponding to the congestion model
is the cost game in strategic form 〈X1, . . . , Xn, C1, . . . , Cn〉 where the cost
for player i is
Ci(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
f∈xi
cf (|{r ∈ N s.t. f ∈ xr}|).
The following theorem is the main result of Rosenthal (1973).
Theorem 7. (Rosenthal (1973)) Every congestion game is a potential game.
The potential function P :
∏
i∈N
Xi −→ R is defined by
P (x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
i∈N
(
∑
f∈xi
cf (|{r ∈ N s.t. f ∈ xr}|).
Monderer and Shapley (1996) showed that the class of finite potential games
coincides, up to an isomorphism, with the class of congestion games.
Definition 40. Let G1 = 〈(Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 and G2 = 〈(Yi)i∈N , (vi)i∈N 〉 be
two game with the same set of players N . G1 and G2 are isomophic if there
exist bijections φi : Xi −→ Yi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that for every i ∈ N and
for every (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
∏
i∈N
Xi,
ui(x1, . . . , xn) = vi(φ1(x1), . . . , φN (xn)).
Proposition 4. (Monderer and Shapley (1996)) Every finite potential game
is isomorphic to a congestion game.
2.4 Decomposition of exact potential games
We conclude the treatment of (exact) potential games with a characteriza-
tion of such games.
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Figure 2.5: PD is sum of coordination game and dummy game.
We can decompose the Prisoner’s Dilemma in Figure 1.4 into the sum
of two games showed in Figure 2.5. It is immediate to see that, in the
first game, the players have the same payoffs, while, in the second game,
the payoffs of a player depend not on his choice, but on the strategy of his
opponent. Formally, we present the following definitions.
Definition 41. A game G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 is a coordination
game if there is a function u :
∏
i∈N
Xi −→ R such that ui = u for each
i ∈ N .
In a coordination game, players pursue the same goal, reflected by the iden-
tical payoff functions. It is a game of pure externality, in the sense that the
strategy chosen by a player has effect only on the contestant.
Definition 42. A game G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 is a dummy game if,
for each i ∈ N and for each x−i ∈ X−i, there is k ∈ R such that ui(xi, x−i) =
k for each xi ∈ X−i.
In a dummy game, each player has no reason to choose a strategy instead
of another, since his payoff does not depend on his own strategy.
Facchini et al. (1997) provide this characterization of exact potential
games by splitting them into coordination games and dummy games.
Theorem 8. Let G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 be a strategic game. G is
a potential game if and only if, for each i = 1, . . . , n, there exist functions
ci :
∏
i∈N
Xi −→ R and di :
∏
i∈N
Xi −→ R such that
i) ui = ci + di, for each i = 1, . . . , n,
ii) 〈X1, . . . , Xn, c1, . . . , cn〉 is a coordination game, and
iii) 〈X1, . . . , Xn, d1, . . . , dn〉 is a dummy game.
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Proof. The part ’if’ is obvious. The payoff function of the coordination game
is an exact potential function of G. Let us consider the assertion ’only if’.
Let P be an exact potential for G. For all i ∈ N , we have ui = P +(ui−P ).
Clearly, 〈X1, . . . , Xn, P, . . . , P 〉 is a coordination game. Let i ∈ N , x−i ∈
X−i, and xi, yi ∈ Xi. Then ui(xi, x−i)−ui(yi, x−i) = P (xi, x−i)−P (yi, x−i)
implies ui(xi, x−i) − P (xi, x−i) = ui(yi, x−i) − P (yi, x−i). Consequently,
〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1 − P, . . . , un − P 〉 is a dummy game.
2.5 Symmetric Game
Let G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 be a game in strategic form with player
set N = {1, . . . , n}. For convenience, in this section we use the notation
(x, y, x−{i,j}) ∈ Xi ×Xj ×X−{i,j},
where i, j ∈ N are the active players, x ∈ Xi is the strategy of player i,
y ∈ Xj is the strategy of player j, and x−{i,j} ∈ X−{i,j} is a fixed strategy
profile of the other players.
Definition 43. G is a symmetric game if X1 = X2 = . . . = Xn and
ui(x, y, x−{i,j}) = uj(y, x, x−{i,j}),
for x, y ∈ X1 and x−{i,j} ∈ X−{i,j}, ∀i, j ∈ N .
Definition 44. A symmetric strategy profile is a profile with all players
playing the same strategy. If such a profile is a Nash equilibrium, it is a
symmetric equilibrium.
Theorem 9. A symmetric binary game is a potential game.
Proof. For Corollary 3, the existence of an exact potential P is equivalent
to the following condition:
ui(xi, xj , x−{i,j})− ui(yi, xj , x−{i,j}) + uj(yi, xj , x−{i,j})+
−uj(yi, yj , x−{i,j}) + ui(yi, yj , x−{i,j})− ui(xi, yj , x−{i,j})+
+uj(xi, yj , x−{i,j})− uj(xi, xj , x−{i,j}) = 0
Using symmetry,
ui(x, y, x−{i,j}) = uj(y, x, x−{i,j}) ∀i, j ∈ N,
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we get:
ui(x, x, x−{i,j})− ui(y, x, x−{i,j}) + uj(y, x, x−{i,j})− uj(y, y, x−{i,j})+
+ui(y, y, x−{i,j})− ui(x, y, x−{i,j}) + uj(x, y, x−{i,j})− uj(x, x, x−{i,j}) =
= ui(x, x, x−{i,j})− ui(y, x, x−{i,j}) + ui(x, y, x−{i,j})− ui(y, y, x−{i,j})+
+ui(y, y, x−{i,j}) − ui(x, y, x−{i,j}) + ui(y, x, x−{i,j}) − ui(x, x, x−{i,j}) = 0.
The conditions of theorem 9 are sufficient to guarantee the existence of
pure equilibria. In fact, Rock-Paper-Scissors, described in 1.1.4, is a 3-player
symmetric game with no pure strategy equilibria and Matching Pennies,
described in 1.1.4, is a 2-player asymmetric game with no pure strategy
equilibria.
Given a symmetric environment, we would expect symmetric equilibria,
but the conditions of Theorem 9 alone are not sufficient to ensure symmetric
profiles. In fact, the Anti-coordination game 1 is a symmetric game with no
symmetric pure equilibria.
Cheng et al.(2004) prove the existence of symmetric equilibria for in-
finite symmetric games. The sufficient conditions are the following. The
strategy set Xi of each player i is a nonempty, convex, compact subset of an
Euclidean space, for example R, and his payoff function is continuous in all
its arguments and strictly quasi-concave in xi ∈ Xi. The statement with its
proof are quoted in Chapter 4 (Corollary 4). We remind that Nash (1951)
proved the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Every finite game has a “ symmetric” equilibrium.
Nash define as “ symmetric” the profile invariant under every automorphism
of the game. This is equivalent to a profile in which all the symmetric players
(if any) are playing the same mixed strategies. In the case of a symmetric
game this notion coincides with our definition, as Cheng et al.(2004) have
already remarked. Then, we conclude saying that a finite symmetric game
has a symmetric mixed-strategies equilibrium.
Now, we are going to deduce from potential function all the NE of a
game. Let
G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉
be a symmetric binary game, with X1 = {0, 1}. Given (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
∏
i∈N
Xi,
let ν be the number of players voting 1, formally
ν
.
= |{i ∈ N : xi = 1}|.
1Each player receives 1 when the players choose different strategies and 0 otherwise.
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Let c1(k) denote the payoff/cost to a player voting 1 when exactly k players
vote 1, and let c0(k) denote the payoff/cost to a player voting 0 when exactly
k players vote 0. Since players are identical and the game is binary, the
payoff/cost to be paid depends only on the number ν of players voting 1 and
not on their identities. So we identify a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn) with ν
The potential function for a symmetric binary game P = P (x1, . . . , xn) is a
discrete function of variable ν:
P [ν] =
ν∑
k=1
c1(k) +
n−ν∑
k=1
c0(k).
This expression is derived from congestion cost, since a symmetric binary
game G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 is a congestion game whose facilities set
is exactly the strategy set X1 = . . . = Xn.
Let G be a potential game and let P be a its potential. The set of all
strategy profiles that maximize P is a subset of the equilibria set of the
game G. The following theorem characterizes the NE of a symmetric binary
game, searching the local optima of P .
Theorem 11. Let G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 be a symmetric binary game
with potential function P = P [ν]. Then (x1, . . . , xn) is a NE of G if and
only if the corresponding ν is such that
P [ν] > P [ν + 1] and P [ν] > P [ν − 1] if 1 6 ν 6 n, or
P [ν] > P [ν + 1] if ν = 0, or
P [ν] > P [ν − 1] if ν = n.
Proof. By Definition 10 (x1, . . . , xn) is a NE of G if for each i ∈ N and
for each yi ∈ Xi we have ui(xi, x−i) > ui(yi, x−i). Since G is a potential
game, then (x1, . . . , xn) is a NE if for each i ∈ N and for each yi ∈ Xi
we have P (xi, x−i) > P (yi, x−i). By symmetry of G, P is function of the
number of players choosing the same strategies and X1 = . . . = Xn. But G
is also binary, then X1 = {0, 1}, P is function only of the discrete variable
ν (which represents the number of players choosing the strategy 1), and the
only unilaterally deviations happen when ν increases by one and decreases
by one. From this, the claim follows.
Chapter 3
Naming Games
3.1 Introduction
Inspiration for this chapter came from the TUIC games. This extension of
the standard definition of TU game was given in Moretti-Patrone (2004),
as a way to take into account the costs incurred when one needs to obtain
the values of the various v(S) (or c(S), for a cost game). In that paper,
particular emphasis was given to a special case, that of shared facilities,
which we shall re-analize in this chapter.
Consider, for example, the problem of sharing the cost of printers, copiers,
faxes among the members of a Department. An easy way to divide costs is
to divide them evenly among all the Department members. But this way
violates fairness, and, at the same time, seems to lack good incentive pro-
perties. It would be reasonable to take into account whether a member uses
or not a given facility (e.g. a printer), and also some measure of intensity
of its use. Here we shall concentrate on the case in which the ’fixed costs’
of a facility are the only ones significant, that is we neglect the intensity of
use. In such a case, a natural approach could be that of dividing the cost of
a facility among the users (Young 1994).
Even if it is common knowledge who the users are, to be able to enforce
the payment one perhaps needs to have a way to make verifiable to a third
part who the users are (possible solutions could be: locked rooms, cards, or
some ad hoc software to detect the users of a given facility): so, to make it
verifiable an additional cost is to be added. If a group of people finds that
the costs generated by these operations are less than the imputed costs for
the use of facilities that they do not use, then they will have an incentive to
41
42 Unilateral Commitments
ask that costs are made verifiable. The question is whether and how a fair
allocation can be achieved. A relevant aspect is the institutional setting,
that is the way in which players reach such a decision.
A rule could be that if there is someone who asks for the verification,
then it must be done, and these additional costs will be imputed to the set
of people that ask for the verification. These costs will be divided evenly,
while costs for the use of facilities, will be divided among the users (evenly).
This rule allows us to consider a non cooperative game in strategic form,
in which each player has just two alternatives, to ask/not to ask that the
verification is made. It turns out that, by deleting dominated strategies, the
game can be reduced to one with a potential, which guarantees that it has
a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (this result can be achieved also by
exploiting the symmetry structure of the game). Notice that this procedure
could be applied to more than one facility. It is fairly obvious that, in such
a case, the problem simply amounts to treating each facility independently.
Another rule that we shall investigate is the decision by voting (in par-
ticular, the absolute majority rule will be considered). In such a case, it
becomes relevant whether there will be a set of independent votations (one
for each facility) or a unique one. In the latter case, linkage effects can be
obviously present.
If we introduce the possibility of abstention from voting, the effect con-
sists in increasing the number of equilibria. That is, by adding a third
strategy to the binary game, the new game has the same outcomes as the
original one.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce the
notations and assumptions. In Section 3.3 we present the first model, the
naming game, in which each player names the machine for which he asks for
verification. We examine first the case with only one machine (Subsection
3.3.2) and then with different ones (Subsection 3.3.3). Since a symmetric
game with only two strategies is a potential game and then it has a pure
Nash Equilibrium, we can model a special case of environmental game via
naming game, that is via a potential or congestion game, a result processed
in Section 3.6, whose proofs are in Section 3.9. In Section 3.4 we investigate
the correlated equilibria and games with contracts applied to the model of
Naming game with one facility. In Section 3.5 we analyze the printer game
on the condition of a majority decision with only one facility (Subsection
3.5.1) or with more machines (Subsection 3.5.2). In Section 3.7 we intro-
duce the possibility of abstention from voting. In Section 3.8 we present
the obtained results in this Chapter.
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3.2 Notations and Assumptions
We shall assume that there is a finite set of players or agents
A = {1, . . . , a},
which can use a set of facilities (or cost components)
M = {1, . . . ,m}.
Let
Mi ⊆M , with mi = |Mi|,
be the set of the machines not used by player i ∈ A while, dually, let
N j ⊆ A , with nj = |Nj|,
be the set of the players not using the facility j ∈M . Assuming that N j 6= A
it is non restrictive. Then,
N
.
=
⋂
j∈M
N j , with n = |N|,
is the set of non users, and
U
.
= A \N , with u = |U|,
the set of machine users. Lastly, let
cj > 0
be the cost associated to j ∈M : we shall assume that this cost is given and
independent of the (non empty) set of players using the facility j and that,
to make the set of users for a game facility verifiable an additional cost
χj > 0
is needed. When we look at only one machine, we will call the facility m,
the machine cost c and the “checking” cost χ.
We shall use the index to indicate sets or objects linked with a specific
player and the apex to indicate those with a specific machine.
The situation as described leads in a natural way to a TUIC game
(Moretti and Patrone, (2004)). In our case, N is A, T is P(M) and ≺ is the
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relation of strict inclusion in P(M). The characteristic function associated
with the parameter t ∈ T is
ct : P(A) −→ R,
with
ct(S) =
∑
j∈t|S∩(A\Nj) 6=∅
Cj +
∑
j 6∈t
Cj
and with
χt =
∑
j∈t
χj .
3.3 Naming Games
3.3.1 An example
We begin introducing a very simple example, to show the kind of issues we
shall consider. “To name” here means asking for checking.
We have three players I, II, III and one facility m, used only by player
III. The associated strategic (cost) game is G = 〈X1, X2, X3, C1, C2, C3〉,
where Xi = {0, 1} is the strategy set for player i (1 stands for naming, 0
for not), in Figure 3.1 below:
I
\
\II 0 1
0 c3
c
3
c
3 0 χ c
1 χ 0 c χ2
χ
2 c
I
\
\II 0 1
0 0 0 χ+ c 0 χ2 c+
χ
2
1 χ2 0
χ
2 + c
χ
3
χ
3
χ
3 + c
0 1
III
Figure 3.1: Cost game G = 〈X1, X2, X3, C1, C2, C3〉.
Since player III has a strongly dominated strategy, we work with the
reduced game G = 〈X1, X2, C1, C2〉 with cost matrix:
Let us consider the function P : X1 × X2 → R given by: It follows that
P (0, x−i)− P (1, x−i) = Ci(0, x−i)−Ci(1, x−i) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, i.e., the function
P measures the gap of game costs of an unilaterally deviating player. So
this symmetric game is a (cost) potential game, and it has two pure Nash
equilibria (0, 1) and (1, 0), obtained by minimizing the function P . Since it
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I
\
\II 0 1
0 c3
c
3 0 χ
1 χ 0 χ2
χ
2
Figure 3.2: Reduced game G = 〈X1, X2, C1, C2〉.
I
\
\II 0 1
0 c3 χ
1 χ 32χ
Figure 3.3: Potential P .
has a potential, the game can be interpreted as a congestion game 1, with
two roads from A to B, which we shall identify as no check and check.
0 c/3
no checkuA u B
check
χ χ/2
The cost for using the road no check is 0 if one player uses it and c3 if both
players use it; the cost of using the road check is χ if one player asks for
checking and χ2 if both ask.
All of these results generalize to the case of any number of players and
facilities. This will be the subject of the following subsections. Hereafter,
given a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn), in our model ν will always denote the
number of players asking for check.
1Given a finite set of facilities, whose costs depend on the number of users, a congestion
game (Rosenthal (1973) or Monderer and Shapley (1996) or Voorneveld (1999)) is a cost
game where each player pays the cost of all facilities he uses. Every congestion game is a
potential game and every finite potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
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3.3.2 The one facility case
We can now formalize the case with one facility. Let G = 〈(Xi)i∈A, (Ci)i∈A〉
be the elementary game, that is the game with only one machine, where
Xi = {0, 1} is the strategy set for player i and Ci :
∏
i∈A
Xi → R is the cost
for player i.
The strategy check of all users i ∈ A\N is strongly dominated by
the strategy no check, since Ci(1, x−i) = ca−n +
χ
ν > Ci(0, x−i), where
Ci(0, x−i) = ca if x−i = (0, . . . , 0) and Ci(0, x−i) =
c
a−n otherwise. Af-
ter removing strongly dominated strategies, we get the reduced game G =
〈(Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N 〉. It is a symmetric binary game, so, from Theorem 9, it is
a potential game and, for Corollary 2, it has at least a pure Nash equilibrium.
The potential function is P :
∏
i∈N
Xi → R, given by
P (x1, . . . , xn) = P [ν] =
{
c
a if ν = 0
χ+ χ2 + . . .
χ
ν otherwise.
In particular we have the following results.
Theorem 12. Let G = 〈(Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N 〉 be the game reduced from ele-
mentary game G.
i. If χ < ca , then G has n pure NE, with ν = 1.
ii. If χ > ca , then G has only one pure NE, with ν = 0.
iii. If χ = ca , then G has n+ 1 pure NE, with ν = 0 and ν = 1.
Proof. For 1 < ν 6 n, we have χ <
ν∑
k=1
χ
k . Then the discrete variable func-
tion P is a strictly increasing function when ν > 1and the strategy profiles
corresponding to ν with ν > 1 are not NE. So we search the equilibrium
profiles between ν = 0 and ν = 1.
If χ < ca , the NE are (x1, . . . , xn) corresponding to ν = 1. The symmetry
assumption implies that there is not a single NE in the game, but n, i.e. the
number of players of the reduced game.
If χ > ca , the only NE is (0, . . . , 0), that is ν = 0.
If χ = ca , the NE are (x1, . . . , xn) corresponding to ν = 0 and ν = 1.
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3.3.3 The general case
We can generalize to the case of m machines. We will show that a game with
m facilities is the sum of m elementary potential games, so it is a potential
game itself. Furthermore, the potential function is the sum of elementary
potential functions.
Let Gj = 〈(Xji )i∈A, (Cji )i∈A〉 be the elementary game of machine j ∈M ,
where A is the set of players, Xji = {0, 1} is the strategy set for player i ∈ A
w.r.t. machine j ∈M and
Cji :
∏
i∈A
Xji → R
is the cost for player i ∈ A w.r.t. machine j ∈M .
Let G = 〈(Xi)i∈A, (Ci)i∈A〉 be the global game, where A is the set of
players, Xi =
∏
j∈M
Xji is the strategy set for player i ∈ A and
Ci :
∏
i∈A
∏
j∈M
Xji → R
is the cost for player i ∈ A so defined
Ci((x
1
1, . . . , x
m
1 ), (x
1
2, . . . , x
m
2 ), . . . , (x
1
a, . . . , x
m
a ))
.
=
C1i (x
1
1, x
1
2, . . . , x
1
a) + C
2
i (x
2
1, x
2
2, . . . , x
2
a) + . . .+ C
m
i (x
m
1 , x
m
2 , . . . , x
m
a ).
We shall briefly refer to this fact saying (somehow improperly) that G =
G1 + . . .+Gm. So, we focus the attention on one machine j and we look at
the elementary game Gj . We eliminate the strongly dominated strategies
and work on G
j
= 〈(Xji )i∈Nj , (Cji )i∈Nj 〉, a game reduced to players in N j .
Since the reduced game is a symmetric binary game, for theorem 9 it has
potential P j . So the overall game G 2 - sum of games G
j
- has potential P
- sum of potential P j of games G
j
. Then the game G has at least one pure
Nash equilibrium. We formulate the following general result.
Proposition 5. Let Γ = Γ1 + . . . + Γm be a game defined for players in
m⋃
j=1
N j with m facilities such that each game Γj = 〈(Xji )i∈Nj , (uji )i∈Nj 〉 is a
2 The player set of game G is
m⋃
j=1
N j . Some players of G
j
can use facility k, that is
N j 6= Nk with j, k ∈M . So, in the game G, the strategy of player i /∈ Nk is xki = 0, being
i a user of facility k.
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potential game with potential P j :
∏
i∈Nj
Xji → R, ∀j = 1, . . . ,m. Then the
function
P :
∏
i∈
m⋃
j=1
Nj
∏
j∈Mi
Xji → R
so defined
P ((xji )j∈Mi)
i∈
m⋃
j=1
Nj
.
=
∑
j∈
m⋃
i=1
Mi
P j((xji )i∈Nj )
is a potential of Γ.
Proof. For each i ∈
m⋃
j=1
N j , each x−i = (x
j
−i)j∈Mi ∈
∏
k∈
a⋃
j=1
Nj ,k 6=i
∏
j∈Mk
Xjk,
and all xi = (x
j
i )j∈Mi , yi = (y
j
i )j∈Mi ∈
∏
j∈Mi
Xji , we have
P (x−i, yi)− P (x−i, xi) = P ((xj−i, yji )j∈Mi)− P ((xj−i, xji )j∈Mi) =
=
m∑
j=1
P j(xj−i, y
j
i )−
m∑
j=1
P j(xj−i, x
j
i ) =
m∑
j=1
uji (x
j
−i, y
j
i )−
m∑
j=1
uji (x
j
−i, x
j
i ) =
= ui((x
j
−i, y
j
i )j∈Mi)− ui((xj−i, xji )j∈Mi) = u(x−i, yi)− u(x−i, xi).
We apply the previous result to the sum of reduced gamesG =
∑
j∈
a⋃
j=1
Mi
G
j
with elementary potential P j :
∏
i∈Nj
Xji → R, ∀j = 1, . . . ,m. Then the func-
tion P :
∏
i∈
m⋃
j=1
Nj
∏
j∈Mi
Xji → R is a potential of G.
3.4 Cutting down on paying or paying fairly
Here we make some comments on the reduced naming game G with one
facility. First, we search for lower costs and then how to remove the problem
of many equilibria.
If χ > ca the strategy 1 for each player i ∈ N is strongly dominated.
Eliminating it, the game becomes trivial and we cannot improve the outcome
cost.
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If χ < ca we have found n non symmetric pure NE, but a special case of
Nash’s theorem 3 ensures the existence of at least a symmetric mixed NE.
The reduced game of the example of the Subsection 3.3.1 for χ < c3 has, in
addition to the two pure equilibria, a mixed NE consisting, for each player,
in playing 0 with probability χ2 /(
c
3 − χ2 ) and with payoff χ2 c3/( c3 − χ2 ).
Is it possible to find a solution yielding better outcomes without having
to turn to binding agreements? The correlated equilibria (Aumann (1974))
add nothing from a cost point of view. In the example of the Subsection
3.3.1 the expected payoff is (χ2 ,
χ
2 ) playing correlated equilibria µ, where µ
allocates probability (0, α, α, 1 − 2α) with 0 6 α 6 1, to the strategy pairs
((0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)). The correlated equilibrium is more efficient than
a mixed equilibrium, since χ2 <
χ
2
c
3/(
c
3 − χ2 ), even if it induces the same
payoff as the one when players vote unanimously for check.
How do we solve the problem of more equilibria? Moreover the ex-
post situation is unworthy, while the ex-ante phase was fair. Any NE is a
priori fair, but in our example only one player in equilibrium behaves as the
scapegoat of the situation, taking all the checking costs upon himself. The
situation is better understood with more players. If all the non-users are
ex-ante identical, who sacrifices oneself ex-post? How to remedy to social
injustice? We examine two possible ways which provide no new insight but
at the same time orient towards the outcome of the great coalition of a
cooperative game.
A possible solution to reduce coordination problems is to play on the
symmetry of the problem and to force all the players to choose the same
strategy. The equilibrium profile is realized by total coordination of players.
We can still resort to correlated equilibrium or to games with contracts
(Myerson (1991)). The game G¯ assumes the form:
I
\
\II 0 1 c
0 c3
c
3 0 χ
c
3
c
3
1 χ 0 χ2
χ
2 χ 0
c c3
c
3 0 χ
χ
2
χ
2
where c is the contract-signing strategy for each player 4. The tran-
3Every finite symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium, in the sense that all
the players are playing the same mixed strategy. (Nash (1951))
4If this contract is signed by both players, they promise to choose 1 and the payoff is
χ
2
for both undersigned, while if it is signed by only one player, then he will choose 0.
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sformed game has, in addition, the equilibrium (c, c), with cost allocation
(χ2 ,
χ
2 ).
Another proposal is in the direction of a partial cooperative agreement
(Mallozzi and Tijs (2006)). Let G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 be a game,
with the same strategy set X1 = . . . = Xn for each player in N = {1, . . . , n}.
We suppose that a group {k + 1, . . . , n} of players participate in an agree-
ment, the remaining players acting, as singletons, in a non-cooperative way.
k is the level of non cooperation. The game is a two-stage game: first signa-
tories announce their joint strategy, then non-signatories react by playing a
non-cooperative game.
Definition 45. [Mallozzi and Tijs (2006)] Given k, a partial cooperative
equilibrium is a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
∏
i∈N
Xi, such that the signato-
ries {k+ 1, . . . , n} choose the same strategy xk+1 = . . . xn = y ∈ X1 and the
non signatories {1, . . . , k} play a NE of the partial game
〈X1, . . . , Xk, {y}, . . . , {y}, u1, . . . , un〉.
We apply this concept to a naming game with one facility. The coopera-
tive players choose 1 and we can read ν = n− k as the level of cooperation.
Since our game is binary, each partial game, fixed ν, has trivially a unique
NE, so the partial cooperative equilibrium is assured. Comparing the cost
of a single signatory player, we choose the more opportune ν. The result is
again the total cooperation. Once more we have interiorized the external-
ities: each player incurs expenses from which he will benefit like the other
players.
We remark, lastly, that, in order to induce the cooperative solution, we
can also impose an efficient disciplinary system, which is extern to the parts
involved in the cooperation.
3.5 The Decision by Majority Rule: Voting Game
Now we set another rule depending on which group of players is able to get
their decision implemented. Checking is made if the minimum number of
votes, called quorum q, is reached. This is what usually happens in several
decision-making situations. We re-analyze our model on the condition of
a majority decision. There are two types of NE, the indifferent NE and
the allure NE. We define indifferent a NE if the payoff/cost to unilaterally
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deviating player is invariant, and allure a NE if it appreciably changes. The
latter equilibrium is more interesting than the former.
At first we will work with only one machine to simplify matters and
afterwards we will examine the cases with more facilities. In Voting Game
with one facility two cases occur. Let n be the number of non users. i) If
n 6 q, there are only indifferent NE, since, not executing the checking, all
players pay ca . The equilibria are obtained when ν players ask for check with
0 6 ν < q − 1 or when ν = q users do not ask. ii) If n > q, in addition to
indifferent NE there are allure NE when exactly q non users ask for check.
We will study the latter case, because it is more interesting.
Since in the naming game only one vote was sufficient to make the check,
the naming model can be read as a majority decision model with q = 1.
3.5.1 The one facility case
LetG = 〈(Xi)i∈A, (Ci)i∈A〉 be the elementary game as described in 3.3.2 with
quorum q. The strategy check for all users i ∈ A\N is strictly dominated by
strategy no check. In fact, for 0 < ν < q, Ci(1, x−i) = ca = Ci(0, x−i) and,
for q 6 ν 6 a, Ci(1, x−i) = χν +
c
a−n >
c
a−n = Ci(0, x−i). Removing strictly
dominated strategies, the reduced game G = 〈(Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N 〉 is a binary
symmetric game and, for theorem 9, it is a potential game with potential
P (x1, . . . , xn) = P [ν] =
{
c
a for 0 6 ν 6 q − 1
χ
q + . . .+
χ
ν for q 6 ν 6 n.
We have the following result.
Theorem 13. Let G = 〈(Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N 〉 be the game reduced from the
elementary game G.
i. If χq >
c
a , then G has only indifferent NE, for 0 6 ν 6 q − 1.
ii. If χq <
c
a , then G has both indifferent NE, for 0 6 ν < q−1, and allure
NE for ν = q.
iii. If χq =
c
a , then G has both indifferent NE, for 0 6 ν 6 q − 1. and
allure NE, for ν = q.
The number of NE is
q−1∑
ν=0
(
n
ν
)
in case (i),
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q−2∑
ν=0
(
n
ν
)
+
(
n
q
)
in case (ii), and
q∑
ν=0
(
n
ν
)
in case (iii).
Proof. The potential P = P [ν] is a discrete variable function, constant for
ν ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}, and strictly increasing for ν ∈ {q, . . . , n}. Then, each
ν ∈ {0, . . . , q − 2} corresponds to indifferent NE. For ν ∈ {q, . . . , n}, P is
strictly increasing, then the strategy profiles corresponding to ν > q are not
NE. So we compare v = q − 1 and ν = q.
If P [q − 1] = ca < P [q] = χq , then q − 1 corresponds to indifferent NE.
If P [q − 1] = ca > P [q] = χq , then q corresponds to allure NE.
If P [q − 1] = ca = P [q] = χq , then v = q − 1 and ν = q correspond to
indifferent NE.
A simple numerical example can help understanding the above analysis.
Let us suppose to have seven players, only one user of one facility, and q = 4.
The actions of players in N and their costs are summarized in the following
table.
ν action individual cost NE
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c7
c
7
c
7
c
7
c
7
c
7 indifferent
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 c7
c
7
c
7
c
7
c
7
c
7 indifferent
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 c7
c
7
c
7
c
7
c
7
c
7 indifferent
3 1 1 1 0 0 0 c7
c
7
c
7
c
7
c
7
c
7
4 1 1 1 1 0 0 χ4
χ
4
χ
4
χ
4 0 0 allure
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 χ5
χ
5
χ
5
χ
5
χ
5 0
6 1 1 1 1 1 0 χ6
χ
6
χ
6
χ
6
χ
6
χ
6
Remark 1. Also with a majority decision, the correlated equilibria, sup-
posing χ < cN , improve the outcomes of each player because the total cost
is constant in each equilibrium outcome.
3.5.2 Overall Game: m machines - Majority Decision
Let us review a game with m machines. We can choose between various
rules of the game. By instituting disjoint votations each player votes for
each machine so we have m independent ballots, then the overall game is
split into the sum of m elementary games, whose equilibria are obtained by
juxtapposing the equilibria of each elementary game. Hence we are back
to the situation of a single machine. Using a unique votation instead, each
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player votes for all the machines. The case is more ticklish since the outcomes
are due to the combination of different factors such as the amount of users
and the cost of each individual printer.
We remind that M \Mi is the set of machines used by player i, A\N j is
the set of players using machine j with a−nj its cardinality, and U .= A\N
the set of facility users.
We sort out the players into three sets.
Aˇ := {i ∈ A | χ
q
+
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a− nj >
1
a
∑
j∈M
cj},
A¯ := {i ∈ A | χ
q
+
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a− nj =
1
a
∑
j∈M
cj},
and
Aˆ := {i ∈ A | χ
q
+
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a− nj <
1
a
∑
j∈M
cj},
with the convention that we set
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a−nj = 0, when i ∈ N , that is when
i is a non-user, or equivalently when the set M \Mi is empty. If i ∈ Aˇ,
the strategy check is strictly dominated by the strategy no check. So we
eliminate it, passing to the reduced game Gˆ = 〈(Xi)i∈Aˆ∪A¯, (Ci)i∈Aˆ∪A¯〉. In
this way, we are supposing that it is convenient for some users to ask for
check. The game Gˆ is binary, but non symmetric, since the players are not
identical. Further more Gˆ is a non potential game, since for i ∈ Aˆ \N and
k ∈ N :
Cqi (1, x−i)−Cq−1i (0, x−i)+Cq+1k (1, x−k)−Cqk(0, x−k)+Cqi (0, x−i)−Cq+1i (1, x−i)+
+Cq−1k (0, x−k)−Cq−1k (1, x−k) = +(
χ
q
+
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a− nj )−
1
a
∑
j∈M
cj+
χ
q + 1
−0+
+
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a− nj −(
χ
q + 1
+
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a− nj ))+
1
a
∑
j∈M
cj−χ
q
=
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a− nj .
The apex over cost function informs about the number of checking requests.
The condition of Corollary 3 is dealt only in the simple closed path of length
four. Obviously, if Aˆ = N and A¯ = ∅, then the game G is reduced to only
the players in N and Gˆ = 〈(Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N 〉 is a potential game.
The game has indifferent NE for 0 6 ν < q − 1 and allure NE for ν = q,
the profiles for q < ν 6 n are not NE since for each player that asks for
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check, it is convenient to deviate and to not ask for it. Also for ν = q − 1
the strategy profile is not NE, since if i ∈ Aˆ \N , Cq−1i (0, x−i) = 1a
∑
j∈M
cj >
χ
q +
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a−nj = C
q
i (1, x−i). We get down to examining the possible devia-
tions for allure outcomes since for the indifferent equilibria the proof is obvi-
ous, as the outcome has the same costs. Let i ∈ Aˆ∪A¯ be a player of reduced
game. Then Cqi (1, x−i) =
χ
q +
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a−nj 6
1
a
∑
j∈M
cj = Cq−1i (0, x−i)
5, and
Cqi (0, x−i) =
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a−nj <
χ
q+1 +
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a−nj = C
q−1
i (1, x−i). Between
the non symmetric allure NE, neither is Pareto efficient.
3.6 Environmental Game
The model presented in this paper is suitable for concrete situations where
at most one coalition can be formed. The economic applications are, for
example, joint ventures, cartels, or enviromental protocols. We pause over
the last ones, considering in particular the model studied by Carraro and
Marchiori (2003) about policy coordination on greenhouse gases emission,
since it corresponds to our model. The standard environmental game is
a two-stage game whose players are a finite set of countries. In the first
stage (coalition game), countries decide non-cooperatively and simultane-
ously whether or not to sign the agreement, (i.e. to join a coalition) thus
accepting the burden sharing rule of the coalition. In the second stage (emis-
sion game) the countries in each coalition decide the level of gases emission
in order to maximize the welfare of the coalition. Formally, the two stage
game in its normal form is
〈Y1, . . . , Yn, v1, . . . , vn〉,
where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of countries, Yi is the strategy set for
player i ∈ N , and the utility function vi allocates the coalition gain shared
according to the coalition burden-sharing rule, if i is a signatory in the first
game, or his payoff, if i is a singleton. In order to particularize the model,
Carraro and Marchiori (2003) make the following assumptions. a1) Uniquss.
The emission game has a unique NE for each coalition. a2) PANE. Inside
each coalition, in the emission game, players act cooperatively in order to
maximize the joint payoff, whereas coalitions and singletons compete in a
non-cooperative way. a3) Symmetry. All players are ex-ante identical. a4)
5The sign of equality holds only if i ∈ A¯.
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Single coalition. Only one coalition can be formed, the non-signatoring
countries play as singletons.
For the assumption a1), the second stage of the game can be reduced
to a partition function obtained (for assumption a2)) as a NE payoff of the
coalition game. Then, the study of the two-stage game is reduced to the
analysis of the first-stage game. The symmetry assumption a3) means that
each player has the same strategy space in the emission game and receives
the same payoff as the other members of his coalition. So, each coalition can
be identified with its size c. For the assumption a4), the strategies of the
coalition game consist in a binary choice. The environmental game becomes
a binary choice game:
〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉,
where Xi has two options ( sign/not sign) and ui divides in equal proportions
the gain of coalition among the signatories while allocating the singleton his
payoff. The structure of this game is the same as our model, even if our
model is a cost game. Whereas we work on the game in a normal form,
Carraro and Marchiori (2003) study the game in a partition function form,
in particular they analize the per-member partition function p(c, pi) and
the non-member one p(1, pi) which represent respectively the payoff ui of a
player i belonging or not to the coalition pi of size c. By symmetry a3), these
functions depend on the coalition size c, as in our model the cost to be paid
depends only on the number ν of players asking for check.
In their work, Carraro and Marchiori determine the equilibrium coalition
and how it changes modifying the rules of the game. The equilibrium coali-
tion structure depends on important features: the membership rules, the
order of moves, the players’ conjectures, the shape of profitability function,
the type of free-riders. Specifying these features, it is possible to match our
model with theirs. It is enough to assume that the players are free to join
or to leave the coalition without the consensus of the other coalition mem-
bers (open membership): the game is with Nash conjectures (each player
takes his decision given the decisions of the others, which do not change as
a consequence of the decision of the first player) and the payoff function is
humped-shaped. In particular assuming orthogonal free-riding 6 their model
corresponds to our naming game, while assuming non-orthogonal free-riding
7 corresponds to our voting game. The Appendix features the proof of our
6The free-riders are orthogonal if they benefit from the cooperative abatement of the
coalition, but have no incentive to damage it: in international environmental games, there
is no leakage (Carraro and Marchiori (2001) page163)
7The free-riders are non orthogonal if they benefit from countries’ cooperation and
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claim. The research of Carraro and Marchiori and ours have been tackled in
different ways. They worked to identify the size of the unique Nash stable
coalition, or rather internally and externally stable coalition. By contrast,
we fixed the quorum to make the checking and morover we used the con-
dition of Nash equilibrium. They assume the payoff functions ui are twice
continuously differentiable functions, while we work with discrete functions
ci. Again, they formulate the game with at least three players and require
at least two players to make a coalition, instead we suppose the players of
the game to be at least two (otherwise there is no game) and the coalition
to be composed of at least one player. The little difference between their
size of an equilibrium coalition and our quorum is thus explained . Lastly,
we note that environmental game turns out to be a potential game, being a
symmetric two-strategy game. This guarantees the existence of pure Nash
equilibria.
3.7 Abstention from Voting
Once again let us perturb the rules of the game. We introduce the possibility
of abstention from voting, adding a third strategy Ab for each player. We
shall analyze two cases: the abstentionists do not pay the checking cost or
they pay a part of the quota.
When the abstentionists do not pay the cost of a possible checking,
the strategy abstention has the same effects as strategy no check, since
Ci(Ab, x−i) = Ci(0, x−i), for i ∈ A. We can thus think in terms of only
two strategies: check and no check, and, at the end, we have duplicated the
equilibria (substituting Ab with 0 in the strategy profiles).
Let us analyze the situation when the checking cost is divided into equal
parts among the abstentionists and the players who vote 1, since we can
refer to it also the case when the abstentionist pays a share of cheching cost
( that is αχ, with α ∈ (0, 1]) and the players who vote 1 the remaining
quota.
First, we consider the naming game with one facility. The strategy check
for a player in U is strongly dominated by the strategy no check, so we
eliminate it. There are various possibilities. i) If ca <
χ
a , that is c < χ, the
strategy check for a player in N is strongly dominated by the strategy no
check. By eliminating it, the checking is never made since the only strategies
damage the coalition, for example, in environmental games, by increasing emission when-
ever cooperating countries reduce their own. (Carraro and Marchiori (2001) page 164)
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of players, users or not, are no check and abstention, so the game has only
one outcome. ii) If ca > χ the strategy abstention for a player in U is strictly
dominated by strategy check. By removing it, we lose no equilibrium. So let
us consider the game limited to the players in N . Also for them the strategy
abstention is strictly dominated by the strategy check, so the reduced game
is a binary symmetric game. That is, by adding a strategy to the game,
the equilibria are the same as the original game with two strategies. iii) In
the intermediate cases, χa 6
c
a 6 χ, the equilibria are indifferent since the
checking is not made.
Now, let us consider the majority game with one facility. The strategy
check for a user is strictly dominated by the strategy no check, so we eli-
minate it. The strategy Ab for an user is again strictly dominated by the
strategy no check, so we eliminate it and we study the symmetric game
reduced to players in N . But the strategy Ab for a non user is strictly domi-
nated by the strategy no check, so, by eliminating it, the reduced symmetric
game becomes a binary game. Then, also in this case, adding a strategy,
the equilibria are the same with two strategies, but larger in number since
the strategy Ab has the same rule as strategy 0.
3.8 Conclusions
This Chapter presents a study of two games from the same model, the
naming game and the majority decision game, both framed in two subcases
(one and more facilities) working on a game reduced to only non user players.
In the naming game with one facility the NE is reached when only one
player asks for checking. The game with M facilities is shared in sum of
M elementary games. In the majority decision game with one facility, with
quorum q, the allure NE is reached when q players ask for checking. With
M facilities, beyond non users, the players of the reduced game are players
such that
{i ∈ U | χ
q
+
∑
j∈M\Mi
cj
a− nj <
1
a
∑
j∈M
cj}.
Also in this case we have an allure NE with q votes for checking. It is
immediately noticeable that the naming game is a special majority decision
game with quorum q = 1. We can generalize claiming that, setting q the
quorum with 1 6 q 6 a, we have the allure equilibria exactly when q players
ask for check, while we have indifferent equilibria with 1 6 ν < q − 1. The
existence of pure NE is guaranteed only for first three cases examinated
by the original result of this paper: given a symmetric game, a sufficient
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condition to have a potential game consists in having only two strategies.
This theorem cannot be applied to the fourth case since it is not a symmetric
game.
A possible improvement of this work is in the area of cooperative tran-
sferable utility games which measure the power of influence among players.
It is assumed that players have to make a yes-no decision and each player
has an inclination to say yes or no. But, due to influence of others, the
decision of the player can be different from his inclination. A careful study
of influence indices and influential functions, also with abstention, has been
performed by Grabisch and Rusinowska (2008) and (2009).
3.9 Appendix
In this Appendix we compare the model of Carraro and Marchioni (2003)
with ours. Obviously, the two models are not identical since we have con-
structed a discrete game, while Carraro and Marchioni (2003) made a contin-
uous game applied to a discrete example. In their paper (2003), Carraro and
Marchiori introduce three functions relating to a standard (payoff) game:
the profitability function
P = P (c)
.
= p(c, pi)− p(1, piS),
the free-riding function
Q = Q(c)
.
= p(1, pi)− p(1, piS),
and the stability function
L = L(c)
.
= p(c, pi)− p(1, pi′) = P (c)−Q(c− 1),
where pi is a coalition of size c, pi
′
is a coalition of size c− 1, and piS is the
singleton structure, that is all the players are singletons. P measures the
profitability and L is useful to identify the size of a Nash stable coalition.
In fact,
c∗ is stable⇔ c∗ = max{[x]|L(x) = 0 and L′(x) < 0}.
For convenience, let c∗ = 1 when L(c) < 0 for all c ∈ (1, n]. Moreover, they
define
c] = max{[x]|L(c) = 0 and L′(c) > 0}.
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Again, it turns out that: i) if Q or the partition function of a player out-
side the coalition p(1, pi) is increasing in c, then the game is with positive
spillovers, ii) if P > 0 and Q is convex, then the free riders are orthogonal,
and iii) if P is negative for c < cm, null in cm, positive for c > cm and if Q
is concave, then the free riders are non orthogonal. Hence, the definition of
cm follows.
The conversion of their continuous model into our discrete model is the
following: c corresponds to ν, cm corresponds to q, p(c, pi) = ui(1, x−i) when
ν 6= 0, p(1, pi) = ui(0, x−i) when ν 6= 0, p(1, piS) = ui(0, x−i) when ν = 0,
and piS corresponds to ν = 0. Since our model is a cost game, the cost
profitability and the cost free-riding functions are defined in the opposite
way, that is P (c)
.
= p(1, piS) − p(c, pi) and Q(c) .= p(1, piS) − p(1, pi). We
analyze first the naming game with one facility under assumption χ < ca .
p(1, pi) = ui(0, x−i) = ca if ν = 0 and p(1, pi) = ui(0, x−i) = 0 if ν 6= 0,
so the game is with positive spillovers. p(c, pi) = ui(1, x−i) = χν if 1 6
ν 6 n. p(1, piS) = ui(0, x−i) = ca with ν = 0, P [ν]
.
= p(1, piS) − p(c, pi) =
c
a − χν > 0. P is increasing in ν and cm that is q is 1. Also the per-
member partition function is monotonic since it differs from P in a constant.
p(1, pi) = ui(0, x−i) = 0 if ν 6= 0, then Q[ν] .= p(1, piS)− p(1, pi) = ca > 0 and
constant. Since P [ν] > 0 and Q[ν] is convex, the game is with orthogonal
free-riding. L = L[ν]
.
= P [ν] − Q[ν − 1] = −χν . We have: L[ν] < 0, so by
convention ν∗ = 1 that corresponds to our NE. The naming game with one
facility under assumption χ < ca satisfies the conditions of Proposition 6 of
Carraro and Marchiori (2003).
Proposition 6 (Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barret (1994)). In a game
with Nash conjectures and open membership, in which the reaction functions
are orthogonal, the stable coalition structures are pi∗ of size c∗ when 1 < c∗ <
n and the grand coalition structure pin of size n when c∗ > n, that is L(c) > 0
for all c ∈ [2, n], both when the per-member partition function is monotonic
and when it is humped-shaped.
Then we analyze the majority game with one facility assuming χ < ca .
We have: p(1, pi) = ui(0, x−i) = ca if 0 6 ν 6 q−1 and p(1, pi) = ui(0, x−i) =
0 if q 6 ν 6 n. Here, the partition function of a non member is constant, so
the game is with positive spillovers. p(c, pi) = ui(1, x−i) = ca if 0 6 ν 6 q−1
and p(c, pi) = ui(1, x−i) = χν if q 6 ν 6 n. p(1, piS) = ui(0, x−i) =
c
a with ν =
0, P [ν]
.
= p(1, piS)−p(c, pi) = 0 if 0 6 ν 6 q−1 and P [ν] = ca− χν if q 6 ν 6 n.
We have P [ν] > 0 if q 6 ν 6 n, cm is just our quorum q and P [ν] is humped
shaped, that is it is locally concave. p(1, pi) = ui(0, x−i) = ca if 1 6 ν 6 q−1
and p(1, pi) = ui(0, x−i) = 0 if q 6 ν 6 n, then Q[ν] .= p(1, piS)− p(1, pi) = 0
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if 1 6 ν 6 q − 1 and Q[ν] = ca > 0 if q 6 ν 6 n. Since P [ν] is null for
ν < q and positive for ν > q, and since Q[ν] is concave, the game is with
non orthogonal free-riding. L = L[ν]
.
= P [ν]−Q[ν− 1] = 0 if 1 6 ν 6 q− 1,
L[ν] = ca if ν = q, and L[ν] = −χν if q + 1 6 ν 6 n. We have: DL[ν] = 0 for
1 6 ν 6 q − 1, DL[q] = ca , DL[q + 1] = − χq+1 − ca , and DL[ν] = χν(ν−1) for
q+ 2 6 ν 6 n, where DL is the discrete derivative of L. Since L[q] = ca > 0
and L[q+1] = −χν < 0,and DL[q+1] = L[q+1]−L[q]1 = − q+1ν − ca < 0, we have
ν∗ = q, which corresponds to our allure NE. Our indifferent NE are given
by searching ν such that L[ν] = 0 and DL[ν] = 0, that is 1 6 ν 6 q−1. The
majority decision game with one facility under assumption χ < ca satisfies
the conditions of Proposition 7 of Carraro and Marchiori (2003).
Proposition 7 (Carraro and Marchiori (2003)). In a game with Nash con-
jectures and open membership, in which the profitability function is positive
for c > cm and humped-shaped, and the free-riding is non orthogonal, the
stable coalition structures are pi∗ of size c∗ when cm 6 c] 6 c∗ 6 n and the
singleton structure piS of size 1 when c] > n.
Chapter 4
Quality Unilateral
Commitments
4.1 Introduction
The words Unilateral Commitments assume a lightly different meaning, de-
pending on its context. In Economics, for example, the term Unilateral
Commitment indicates the commitment, assumed in an independent way,
by an individual towards an organization, to undertake a single action. For
example, in Pereau and Tazdait (1999), a unilateral commitment occurs
when some countries decide to reduce their emission in an individual man-
ner, without coordination, if bargaining with the scope to solve global en-
vironmental problems fail. That is, they provide for a new strategy, next
to the strategies to cooperate or not with the other countries. In Game
Theory, instead, the term Unilateral Commitment means the commitment
of an action before the other players can move, that is the player chooses
to commit a single strategy or to keep all of their strategies for a later de-
cision. We will mean the second acceptation, in a more advanced version.
For us, Unilateral Commitments means to assume binding commitments,
taken simultaneously and unilaterally by all the players before the begin-
ning of the game. This model is very close to delegation models, as showed
in Garc´ıa-Jurado and Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2006).
A Unilateral Commitments Game is a game, in which players can make
unilateral commitments regarding their set of strategies. Formally, we add to
a game, called component game or basic game, an initial round in which each
player simultaneously, unilaterally, and publicly declare, in an enforceable
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way, that he will play only certain strategies of the basic game. We refer to
these choices as unilateral commitments (briefly UC). In the second stage
every player is committed to use strategies only from the subset choosen in
the preliminary round. We underline that i) the unilateral commitments
become common knowledge before the second stage starts, when they are
publicly announced, ii) if the commitments are not made simultaneously
and unilaterally, the players could influence each other, the new game could
be played cooperatively, and then the players could achieve in equilibrium
the cooperative payoffs of the game, and iii) the behavior can be considered
as a signal used by the players to convey information about their type.
The tool of UC is suitable for repeated games especially, but in this
chapter we consider only unilateral commitments in one-shot game for two
reasons. First, we want to make a Nash equilibrium self-enforcing, without
maving to recur to the finitely repeated games tool. Second, if we repeat a
game G a finite number of times m, Gm is nothing else but another game.
This justifies to pay attention to UC added to a generic strategic game, that
is, to a game which is not necessarily a finite repetition of some constituent
game.
There are many strategic situations, in real life, in which people disregard
some of their possible strategies. For example, a firm announces a limited
edition of a certain product or picks its capacity constraints or subscribes to
quality programs in which it commits to follow certain rules, a department
makes the commitment of not hiring its own graduate students, a party
announces, during the election campaign, that it is not going to make certain
alliances regardless of the final result of the election, or a candidate promises
not to raise taxes by more than x%,
The benefits of using Unilateral Commitments for a finite component
game has already been studied and sounded by Fa´ın˜a-Med´ın et al. (1998),
Garc´ıa-Jurado et al. (2000), and Garc´ıa-Jurado et al. (2006). Fa´ın˜a-Med´ın
et al. (1998) proved that, if a preliminary round is included in a Prisoners’
Dilemma repeated a large enough number of times, then not only the players
have incentives to commit themselves to a limited strategy set, but there
is also a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which both players act
cooperatively through the post-commitment stages of the game. Instead,
Garc´ıa-Jurado et al. (2000) worked in a more general framework, consider-
ing finite repetitions of a n-person strategic game form, and they obtain a
Nash folk theorem for finitely repeated games with UC. They proved that,
if a n-strategic game is repeated a number of times large enough and players
restrict their strategy sets in a preliminary round of the game, then every
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outcome, strictly preferred to the minimax outcome by every player, can be
supported by a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Again, adding unilate-
ral commitments to a constituent game without Nash equilibria generates
Nash equilibria when the game is sufficiently repeated and can generate
Nash equilibria even in the one-shot constituent game. Garc´ıa-Jurado et al.
(2006) deepen the influence of UC in the assumption needed for the folk
theorems for repeated games. They show that, when UC are possible, it is
easier to find both Nash and subgame perfect equilibria supporting the coo-
perative payoff of the original game, so no condition on component game is
needed for the Nash folk theorem to hold, when UC are considered. Again,
they introduce a new equilibrium concept for extensive games: the virtual
subgame perfect equilium, which we will present in Section 5.12 in Chapter
5.
Instead, Bade et al. (2006) consider the Unilateral Commitments of
a infinite component game, where the players can choose a subset of their
strategy set. They start from a paper of Schelling (1960) in which players can
commit to a single action before the other players move or keep all of their
actions for a later decision. Not much is gained, since the only outcomes of
this commitment game are the original NE and some equilibrium outcomes
of the sequential version of the game. So, they allow more flexibility in term
of possible commitments assuming the players keep any non-empty, compact,
convex subset of their original strategy space for their choice in the second
stage. Allowing players to commit on sets of strategies affects the set of
equilibrium outcomes. They prove that a strategy profile is implementable by
a commitment 1 if and only if it is implementable by a simple commitment,
that is the commitment where a player chooses a single strategy and the
other a set depending on the best reply to it. Again they prove that all
strategy profiles implementable by a commitment can be described as the
equilibrium outcome of a generalized sequential version of the UC game.
For example the lead-follow equilibrium outcomes is implementable in the
following way. First we modify G such that one player is moving first and
the other follows suit (Stakelberg duopoly). To implement such outcomes
it suffices that the leader commits to a single strategy (his strategy in the
lead-follow profile) and the other player does not restrict his strategy space
at all.
The previous literature has analyzed how allowing players to commit
on (finite or infinite) sets of strategies affects the equilibrium outcome and
1A strategy profile implementable by a commitment is a strategy profile of component
game such that, when played in the second stage, is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
UC game.
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which strategy profiles can be sustained as equilibrium outcomes. In this
chapter, we are interested in a slightly different question. We ask whether,
in order to obtain an efficient equilibrium, the commitment are sufficient
or an other escamotage is needed? The answer we propose is the model of
Quality Unilateral Commitments, i.e. unilateral commitments where, in the
first stage, each player declares that he will pay a penalty if he will not play,
in the second stage, the restricted strategies. This simple sequential game
structure, assuming a self-punishing scheme, makes self-enforcing the Nash
equilibria of the constituent game, if any. We analyze the case of a two
player game G, in which strategy sets and permissible restrictions of them
are compact subintervals of the real line and in which players have strictly
quasi-concave payoff functions. We embed G into a two stage game, in which
players can restrict their strategy spaces in the first stage. In the second
stage, if a player chooses a strategy from his restricted strategy space, he
obtains the same payoff as in the basic game G, otherwise he pays a penalty
dependent on the square of the distance from his restricted strategy space.
The choice of each player to make quality commitments is not only in
order to build a reputation, but also because, when the relations climate
has been so positive and harmonious, the players will behave properly and
make commitments, as it is proved in Snape and Redman (2006). Since a
commitment is a binding of an individual to the others, it measures an atti-
tude to the sense of altruism, compliance, identification and loyalty towards
the group.
Our outlook has been inspired by the declaration of high-quality of very
different products, from mineral water to jeans. For example, a well-known
mineral water bottling factory guarantees the purity of mineral water in a
newpaper promotion and, in order to give the highest guarantee of security,
the firm endows itself with ISO certification, while a famous firm, producing
brand-name jeans, hides away facing a declaration of intent, which guaran-
tees the handmade cure with which they have been realized.
It is no accident we have called our model as quality commitments in-
stead of penalty commitments. The Corporate Social Responsability (briefly,
CSR) is developping and will develop in the following years. CSR is an en-
terprise, which not only produces wealth, makes products on the cheap, but
also is dealing with business within the competence of State, Church, civil
society, and family. The CSR, according to the opinion of Bruni ((2008a),
(2008b)), is an oxymoron between capitalist enterprise and civil economy.
The modern civil economy is based on market, symbol of freedom and equal-
ity. The capitalist enterprise has inherited the hierarchic structure by feudal
Unilateral Commitments 65
society, like Churches, military structure, and family. The oxymoron is also
in the way they are realized. The civil economy and market are based on
contract, that is an exchange between ugual agents. In order to favour the
cooperation, there is an efficient disciplinary system, extern to the parts
involved in the contract. The hierarchic mechanism has asymmetric struc-
ture: there are a principal and one or more agents. The CSR develops on
public fides or faith and on civic virtue, in order to overcome the dualism
between interprise and market. Since the enterprice is the more efficient,
the more it is similar to market, then CRS extends the contract, tipical of
market, to the enterprise. It imports into the enterprise the pact, which is
contract plus fides. It is no accident that, one year after the publication of
Dei delitti e delle pene of Beccaria, Dragonetti (1768) publishes Delle virtu´
e dei premi, where he write the virtue cannot be negotiated (like penalty is
settled by contract), but it is a product of free will. The same it happens
in our model of QUC, since the sanctions is self declared by the players,
then it is internal to the game. In the 2005 a famous food firm told the
press to launch on the market a fair-solidarity product. This move has been
choosen by other producers, while the importers have made a trademark
on producing instead of product. The die of fair-solidarity market gives a
new responsability to market, since it gives value to values. The rewards
are beginning always more qualitative, and the users more sensible to ethi-
cal values, to environmental respect and then they pretend corporate social
responsability, otherwise they punish the enterprises.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the
Unilateral Commitments of a game. In Section 4.3, we present the con-
ditions that assure the existence of NE for infinite games. In Section 4.4,
we introduce the Penalty Function Method, while in Section 4.5 we apply
it to our model. Finally, in Section 4.6 we study the Quality Unilateral
Commitments of Cournot Duopoly.
4.2 Unilateral Commitments
Remark 2. For ease of definition of UC(G), the games G and UC(G) are
expressed in strategic form. At the same time, UC(G) is a two-stage game,
grafically it is represented in extensive form, and hence the subgame perfect
equilibrium is the concept of solution more suitable for our analysis.
Given a game G = 〈(Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉, the corresponding game with uni-
lateral commitments consists of embedding the component game G into a
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two-stage game. In the first stage, each player, independently and simulta-
neously, chooses a nonempty subset Si of his strategy set Xi, i.e. he commits
to play only the choosen strategies in Si. After this preliminary stage, the
choices made by all of the players are publicly known, and the game G,
restricted to S1, . . . , Sn, is played. The commitments are assumed to be
perfectly binding, in the sense that if player i restricts his strategy set to
Si, any strategy choosen in the second stage must belong to Si. We note
that a commitment does not necessarily prescribe the choice of a strategy.
Ex-post, the players are free to choose from the set of strategies specified in
the commitment.
Now, we formalize the UC-extension of a game G.
Definition 46. Let G = 〈(Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 be a strategic form game. The
UC-extension of G is the game
UC(G) = 〈(XUi )i∈N , (uUi )i∈N 〉,
where:
i. the set of players N remains the same of G,
ii. the set XUi of strategies available to player i ∈ N is the set of all the
couples (Si, φi) such that
j)Si ⊆ Xi, Si 6= ∅, and jj)φi :
∏
k∈N
2Xk −→ Xi, with
φi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Si, for each (T1, . . . , Tn) ∈
∏
k∈N
2Xk ,
iii. the payoff function of player i is uUi :
∏
i∈N
XUi −→ R defined by
uUi ((S1, φ1) . . . , (Sn, φn)) = ui(φ1(S1, . . . , Sn), . . . , φn(S1, . . . , Sn)).
Obviously, the condition j) refers to the first stage, and the jj) to the second
stage. That is, a strategy for player i prescribes a choice of a restriction Si
(first-stage strategy) and of a strategy φi (second-stage strategy), for each
possible choice of a restriction for all players in the first stage. Again the
condition φi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Si imposes that the commitments are binding.
The outcome of a strategy profile
((S1, φ1) . . . , (Sn, φn))
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is the vector
((S1, . . . , Sn), (s1, . . . , sn)),
where, for each i ∈ N ,
φi(Si) = si.
The payoffs over outcomes ((S1, . . . , Sn), (s1, . . . , sn)) are assumed to depend
only on the strategy profiles choosen in the second stage of the game and
are given by the payoffs of the UC(G). That is, the utility ui(s1, . . . , sn)
of player i derives from outcome ((S1, . . . , Sn), (s1, . . . , sn)). The result of
((S1, φ1) . . . , (Sn, φn)) is
(s1, . . . , sn),
where ((S1, . . . , Sn), (s1, . . . , sn)) is the outcome of strategy profile
((S1, φ1) . . . , (Sn, φn)).
We illustrate the model with a simple example.
Example 2. In the following Figure 4.1, it is depicted the game form Γ and
its Unilateral Commitments extension. To make more readable the drawing,
some labels are omitted.
Let us recall briefly the following properties due to Garc´ıa-Jurado et al.
(2000).
i) If the original game G has a NE (x¯1, . . . , x¯n), then UC(G) has a NE
with the same outcome. Let us just consider ((S1, φ1), . . . , , (Sn, φn)), where
the commitment (S1, . . . , Sn), is defined by Si
.
= xi, for each i ∈ N , and
the strategy profile (φ1, . . . , φn) as follows, for each i ∈ N : φi(S1, . . . , Sn) .=
xi, φi(Tj , S−j)
.
= xi for all i ∈ N\{j} (i.e. if a unique player j deviates
from the commitment (S1, . . . , Sn), the others stick to their NE strategies),
and φi is defined ad libitum otherwise. (To avoid cumbersome notations,
the definition is given in a colloquial style). Checking that, the couple
((S1, φ1), . . . , (Sn, φn)) is a NE for UC(G), is straightforward.
ii) If the original game G does not have a NE, it cannot be guaranteed
that UC(G) has a NE: an example in pure strategies is Matching Pennies.
iii) It can happen that a game G does not have a NE, while UC(G)
has, as shown in the following example (see Figure 4.2). The game G
does not have NE, but ((S1, φ1), (S2, φ2)) defined by (S1, S2) = ({t}, {l, r}),
φ1(T1, T2) = t, φ2(S1, T2) = t and φ2(T1, S2) = r if T1 6= {t}, for each
T1 ∈ 2X1 and T2 ∈ 2X2 , do provide a NE for UC(G).
For this reason, in the model of Quality Unilateral Commitment, we con-
sider a component game with non-empty compact real intervals as strategic
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spaces, and continuous and strictly quasi-concave payoff functions. These
assumptions, met by many economic models, ensure that the equilibria set
of a component game is a non-empty set.
4.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
In this section we now tackle the question of the existence of Nash equilibria.
In the case of finite games, the theorem of Nash (1950) guarantees the
existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Theorem 14. (Nash (1950)) Every finite strategic-form game has a mixed-
strategy equilibrium.
In the case of infinite games with continuous payoffs, the existence of
Nash equilibria in pure strategies is ensured by the theorem of Debreau,
Glicksberg, and Fan (1952). In its formulation, we adopt the concept of
nice game introduced in Rn by Bade, Haeringer and Renou (2005), and we
give the definition in the context of Euclidean spaces.
Before stating the theorem, some preliminaries are needed. We recall
that a real Euclidean space of finite dimension is a linear vector space of
finite dimension on R with a scalar product. So, it is equipped with a norm,
a metric, and a Hausdorff topology, admitting convex bases, where vector
operations of addition and scalar multiplication are continuous.
Definition 47. A subset X of a Euclidean space is compact2 if every se-
quence in X has a subsequence that converges to a limit point in X.
Definition 48. A subset X of a linear vector space is convex if, for any
x, y ∈ X and any α ∈ [0, 1],
αx+ (1− α)y ∈ X.
Definition 49. Let X be a convex subset of an Euclidean space. The func-
tion f : X −→ R is concave if for any x, y ∈ X and for any α ∈ (0, 1) we
have
f(αx+ (1− α)y) > αf(x) + (1− α)f(y).
2The notion of compactness for more general topological spaces uses the notion of
cover, which is a collection of open sets whose union includes the set X. X is compact if
any cover has a finite subcover.
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The function f is strictly concave if for any x, y ∈ X and for any α ∈ (0, 1)
we have
f(αx+ (1− α)y) > αf(x) + (1− α)f(y).
Definition 50. Let X be a convex subset of an Euclidean space and let
f : X −→ R. The function f : X −→ R is quasi-concave if, for each t ∈ R,
the set
{x ∈ X : f(x) > t}
is convex. The function f : X −→ R is strictly quasi-concave if, for each
t ∈ R, the set
{x ∈ X : f(x) > t}
is convex.
Or, equivalently,
Definition 51. The function f is a quasi-concave function if for any x, y ∈
X and for any α ∈ [0, 1] we have
f(αx+ (1− α)y) > min(f(x), f(y)).
The function f is a strictly quasi-concave function if for any x, y ∈ X and
for any α ∈ [0, 1] we have
f(αx+ (1− α)y) > min(f(x), f(y)).
Remark 3. If f is a strictly concave function, it is also quasi concave. The
converse is false. For example, f : R −→ R such that f(x) = x3.
Definition 52. A game 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 in strategic form is a nice
game if for each player i ∈ N , Xi is a non-empty compact, convex subset
of an Euclidean space, and the payoff function ui is continuous in all its
arguments, and strictly quasi-concave in xi.
The continuity is with respect to the topology induced by the metric.
Example 3. A non-empty closed real interval is a compact, convex subset
of the real line.
Definition 53. Let F : X −→ X be a function (or a multifunction). x¯ ∈ X
is a fixed point for F if x¯ ∈ F (X).
Definition 54. Let X,Y be topological spaces, F : X
−→→ Y be a multifunc-
tion, and gph(F ) = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : y ∈ F (x)} be its graph. F is said to
have closed graph if gph(F ) is a closed of X × Y .
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If X,Y ⊆ Rn, the definition 54 is formulable in a sequential way: F has a
closed reduced graph if the following condition holds. If (xk, yk) ∈ X × Y
such that (xk, yk) −→ (x, y), as k → +∞, then (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
Or, equivalently.
If xk −→ x, yk −→ y, as k → +∞, and yk ∈ F (xk), then y ∈ F (x).
Definition 55. Let X be a topological space. A function f : X −→ R is
called upper hemicontinuous if and only if the set {x ∈ X : f(x) > t} is
open for each t.
Upper hemi-continuity property requires that, for any x0 and for any open
set V that contains f(x0), there exists a neighborhood U of x0 such that
f(x) ⊆ V if x ∈ U . In general, this differs from the closed-graph notion, but
the two concepts coincide if the range of f is compact and f(x) is closed for
each x, conditions which are generally satisfied when applying fixed-point
theorems.
Theorem 15. (Kakutani3) Let K ⊆ Rk be a non-empty, compact, convex
set. If F : K
−→→ K is a non-empty, convex-valued multifunction with closed
graph, then F has a fixed point.
If F (x) is a singleton for each x ∈ X, then we come across again the Browner
fixed point theorem, focal theorem in differential and algebraic topology.
Theorem 16. (Berge) Let X,Y be metric spaces, and f : X × Y −→ R be
a continuous function, then the multifunction F : X
−→→ Y , so defined
F (x) = argmaxy∈Y f(x, y),
has a closed graph.
Theorem 17. (Debreau (1952), Glicksberg (1952), and Fan (1952)) Every
nice game G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 has a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to apply the theorem of fixed-point of Kaku-
tani to the best reply correspondences. The set of (pure) best replies of
player i to x−i ∈ X−i, for each player i ∈ N , is defined as follows:
BRi(x−i)
.
= argmaxxi∈Xi ui(xi, x−i)
3With the intention of simplifying the original proof of von Neumann, Kakutani (1941)
extended the classical Brouwer’s theorem to set valued maps and derived the minimax
theorem as an easy corollary.
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With variation of x−i ∈ X−i, we define the best replay multifunction for the
player i
BRi : X−i
−→→ Xi,
which associates, with each element of X−i, only one subset of Xi, empty
too. But, for hypothesis, Xi is a compact, ui is continuous, and
BRi(x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi : ui(xi, x−i) > ui(yi, x−i) for all yi ∈ Xi},
then BRi is a continuous, non-empty, single-valued function in any nice
game. We define the correspondence BR as the Cartesian product of the
best reply BRi:
BR : X1 × . . .×Xn −→ X1 × . . .×Xn
BR(x1, . . . , xn)
.
=
∏
i∈N
BRi(x−i)
A fixed point of BR is a strategy profile (x¯1, . . . , x¯n) such that
BR(x¯1, . . . , x¯n) = (x¯1, . . . , x¯n),
that is such that
BRi(x¯−i) = x¯i, for each i ∈ N,
thus, a fixed point of BR is a Nash equilibrium of G. In order to prove our
statement, we show that BR satisfies the hypotesis of Kakutani’s theorem
to have a fixed point.
i) (X1 × . . . × Xn) is a compact, convex, non-empty subset of a finite-
dimensional Euclidean space.
ii) BR(x1, . . . , xn) is non-empty for all (x1, . . . , xn).
iii) BR(x1, . . . , xn) is convex for all (x1, . . . , xn).
iv) BR(·) has a closed graph or is upper hemi-continuous.
Condition i) is easy to verify. Since the Cartesian product of non-empty sets
or compact sets or convex sets is a non-empty set or compact set or convex
set, respectively, then X1 × . . .×Xn satisfies immediately the condition i).
From the definition of BR as Cartesian product, it is sufficient to check
that each BRi satisfies conditions ii) and iii). Now, BRi has non empty
values for Weierstrass theorem (in fact Ri is a continuos function defined on
a compact set). Let us prove that Ri is convex-valued. By definition,
Ri(x−i)
.
= argmaxyi∈Xi ui(yi, x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi : ui(xi, x−i) > maxyi∈Xi ui(yi, x−i)},
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where the last set is convex since ui is a quasi-concave function. If we
choose t = max
yi∈Xi
ui(yi, x−i), then Ri is convex-valued. At least, for each
i ∈ N the payoff function ui : Xi × X−i −→ R is a continuous function
on metric space payoffs, so Berge’s Theorem 16 implies closed-graph best
reply BRi(x−i)
.
= argmaxxi∈Xi ui(xi, x−i). Since the sufficient conditions of
Kakutani’s Theorem 15 are satisfied, BR has a fixed point.
By using Theorem 17 for a symmetric game, we have the following exi-
stence results of a pure symmetric equilibrium.
Corollary 4. A symmetric nice game 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 has at least
one symmetric pure NE.
Proof. Theorem 17 states that there exist a strategy (x¯1, . . . , x¯n) ∈ X1 ×
. . .×Xn such that
BR(x¯1, . . . , x¯n) = (x¯1, . . . , x¯n),
that is such that
BRi(x¯−i) = x¯i, for each i ∈ N.
But G is a symmetric game, so, for each i, j ∈ N ,
x¯i = BRi(x−i) = argmaxxi∈Xi ui(xi, x−i) = argmaxxj∈Xj uj(xj , x−j) =
= BRj(x−j) = x¯j .
Corollary 5. Let 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 be a symmetric potential game,
where X1 = . . . = Xn is a closed real interval, P is a continuous function in
all its arguments and quasi-concave in xi for all i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}, there
exists at least one pure symmetric NE.
Remark 4. Let G = 〈(Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 be a nice game. When the second-
stage of UC(G) is played, we can consider the sub-game G limited to
(S1, . . . , Sn), denoted with GS1,...,Sn , as a restriction of G. So we can ap-
ply the results of Bade, Haeringer and Renou (2005), concerning the rela-
tions between the equilibria of a nice game4 and its restriction. The first
property is an obvious property of a restricted game: any equilibrium of
G, which belongs to the restricted set of strategies (S1, . . . , Sn), is also an
equilibrium of GS1,...,Sn . That is, if there exists a NE (t¯1, . . . , t¯n) such that
4If the game G is finite, the results do not hold.
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(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) ∈ (S1, . . . , Sn), then (t¯1, . . . , t¯n) is a NE of GS1,...,Sn . The con-
verse is obviously not true. However, Bade, Haeringer and Renou (2005)
prove that any interior equilibrium of GS1,...,Sn is also an equilibrium of G,
where a strategy profile is interior if (t¯1, . . . , t¯n) ∈ int
∏
i∈N
Si. It follows that
the equilibria of GS1,...,Sn , which are not equilibria of G, are on the boundary
of
∏
i∈N
Si. In particular, if the players are two, the equilibria of the GS1,S2 ,
which are not equilibria of G, are in number less than or equal to four.
4.4 Penalty Function Method
The statement of the problem of QUC recurs to the Penalty Method, which is
one of the techniques of Constrained Optimization. Sometimes, a problem of
optimization with equality constraints and/or inequality constraints can be
transformed into an equivalent unconstrained problem. The transformations
can be made on the variables or on the objective function. For example, with
linear constraints, it is to be preferred to treat the constraints directly and
to transform the variables. Instead, when the constraints are nonlinear, it is
particularly useful to use a method, such as the penalty, which acts on the
objective function.
When solving a nonlinear programming problem, in which the con-
straints cannot easily be eliminated, it is necessary to balance the aims
of reducing the objective function and staying inside or close to the feasible
region, in order to induce global convergence, that is convergence to a local
solution from any initial approximation. This inevitably leads to the idea of
a penalty function, which is some combination of the objective function and
the constraint function. Early penalty functions are smooth so as to enable
to use efficient techniques for smooth unconstrained optimization.
The penalty method approximates a given constrained problem with
unconstrained problems, penalizing each deviation from acceptable values.
Let us consider the following problem in Rn:
(P ) max{f(x1, . . . , xn) | (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ K}.
where f : Rn −→ R, with n ∈ N∗, is the objective function and K ⊆ Rn is
the feasible region, usually defined by
K = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn| gj(x1, . . . , xn) > 0, j = 1, . . . ,m},
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with assigned constraint functions gj : Rn −→ R, for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
We underline the general formulation of the problem (P ): we can switch the
maximum research to minimum, only changing the sign of f .
The penalty method associates with a constrained problem (P ) a se-
quence of unconstrained problems (Pk)k∈N, where
(Pk) max{pk(f(x1, . . . , xn), gj(x1, . . . , xn)) | j = 1, . . . ,m, (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn}.
The solution of each problem (Pk) is a point (xk1 , . . . , xkn), which maximizes
the relative unconstrained function pk = pk(f, g1, . . . , gm). These functions
are constructed so that, as k → +∞, a convergent sequence of unconstrained
maximizer approaches a constrained maximizer of problem (P ).
Let us assume f defined, continuous on Rn, and strictly concave. We
assume K is a closed convex set defined by only one concave function g on
Rn. Again, for simplicity we assume n = 2.
There is a lot of offers for penalty function p. The earliest penalty
function (Courant (1943)) is
pn(x, y) = f(x, y)− 1
2
ng2(x, y).
The penalty is formed from a difference of squares of constraint violations
and the parameter n determines the amount of penalty.
Remark 5. We suppose (xn, yn) is a point of maximum for pn in R2. If
g(xn, yn), as n → +∞, does not converge to zero, the term −12ng2(x, y)
diverges to −∞ as n→ +∞. So, for a great value of n, the values pn(xn, yn)
become very small, if f is not upper limited, and (xn, yn) cannot maximize
pn, as we have assumed. That is, the sequence of free problems defined
by pn is equivalent to penalize the point (x, y) if it does not belong to the
constraint g(x, y) = 0. Multiplying g2(x, y) by −12n implies that we subtract
from f a quantity which diverges, so −12ng2(x, y) has very small values and
then is not competitive in order to calculate the maximum of pn. We say
that pn is obtained penalizing the constraint.
Obviously, g(x, y) = 0 if and only if (x, y) ∈ K, and, since pn(x, y) ≤
f(x, y) and stricly convex, only one (xn, yn) ∈ R2 exists such that
pn(xn, yn) = max
(x,y)∈R2
fn(x, y).
Then, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 18. Under the previous assumption on f , g, and pn, we have
(xn, yn)→ (x¯, y¯), as n→ +∞,
where (x¯, y¯) is the maximum point of f on K.
Proof. We have:
f(xn, yn) > pn(xn, yn) > max
(x,y)∈K
pn(x, y) > max
(x,y)∈K
f(x, y) = f(x¯, y¯).
From which, (xn, yn) is in a limited set of R2. We extract a subsequence in
R2 (xnk , ynk)→ (x∗, y∗), as k → +∞. From 4.4 follows
f(x∗, y∗) > f(x¯, y¯).
Again, from 4.4, we have
1
2
kg2(xnk , ynk) > f(x¯, y¯)− f(xnk , ynk),
and then
g2(x∗, y∗) = lim
k→+∞
g2(xnk , ynk) = 0.
From which, (x∗, y∗) ∈ K which, with 4.4, implies (x∗, y∗) = (x¯, y¯).
It is interesting to observe that this result is obtained in absence of
differentiability or Karush-Kuhn-Tucker regularity assumptions. However,
not only the method suffers from necessity of a sequence of maximizations,
but also these maximizations become more and more difficult numerically,
as k grows.
It is also possible to get asymptotic estimates of the rate of convergence.
These estimates can be used to terminate the penalty function iteration and
also to provide better initial approximations when maximizing pk = pk(f, g).
Aubin (1969) proves that, under suitable assumptions, there is a valuation of
maximum points xk = (xk1 , . . . , xkn) of problem (Pk) to maximum point x =
(x, . . . , xn) of problem (P ) like |x−xk| ≤ C 1k , with C appropriate constant.
Lucchetti and Patrone (1977) notice that this result cannot improve, that
is, a convergence like |x− xk| ≤ C( 1k )α, with α > 1, is not possible.
The penalty method is an exterior point algorithm, so called since it ge-
nerates a sequence of maxima exterior to the constraints, forcing convergence
to a feasible point in the limit as n → +∞. Equality constraints problems
76 Unilateral Commitments
can only be handled by using exterior point algorithms. Instead, problems
with inequality constraints can be handled by exterior point algorithms or
interior point algorithms, where the sequence of maxima is interior to the
constraints set.
4.5 The model
We model the choice of quality unilateral commitments applied to a one-
shot game, looking at the reputation, trust and loyalty effect between the
players. The structure of the QUC model is traced out from UC model, but
here the commitments are assumed to be not binding, since in the second
stage a player can play a strategy not belonging to his restricted set declared
in the first stage. The role, played in UC by binding commitments, is in
the QUC performed by penalty. In fact, we must interpret in a positive
way the penalty of a player, as guarantee towards the others of his perfect,
unobjectable and fair behavior, and not in a negative way, as a punishment
for his (possible) deviation. Again, the QUC want to make self-enforcing
any NE of the reduced game GS1,...,Sn .
Given a game G = 〈(Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉, the corresponding game with
quality unilateral commitments consists in embedding the component game
G into a two-stage game. In the first stage, each player, independently and
simultaneously, chooses a nonempty subset Si of his strategy set Xi, i.e. he
commits to play only the choosen strategies in Si. After this preliminary
stage, the choices made by all players are publicly known, and the game G
is played. If player i adheres to his declaration and plays a strategy in Si,
he obtains the payoff ui of G, otherwise his payoff is cut down.
In order to make self-enforcing a NE of the reduced gameGS1,...,Sn , we ap-
proximate to the problem of maximizing each ui, subject to the constraints
S1, . . . , Sn, by a maximization problem without constraints, in which the
function to be maximized is modified by the subtraction of a penalty term,
equal to the square of the distance between the strategy xi and the declara-
tion set Si, multiplied by a large penalization factor. To be precise, we take
a natural k, which will be made to tend to infty, and we associate with it
the problem of finding, for each i ∈ N ,
argmax{ui(x1, . . . , xn)− k[dist(xi, Si)]2 : (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X1 × . . .×Xn},
where the distance between a strategy profile xi and a set Si is so defined
dist(xi, Si)
.
= inf{d(xi, y) : y ∈ Si},
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with d the usual distance of the metric space R.
As reminded earlier, the existence of NE for the component game G is
not a guarantee of existence of equilibria for its extension with UC. So, we
assume for G and for its extension QUC(G) the same hypothesis as Theorem
17. In particular, we assume that each player i has, as strategy set of G,
a non-empty closed real interval (i.e. a compact, convex subset of the real
line), and that in the preliminary stage of QUC(G), i chooses a non-empty
closed interval of his available strategies 5. We denote the compact real
interval Si of player i by
[xi, xi] ⊆ Xi,
where xi is the minimum of Si and xi its maximum. Player i can also commit
to a singleton, when xi = xi. Again, we assume that the payoff functions of
both games is continuous in all its arguments, and strictly quasi-concave in
the respective variables.
We limited the analysis of the model, for simplycity, to the case of two
players, but it extends immediately up to the case of n players. We suppose
that the players are symmetric, for example two identical firms producing
the same good, and we propose the same type of penalty for each player.
Let G = 〈X,Y, f, g〉 be a nice game, that is the strategy set X,Y are
non-empty compact, convex subset of the real line, and the payoff functions
f, g are continuous in (x, y), and strictly quasi-concave in x and in y, respec-
tively6. Then Theorem 17 assures that the set of NE of G is non-empty.
Now, we can formalize the QUC-extention of a game G.
Definition 56. Let G = 〈X,Y, f, g〉 be a nice game. The QUC-extension of
G, briefly QUC(G), is the sequence of games
Gn = 〈[x, x], [y, y], pn, qn〉,
where, for each n ∈ N,
i. the set of players N = {I, II} remains the same of G,
5 Without loss of generality, we have assumed convex the restricted strategy space Si.
Imposing some Lipschitz conditions is sufficient to ensure that the game played in the
second-stage, has a NE. We also note that imposing a convex strategy space is a common
assumption in Economics literature.
6 The model developed in this section cannot be applied to mixed extensions of finite
games. In fact, payoff functions are not strictly quasi-concave, and mixed strategy space
is not a subset of the real line, except for a binary game.
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ii. [x, x] and [y, y] are respectively the set of strategies declared by player
I and II,
iii. the payoff function pn of player i is given by
pn(x, y) =

f(x, y)− n(x− x)2 if x < x
f(x, y) if x ∈ [x, x]
f(x, y)− n(x− x)2 if x > x
and the payoff function qn of player i is given by
qn(x, y) =

g(x, y)− n(y − y)2 if y < y
g(x, y) if y ∈ [y, y]
g(x, y)− n(y − y)2 if y > y
It is immediately noted that the penalty functions are strictly quasi-
concave, since payoff functions of G are strictly quasi-concave and penalty
is concave since it is proportional to square of the deviation.
Remark 6. The model is very flexible and foresees many enhancements.
For example we could investigate what happens when the penalty functions
are different,one for each player, or what happens when the players do not
commit simultaneously but they play hierarchically, for example a monopo-
list and its consumers.
4.6 An Example: QUC of Cournot Duopoly
4.6.1 Cournot Duopoly
Let us consider a simplified version of Cournot Duopoly. Two firms I and
II produce a homogeneous good, for example mineral water, and simulta-
neously choose their respective output level. If producer I brings on the
market an amount x ∈ [0,+∞), and II a quantity y ∈ [0,+∞), then the
price p of mineral water depends on the total amount q = x+ y brought on
the market. We assume a linear demand p(q) = a − q7, where a > 0 is a
7 Our choice for p(q) is due only to technical reasons. It simplifies the scenarios when
we apply QUC to Cournot Duopoly. Obviously, our choice for p(q) is less realistic than
the classical assumption p(q) = max(0, a− q) of Cournot Duopoly, but it is irrelevant for
the purpose of QUC. With classical assumptions, the total profit has linear and quadratic
expression, but after application of QUC, the penalty function becomes quadratic, like in
our model.
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costant, and a symmetric linear output cost cx and cy for each correspon-
ding firm, where c > 0 is the constant unit price. The firm total profits are
then, respectively,
f(x, y) = xp(q)− cx = −x2 + (a− c− y)x,
and
g(x, y) = yp(q)− cy = −y2 + (a− c− x)y.
We assume that c < a, otherwise the market price for good unit, being less
than or equal to a, does not exceed the output price.
The duopoly situation can be modeled as a game in strategic form where,
the players are the two firms, the strategies are quantities x, y ∈ [0,+∞) of
produced good, the payoff functions are total profits f, g. Formally,
G = 〈X,Y, f, g〉,
where X = Y = [0,+∞) and, for all strategy profiles (x, y) ∈ X × Y ,
f(x, y) = xp(q)− cx = −x2 + (a− c− y)x,
g(x, y) = yp(q)− cy = −y2 + (a− c− x)y.
It follows immediately that the Cournot game G is a nice game. The in-
tersection (if any exists) of the two reaction functions BRI : Y −→ X and
BRII : X −→ Y are the Nash equilibria of the Cournot game: neither firm
can gain by a change in output, given the output level of its opponent. The
best reply of firm I to strategy y of firm II is
BRI(y) = argmax{−x2 + (a− c− y)x : y ∈ [0,+∞)} =
=
{ a−c−y
2 if 0 6 y < a− c
0 if y > a− c
By simmetry, the best reply of firm II to strategy x of firm I is
BRII(x) = argmax{−y2 + (a− c− x)y : x ∈ [0,+∞)} =
=
{
a−c−x
2 if 0 6 x < a− c
0 if x > a− c
The NE must satisfy {
x = BRI(y)
y = BRII(x)
then, there is only one NE given by
(
a− c
3
,
a− c
3
).
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At the equilibrium, each firm gains
f(
a− c
3
,
a− c
3
) = g(
a− c
3
,
a− c
3
) =
(a− c)2
9
.
The sale price is
p(q) = p(2
a− c
3
) =
a+ 2c
3
.
Since, for hypothesis, c < a, the sale price is greater than unit price, so each
firm gets a profit.
We assume firm I has a monopoly on mineral water, so II produces
y = 0, without profit. Then, the best strategy for I is the quantity of
monopoly
x =
a− c
2
,
which gives to I a profit
f(
a− c
2
, 0) =
(a− c)2
4
.
The sale price is
p(q) = p(
a− c
2
),
which is greater than sale price of duopoly. So the monopolist makes a
profit.
If the firms agree on producing half of monopoly quantity and dividing
the profit in half, their payoff is
f(
a− c
4
,
a− c
4
) = g(
a− c
4
,
a− c
4
) =
(a− c)2
8
,
which is greater then payoff of duopoly. But the strategy profile (a−c4 ,
a−c
4 )
is not a NE, since a−c4 6= BRI(a−c4 ) and a−c4 6= BRII(a−c4 ), so the NE
(a−c3 ,
a−c
3 ) is inefficient.
4.6.2 QUC of Cournot Duopoly
The QUC-extention of the Cournot game G, QUC(G), is the sequence of
games
Gn = 〈[x, x], [y, y], pn, qn〉,
where, [x, x] ⊆ [0,+∞) and [y, y] ⊆ [0,+∞), and the payoff functions are
given by
pn(x, y) =

−x2 + (a− c− y)x− n(x− x)2 if x ∈ [0, x]
−x2 + (a− c− y)x if x ∈ [x, x]
−x2 + (a− c− y)x− n(x− x)2 if x ∈ [x,+∞)
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=

−(1 + n)x2 + (a− c− y + 2xn)x− nx2 if x ∈ [0, x]
−x2 + (a− c− y)x if x ∈ [x, x]
−(1 + n)x2 + (a− c− y + 2xn)x− nx2 if x ∈ [x,+∞)
and
qn(x, y) =

−y2 + (a− c− x)y − n(y − y)2 if y ∈ [0, y]
−y2 + (a− c− x)y if x ∈ [y, y]
−y2 + (a− c− x)y − n(y − y)2 if y ∈ [y,+∞)
=

−(1 + n)y2 + (a− c− x+ 2yn)y − ny2 if y ∈ [0, y]
−y2 + (a− c− x)y if x ∈ [y, y]
−(1 + n)y2 + (a− c− x+ 2yn)y − ny2 if y ∈ [y,+∞)
We focus on pn(x, y) to study the best reply function. pn is composed of
three parables, then the best reply of firm I to strategy y of firm II is
the quantity corresponding to one of the vertices of parables, which are
respectively,
V = (
a− c− y + 2nx
2(1 + n)
,
(a− c− y)2 + 4nx(a− c− y − x)
4(1 + n)
),
V = (
a− c− y
2
,
(a− c− y)2
4
),
and
V = (
a− c− y + 2nx
2(1 + n)
,
(a− c− y)2 + 4nx(a− c− y − x)
4(1 + n)
).
Set
xV
.
=
a− c− y + 2nx
2(1 + n)
, xV
.
=
a− c− y
2
, and xV
.
=
a− c− y + 2nx
2(1 + n)
,
we have:
j) xV < xV ⇔ x < xV ,
in fact, a−c−y+2nx2(1+n) <
a−c−y
2 ⇔ a− c− y+ 2nx < a− c− y+ n(a− c− y) ⇔
x < a−c−y2 .
We have, again,
jj) xV < x ⇔ xV < x,
in fact, a−c−y+2nx2(1+n) < x ⇔ a− c− y + 2nx < 2x+ 2nx ⇔ a−c−y2 < x.
If xV 6 0, that is y > a−c, it is immediate to verify that, for each x > 0,
pn(0, y) = 0 > pn(x, y),
so BRnI (y) = 0.
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If xV > 0, that is y < a − c, then, there are three scenarios, corresponding
to
i) x < x < xV , ii) x < xV < x and iii) xV < x < x.
Case i) x < x < xV . Then,{
xV > x
xV < xV
and
{
xV > x
xV < xV
So, BRnI (y) = xV .
Case ii) x < xV < x. Then,{
xV > x
xV < xV
and
{
xV < x
xV > xV
So, BRnI (y) = xV .
Case iii) xV < x < x. Then,{
xV < x
xV > xV
and
{
xV < x
xV > xV
So, BRnI (y) = xV . The best reply of firm I to strategy y of firm II is
BRnI (y) = argmax{pn(x, y : x ∈ [0,+∞)} =
=

a−c−y+2nx
2(1+n) if 0 6 y 6 a− c− 2x
a−c−y
2 if a− c− 2x < y < a− c− 2x
a−c−y+2nx
2(1+n) if a− c− 2x 6 y < a− c
0 if y > a− c
Simmetrically, the best reply of firm II to strategy x of firm I is
BRnII(x) = argmax{qn(x, y) : y ∈ [0,+∞)} =
=

a−c−x+2ny
2(1+n) if 0 6 x 6 a− c− 2y
a−c−x
2 if a− c− 2y < x < a− c− 2y
a−c−x+2ny
2(1+n) if a− c− 2y 6 x < a− c
0 if x > a− c
Since the reaction functions are linear, there is only one NE, given by the
intersection of the two reaction functions. It depends on the overall sixteen
scenarios.
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4.6.3 A particular case
Let’s consider a particular situation: both firms commit to produce only
one quantity, that is the restricted action space is a singleton, the same for
both players:
x = x = y = y.
The penalty function for firm I becomes, for each x ∈ [0,+∞),
pn(x, y) = −(1 + n)x2 + (a− c− y + 2xn)x− nx2.
If xV 6 0, that is y > a− c+ 2nx, we have, for each x > 0,
pn(0, y) = −nx2 > pn(x, y),
so BRnI = 0. If xV > 0, that is 0 6 y < a− c+ 2nx, the best reply of firm
I to strategy y of firm II is the quantity corresponding to the vertex of the
parable pn, that is
BRnI (y) =
a− c− y + 2nx
2(1 + n)
.
Then, the best reply of firm I to strategy y of firm II is
BRnI (y) =
{
a−c−y+2nx
2(1+n) if 0 6 y 6 a− c+ 2nx
0 if y > a− c+ 2nx
Simmetrically, the best reply of firm II to strategy x of firm I is
BRnII(x)
{
a−c−x+2nx
2(1+n) if 0 6 x 6 a− c+ 2nx
0 if x > a− c+ 2nx
Then, there is only one NE given by the intersection of the two reaction
function graphics in the plane xy:
(
a− c+ 2nx
2n+ 3
,
a− c+ 2nx
2n+ 3
).
As n → +∞, the NE converges to (x, x), that is the wished result. (We
recall that, the Cournot duopoly equilibrium is not Pareto efficient, but if
each player commits to play half the monopoly quantity, then we obtain a
NE for QUC game.). At the equilibrium, each firm gains
pn(
a− c+ 2nx
2n+ 3
,
a− c+ 2nx
2n+ 3
) = qn(
a− c+ 2nx
2n+ 3
,
a− c+ 2nx
2n+ 3
) =
(n+ 1)(
a− c+ 2nx
2n+ 3
)2 − nx2.
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The sale price is
p(q) = p(2
a− c+ 2nx
2n+ 3
) =
(2n+ 1)a+ 2c− 4nx
2n+ 3
.
In particular, if x is the NE duopoly quantity, that is x = a−c3 , the sale
price is the same sale price as for NE duopoly quantity p(2a−c+2nx2n+3 ) =
a+2c
3 .
Instead, if x is half of the monopoly quantity, that is x = a−c4 , the sale price
is p(2a−c+2nx2n+3 ) =
(n+1)a+(n+2)c
2n+3 .
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Figure 4.1: Extension of the game form Γ.
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Figure 4.2: G without NE, but UC(G) with NE.
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Chapter 5
Essentializing Equilibrium
Concepts
5.1 Introduction
We live in a society in which information, the cost of information, and the
quality of products are very important. The efficient use of information is
one of the important matters of Game Theory. In this Chapter we present
a framework to identify what information about a game may be neglected,
in order to check whether a specific profile corresponds to an equilibrium
outcome or not.
Given a game, the goal is usually to find all equilibrium profiles. In this
work, we reverse the perspective. We select a strategy profile and check
whether it is an equilibrium of the game. Why this different approach?
The starting point of this research is a question raised in Garc´ıa-Jurado and
Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2006). Given an extensive game, an equilibrium concept se-
lects a set of strategy profiles (even empty ) satisfying well-defined conditions
testing on all game trees 1. Dealing with unilateral commitments, we face
extremely large game trees, with many subgames, some of which correspond
to senseless commitments. From here, the demands of “pruning” the tree
springs, i.e. locating the irrelevant parts of the game tree which need not be
considered. So, in the preliminary stage of the unilateral commitment game,
we have to choose the commitment corresponding an efficient outcome, and
then to check whether the profile is an equilibrium. To essentialize an EC
for a fixed strategy profile means to locate the parts of the game tree needed
1Hereafter we will shorten EC for equilibrium concept.
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to check whether the profile satisfies the EC conditions.
5.1.1 An example
Let us begin by introducing a simple example to understand the essentializ-
ing of an equilibrium concept. We consider the following extensive game G
in Figure 5.1. The NE are (L, l) and (R, r). To check whether the strategy
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Figure 5.1: G.
profile b = (L, l) is a subgame perfect equilibrium 2, the payoff (2, 2) is irrel-
evant, since the outcome z4 can never be reached after unilateral deviations.
Let G′ be the game in Figure 5.2, obtained by G replacing the terminal
node z4 with a matching pennies game. We consider b
′ = ((L,L1), (l, l1)),
which restricted to G coincides with b. To check if b′ = ((L,L1), (l, l1)) is
a SPE for G′, in this case the behavior in the subgame matters. Indeed, b′
is not a SPE of G′, because the matching pennies subgame has not a Nash
equilibrium. The problem becomes to search for an equivalent profile. That
is, we search any SPE of G′ realization equivalent to b′, in the sense that
it coincides with b′ in the part of the game relevant for b′. To answer this
question, the payoffs and the behavior in the matching pennies game are
completely irrelevant since this subgame cannot be reached via unilateral
deviations from b′.
If we replace again the matching pennies payoffs with all zero, b′ is a
2Hereafter we will shorten SPE for subgame perfect equilibrium.
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SPE of the new game, but the matching pennies subgame is not relevant
for b′, since it cannot be reached via unilateral deviations from b′. For this
reason we abstract the game form Γ from the game G and we focus only on
the game form. Throughout this chapter, a game in extensive form G is a
game form together with a payoff function G = (Γ, h). Then, for every game
having the same game form as G, the payoffs and behavior in the proper
subgame of the game are irrelevant to know if the outcome of b is a SPE
outcome.
The above discussion suggests that we may determine whether the out-
come of a given strategy profile is an equilibrium outcome, without taking
into account all the parts of the game tree. So we identify the relevant part
of the tree and disregard the information about the irrelevant part of the
tree. Formally we study the following problem:
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“Given an equilibrium concept EC, an (extensive) game form Γ,
and a (behavior) strategy profile b, identify W , a minimal collection
of information sets of Γ, with the following property:
If a game G has game form Γ and b is an equilibrium of G, then,
whatever changes are made in the payoffs and strategies outside W ,
the outcome of b will be an equilibrium outcome in the resulting
game.”
The concept of inessentiality is very intuitive. Not being in W , i.e. being
irrelevant,it is related to the fact of not being reachable through unilateral
deviations or sequences of unilateral deviations. The difficulty lies in find-
ing an appropriate mathematical formulation of the above problem that is
operative for all equilibrium concepts. Under our approach, given an equili-
brium concept, a game form, and a strategy profile, there is a unique minimal
collection of information sets satisfying the above property. We refer to it as
the essential collection for EC, Γ, and b. Then, we characterize the essential
collections of different equilibrium concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, sub-
game perfect equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, sequential rationality, weak
perfect Bayesinan equilibrium, and sequential equilibrium. The contribution
of this chapter is to provide a definition of essential collection useful in the
various applications, as described below.
Applications
The possible applications of essentializing equilibrium concepts concern the
reduced games, the structural robustness, and the virtual equilibrium con-
cepts.
Given an equilibrium concept, a game G, and a strategy profile b of G,
the reduced version of G is a game sufficient to check whether b is an equi-
librium for G. That is, if b restricted to the reduced game is an equilibrium
of the reduced game, then b is an equilibrium of the original game G. Since
the reduced game might be smaller than the original game, the above verifi-
cation might be easier. A similar approach to the concept of reduced game
has already been used for SPE in Osborne (1993) in a model of political
competition. In Section 5.5 we use the model of Osborne to illustrate the
different implications and applications of the essentializing of an EC and in
Section 5.11 we treat the concepts of reduced game.
The results obtained for the reduced game also allow us to understand
the structural robustness of the equilibrium concepts to modifications in the
game, such as changes in the sets of strategies, in the players of the game, in
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the information available to the players, and also in the payoffs. The checks
of robustness for Nash equilibrium have already been made in Kalai (2005)
and in Kalai (2006) in the so-called large games Moreover, we show that
sometimes we may determine whether a given outcome is an equilibrium
outcome of a game only partially-specified.
The virtual equilibrium concept is the other main application of our re-
sults. For each equilibrium concept we define its virtual version by nar-
rowing the checking conditions on the relevant parts of the game tree. We
show that, given an equilibrium concept, if the original game has at least
an equilibrium, the sets of equilibrium outcomes and virtual equilibrium
outcomes coincide. In general, there are games without equilibria but with
virtual equilibria, the virtual equilibria being still sensible in the spirit of
their non-virtual counterpart. The concept of virtual equilibrium for SPE
has been introduced by Garc´ıa-Jurado and Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2006) to get a
folk theorem for a class of repeated games in which the existence of subgame
perfect equilibria is not guaranteed. The equilibrium notion used in Osborne
(1993) is also very close to the virtual SPE, as well as the approach taken in
Groenert (2007) in order to introduce the idea of trimmed equilibrium and
apply it to subgame perfect equilibrium and weak perfect Bayesian equili-
brium. In Section 5.12 we define the virtual equilibria of various equilibrium
concepts according to the analysis developed for SPE in Garc´ıa-Jurado and
Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2006).
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we introduce the
basic notations and, in particular, the concept of W-combination of games,
profiles, and beliefs (Subsection 5.2.3). In Section 5.3 we define the main
concepts of essential collection which we will analyze. In Section 5.4, we
present an overview of the main results and, in Section 5.5, we build upon
the model in Osborne (1993) to illustrate some implications and applica-
tions. In Sections 5.6 and 5.8, we characterize the essential collections for
the most used equilibrium concepts (NE, SPE, PE, and SR, WPBE, and
SE). In the remaining sections we present some applications of our analy-
sis. In particular, in Sections 5.9 and 5.11, we introduce the decomposition
(with respect to a collection) of a game into two games, the reduced and the
complementary. In Subsection 5.11.1, we analyze the robustness of different
equilibrium concepts with respect to changes in the games, and what hap-
pens when a game is partially-specified game. Finally, in Section 5.12 we
study the concept of Virtual Equilibrium.
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5.2 Notations
5.2.1 Game and Game Form
We develop our analysis for finite extensive games with perfect recall, al-
though it can be extended to extensive games of infinite length. We fol-
low the representation of an extensive game given in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991a), representation equivalent to the classic one given by Kuhn (1953)
and further developed in Selten (1975) and Kreps and Wilson (1982).
Definition 57. A game form Γ in extensive form is characterized by
i) a finite game tree with root r(Γ), ii) a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n},
iii) the sets of nodes X(Γ), terminal nodes Z(Γ), and information sets U(Γ),
iv) the probabilities of natural choice, if any.
Under this representation, nature moves only once at r(Γ) and U(Γ) is a
partition of X(Γ), i.e. each terminal node is also an information set. Let
Ui(Γ) denote the information sets belonging to a player i ∈ N .
Definition 58. A game G in extensive form is a pair 〈Γ, h〉, where Γ is
a game form and h : Z(Γ) → Rn is the payoff function, such that h(z) =
(h1(z), . . . , hn(z)). hi(z) is the payoff of player i ∈ N if z is occurred.
G(Γ) denotes the set of games with game form Γ, B(Γ) =
n∏
i=1
Bi(Γ) the set
of behavior strategy profiles of a game G or a game form Γ, and, with slight
abuse of notation, hi(b) the (expected) payoff to player i when b ∈ B(Γ) is
played. Given G ∈ G(Γ), let MG := max
i∈N,z∈Z(Γ)
|hi(z)|+ 1.
Definition 59. Let Γ be a game form, and b, b¯ ∈ B(Γ). b and b¯ are realiza-
tion equivalent if all the nodes of Γ are reached with the same probabilities
under b and b¯.
Being b and b¯ realization equivalent does not mean that b ≡ b¯, as proved by
Figure 5.3.
We will show that b and b¯ are equivalent realization if the profiles are
the same when restricted to an essential collection W . In fact, by Defini-
tion 70 of essential collection, W contains pi(b), which in turn contains the
nodes reached with positive probability. Out of W , the information sets are
reached with null probability. Then, if two behavior strategy profiles coin-
cide in W , they coincide in the information sets we can reach with positive
probability.
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Figure 5.3: b and b¯ are equivalent realization.
Given b ∈ B(Γ), pi(b) denotes the collection of information sets that are
reached with positive probability when b is played, i.e., pi(b) can be seen
as the union of all paths of play that might be realized when b is played.
Hence, with slight abuse of language, we refer to pi(b) itself as the path of b.
Only if the strategies are pure, we can characterize two equivalent profile in
the following way.
The profiles b, b′ ∈ B(Γ) are equivalent realization if and only if pi(b) = pi′(b).
In fact, with mixed strategies, there might be two strategy profiles which
reach the same nodes but with different probability.
The concept of equivalence which we apply to profiles is similar to the
one introduced for strategies by Aumann and Hart (1992). The authors
define equivalent two strategies bi and b
′
i of player i if they yield the same
payoffs for any strategies b−i of the other players. They show that, for each
terminal node z, the probabilities that z is reached under (bi, b−i) and under
(b
′
i, b−i) are the same for any b−i. The two concepts are different, not only
since we apply to strategy profiles instead of strategies, but also because our
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case equivalent realization requires that the probability that each node is
reached is the same for the two strategy profiles.
Now we define some binary relations for the sets X(Γ) and U(Γ).
Definition 60. The node x ∈ X(Γ) is a predecessor of y ∈ X(Γ), denoted
by x ≺ y, if x 6= y and x is in the path from the root to y; x 4 y means that
either x ≺ y or x = y. If x 4 y, then the path of nodes from x to y is the
sequence formed by x, y, and the nodes between x and y.
The precedence relation is transitive (if x ≺ y and y ≺ z, then x ≺ z) and
asymmetric (if x ≺ y then not y ≺ x), hence it is a partial order. It is
not a complete order since two nodes may not be comparable: in figure 5.1,
neither z1 ≺ z3 nor z3 ≺ z1.
Similarly,
Definition 61. The information set u ∈ U(Γ) is a predecessor of v ∈ U(Γ),
denoted by u ≺ v, if u 6= v and there are x ∈ u and y ∈ v such that x ≺ y;
u 4 v means that either u ≺ v or u = v. 3 If x 4 y, then the path
of information sets from x to y is the sequence formed by ux, uy, and the
information sets containing nodes in between x and y.
Whenever we represent a path of nodes or information sets as a sequence
{x1, . . . , xk} it is implicitly assumed that x1 ≺ x2 ≺ . . . ≺ xk. Also, given
x ∈ X(Γ) and u ∈ U(Γ), x ≺ u and u ≺ x are defined in the obvious manner.
5.2.2 Collections
Definition 62. A collection W of information sets is a subset of U(Γ).
We denote Wi the information sets belonging to player i ∈ N .
Definition 63. A collection W ⊂ U(Γ) is closed (under 4) if, for each
v ∈W and each u ∈ U(Γ),
u ≺ v ⇒ u ∈W.
It is immediate to prove that arbitrary unions and intersections of closed
collections lead to closed collections. Then, given an arbitrary family of
3Note that it is possible to have both u ≺ v and v ≺ u.
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closed collections containing a collection W , it makes sense to introduce the
smallest closed collection containing W , since this set is the intersection of
all elements of the family. According to the previous considerations, 〈W 〉
denotes the smallest closed collection containing a collection W . Then, we
can define a closed collection.
Definition 64. A collection W ⊂ U(Γ) is closed (under 4), if
〈W 〉 = W.
Remark 7. In the definition of Essential Collection, we will require closed-
ness, not only in order to facilitate the analysis (and the proofs) of the results
in Sections 5.6 and 5.8, and applications in Section 5.11, but also since we
want, from a game form,to build a structure which is as close as possible to
a game form. The Example in Figure 5.8 shows a collection sufficient but
not closed.
Definition 65. A collection W ⊂ U(Γ) is terminal if, for each u ∈W and
each x ∈ u, there is z ∈W ∩ Z(Γ) such that x 4 z.
It is immediate to prove that arbitrary unions of terminal collections
lead to terminal collections.
The next lemma is useful for the proofs of the main results in this chapter.
We show that a closed and terminal collection is different from a terminal
collection in terminal nodes only.
Lemma 3. Let Γ be a game form. Let W and W¯ be two collections in U(Γ)
closed under 4. If W¯ is terminal and W¯\W 6= ∅, then (W¯\W )∩Z(Γ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Let u ∈ W¯\W . Since W¯ is terminal, there is z ∈ W¯ ∩Z(Γ) such that
u 4 z. Now, since W is closed under 4, u /∈ W , and u 4 z, we have that
z /∈W .
5.2.3 W-combination
Given a collection W relating to a given game form Γ, we define an operation
⊗W which allows to combine games, payoffs, strategy profiles, and beliefs.
Given b ∈ B(Γ) and W ⊂ U(Γ), bW denotes the restriction of b to the
information sets in W . Similarly, b−W denotes the restriction of b to the
information sets outside W .
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Definition 66. Given a collection W ⊂ U(Γ), the W -combination of two
games G = (Γ, h), G¯ = (Γ, h¯) ∈ G(Γ) is the game of G(Γ)
G⊗W G¯ := (Γ, h⊗W h¯),
where
h⊗W h¯(z) =
{
h(z) if z ∈ Z(Γ) ∩W and
h¯(z) if z ∈ Z(Γ)\W .
The Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 show the two games with their combination
and that ⊗W is not commutative.
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Figure 5.4: First factor game: G b = (L, l).
Similarly,
Definition 67. Given a collection W ⊂ U(Γ), the W -combination of two
profiles b, b¯ ∈ B(Γ) is the profile of B(Γ)
b⊗W b¯ := (bW , b¯−W ),
i.e., the profile that consists of playing according to b in W and to b¯ else-
where.
Clearly, the payoffs associated with b and b ⊗W b¯ coincide, since they
define the same path.
Let M(Γ) denote the set of all beliefs that can be defined on Γ.
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Figure 5.5: Second factor game: G¯ b¯ = (R, r).
Definition 68. Given a collection W ⊂ U(Γ), the W -combination of two
beliefs µ, µ¯ ∈M(Γ) is the belief of M(Γ)
µ⊗W µ¯ := (µW , µ¯−W ).
For sake of notation, when no confusion arises, we use the abbreviated
notations G⊗, h⊗, b⊗, and µ⊗.
5.3 Essential collections
5.3.1 Essential collections
Definition 69. Fixed an equilibrium concept EC, let Γ be a game form and
b ∈ B(Γ). A collection W ⊂ U(Γ) is sufficient for EC, Γ, and b if it satisfies
the following properties:
i. pi(b) ⊂W , i.e., W contains the path of b.
ii. If G, G¯ ∈ G(Γ) are such that b ∈ EC(G) and EC(G¯) 6= ∅, then, there
is bˆ ∈ EC(G⊗W G¯) such that b and bˆ coincide in W .
Note that the conditions i) and ii) together imply that b and bˆ are real-
ization equivalent. If EC(G¯) = ∅, the definition is without consequences.
The property ii) contains the gist of being a sufficient collection and the
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Figure 5.6: The combination of games.
property i) imposes some minimality requirement, since an empty collection
always satisfies ii). Thus, the path of b is a natural candidate since we then
ensure that (bW , bˆ−W ) is realization equivalent to b, which was an important
element in the motivation section.
In place of condition ii), the most natural thing to do would be to request
that:
iii. b ∈ EC(G) and b¯ ∈ EC(G¯) ⇒ b⊗W b¯ ∈ EC(G⊗W G¯).
This natural condition is suitable for non belief-based equilibria (see Section
5.6), but it is too restrictive for belief-based equilibria. We will debate about
it in Section 5.8, where we will show that, for SE as equilibrium concept,
condition iii) is false.
The idea behind the sufficient collections is the following. Taken a col-
lection W sufficient (for EC, Γ, and b) and taken G ∈ G(Γ) for which b is
an equilibrium, if we change the payoffs outside W , provided that the new
game has some equilibrium, then there will be one that is realization equiva-
lent to b. Consider again the game G′ introduced in section 5.1.1, with SPE
as the equilibrium concept. There will always be a SPE of the game that
is realization equivalent to b′, whatever payoffs we put instead of those of
the matching pennies subgame, since the collection W , left after removing
the matching pennies subgame, is sufficient for SPE, Γ, and b′. Indeed to
answer the question “does any equilibrium of G′ coincide with b′ in W?”,
the behavior outside W does not matter and if the answer is positive, then it
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remains positive for the new game, regardless of how we change the payoffs
outside W . In particular, the outcome of b′ will be an equilibrium outcome
in the new game.
The property of being a sufficient collection only depends on the equi-
librium concept at hand and on the given game form and strategy profile,
while it does not depend on the possible payoffs associated with the game
form.
Lemma 4. If W is sufficient for EC, Γ and b, then it is also sufficient for
any other b¯ such that bW = b¯W .
Proof. Straightforward.
Lemma 5. The finite intersection of sufficient collections is a sufficient
collection.
Proof. Fixed an equilibrium concept EC, let Γ be a game form, b ∈ B(Γ),
and W ,W¯ be two sufficient collections (for EC, Γ, and b). First, the de-
finition of sufficient collection implies W ∩ W¯ contains pi(b). Then, let G
and G¯ ∈ G(Γ) be such that b ∈ EC(G) and EC(G¯) 6= ∅. We want to find
bˆ ∈ EC(G ⊗W∩W¯ G¯) such that b and bˆ coincide in W ∩ W¯ . Since W is a
sufficient collection, there is b˜ ∈ EC(G ⊗W G¯) that coincides with b in W .
Let G˜ = G⊗W G¯. Since W¯ is a sufficient collection, there is bˆ ∈ EC(G˜⊗W¯ G¯)
that coincides with b˜ in W¯ . Now, by definition, bˆ coincides with b in W ∩ W¯
and G˜⊗W¯ G¯ = G⊗W∩W¯ G¯.
Corollary 6. Fixed an equilibrium concept EC, let Γ be a game form and
b ∈ B(Γ). Then, there is a unique minimal collection that is sufficient for
EC, Γ, and b. Moreover, there is a unique minimal collection that is closed
and sufficient for EC, Γ, and b.
Proof. We consider the intersection of all the sufficient collections for EC,
Γ, and b. Since Γ is always a sufficient collection and all the sufficient col-
lections contain pi(b), non-emptiness is guaranteed. The above intersection
is contained in all the sufficient collections and its sufficiency follows from
Lemma 5. The proof of the second statement is analogous, since Γ is a closed
collection and the intersection of closed collections is a closed collection.
Remark 8. If W and W¯ are two collections such that W ⊂ W¯ and W is
sufficient (for some EC, Γ, and b), then W¯ need not be also sufficient. In
fact the condition that b and bˆ coincide in W¯ (see Definition 69) can be
much more demanding than the corresponding condition for W .
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Definition 70. Fixed an equilibrium concept EC, let Γ be a game form and
b ∈ B(Γ). The essential collection for EC, Γ, and b, denoted by WEC(Γ, b),
is the unique minimal collection closed under 4 and sufficient for EC, Γ,
and b.
Definition 71. To essentialize an equilibrium concept EC is to find the map
WEC that assigns, to each pair (Γ, b), the essential collection WEC(Γ, b).
The closing request for an essential collection is quite natural. For exam-
ple, in the case of belief-based equilibrium concept, let u ∈ Ui(Γ) be an
information set in the essential collection, that is player i’s behavior at u
is relevant for EC, Γ, and b. The closedness under 4 assures that what b
prescribes for information sets that precede u should also be relevant, as it
might affect the beliefs and behavior of i at u. The closedness provides to a
collection a structure similar to a game form. Again, if this requirement is
removed, then some unnatural essential collections might appear.
5.4 Discussion of the contribution
The definition of essentializing an equilibrium concept is so general that it
is implementable to all the classical equilibrium concepts. But the analysis
is cumbersome already for Nash equilibrium. Before the formal charac-
terization of the essential collections associated with different equilibrium
concepts, we present in this section the main results of the chapter.
We divide the equilibrium concepts into two groups: non-belief-based
equilibrium concepts (NE, SPE, and PE) and belief-based-equilibrium con-
cepts (SR, WPBE, SE, and a whole family of intermediate equilibrium con-
cepts). i) The characterization for the first group is quite intuitive and
provides no new insights into the nature of those equilibria. Let Γ be a
game form and b ∈ B(Γ), then we have:
Nash equilibrium: the essential collection consists of all the information
sets that can be reached after an unilateral deviation from b.
Subgame perfect equilibrium: the essential collection is constructed ite-
ratively. At each step, we add to the essential collection those infor-
mation sets that can be reached after an unilateral deviation from b,
deviation narrowed to subgames reached in the previous step.
Perfect equilibrium: every information set belongs to the essential col-
lection.
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In particular, in a game with perfect information, since a subgame begins
at every node, the essential collection for SPE contains all the nodes of
the game, that is it coincides with the essential collection for PE. This is
not the case for NE. For the above characterizations, the more demanding
an equilibrium concept is, the larger its corresponding essential collection.
ii) This natural result does not hold for belief-based equilibrium concepts,
rather the opposite one does. More specifically, let Γ be a game form and
(b, µ) an assessment, where b ∈ B(Γ), and µ ∈M(Γ), then
Sequential rationality: every information set belongs to the essential col-
lection.
Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium: µ is calculated using Bayes rule
in the path of b and the essential collection is constructed iteratively.
At each step, we add to the essential collection those information sets
that can be reached after an unilateral deviation from b, deviation
narrowed to the continuation games reached with positive probability,
according to µ, in the previous step.
Sequential equilibrium: µ is consistent with b and the essential collec-
tion is constructed iteratively. At each step we add to the essential
collection those information sets that can be reached after an unilate-
ral deviation from b narrowed to the continuation games reached with
positive probability, according to µ, in the previous step.
We can note the parallelism between the characterization of essential col-
lection for WPBE and for SE. When we use the same approach to SR, we
require that µ is a system of beliefs and we apply the iterative construc-
tion for the essential collection. With no restrictions on the beliefs, every
node can always be reached after a series of unilateral deviations. From the
characterization for belief-based-equilibrium concepts, the more demanding
an equilibrium concept is, the smaller its corresponding essential collection.
For instance, for every game form and every strategy profile, the essential
information sets for SE are a subset of those for WPBE or, equivalently, if an
information set is irrelevant for WPBE, then it is irrelevant for SE as well.
We show in the example below that the converse is not true in general. The
definition of essential collection for belief-based equilibrium concepts, com-
pared to one for non-belief-based equilibrium concepts, requires a condition
on the belief set to be considered. The less restrictive equilibrium concepts
allow for more beliefs, hence more parts of the game tree can be reached af-
ter a sequence of unilateral deviations, then the essential collections became
larger.
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We present now an example to illustrate some implications of the above
characterizations and also some applications of results in the paper. We
mainly concentrate our discussion on the essential collections for WPBE
and SE.
5.5 A candidate positioning game (Osborne (1993))
In this Section, we read the model of Osborne (1993) in the light of the argu-
ments introduced in the Chapter. We omit some elements not needed to our
approach. We consider a game with three players, which represent the three
potential candidates in an election. We denote Γ(3) the three player game.
The voters are a continuum set, each of whom has a most preferred or ideal
policy. The ideal policies of voters are given by the continuous distribution
function F , whose support is the [0, 1] interval. Voters vote sincerely, i.e.
each voter endorses the candidate whose position is closest to his ideal, if
indifferent, he decides randomly. The candidate, who obtains a majority
(plurality rule), wins. At each period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, with T > 2, candidates
simultaneously decide whether to wait, which is denoted by w, or to enter
the competition announcing a policy pi ∈ [0, 1]. Policies are decided once
and for all. Hence, at each period, a player who has already announced a po-
licy cannot take any further action and, otherwise, he can either announce a
policy, i.e. a number in [0, 1], or decide to wait, i.e. w. Candidates can only
use pure strategies4. The player who plays w in every period has decided to
stay out of the election. Once reached period T , the election is held and the
candidate with more votes wins. The notion of essential collection is very
close to the idea behind the observation of Osborne: “in Γ(3), as in other
sequential games in which some choices are made simultaneously, the spirit
of subgame perfect equilibrium is captured by a notion that requires only a
partial specification of the player’s strategies”.
Suppose we want to study the strategy profile b where the player I and
II enter in period 1 with policies p1 and p2 respectively, whereas player III
chooses w in each period. Again, following Osborne (1993): to fully describe
b, for player I we must “specify an action in period 2 for every first-period
profile of action (w, s2, s3), where s2 and s3 are members of [0, 1] ∪ {w}.
However, there is just one relevant subgame in which player I has to take
an action: the one that follows the first-period action profile (w, s2, w)”.
4Osborne argues that, in this setting, “the problem of finding equilibria in mixed
strategies seems intractable” and, moreover, ”voters may have an aversion to candidates
who choose their positions randomly. . .”
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Essential collection for SPE. Let WSPE be the essential collection for
SPE, Γ, and b. Then, following the informal characterization above, the
only information set of the form (w, x2, w) that would belong to WSPE would
indeed be (w, s2, w), since all the others involve a multilateral deviation at
period 1. That shows an important advantage of the essentializing approach.
In order to study whether an outcome of the game is an equilibrium out-
come or not, we need to check the incentive only in some subgames of the
game. The reduced game. In Section 5.11, given a game G, we associate a
reduced game GW with each closed collection of information sets W . The
idea is to remove from G all the information sets that are not in W , in such
a way that what is left still forms a game. For instance, when studying the
strategy profile b, none of subgames starting at information sets of the form
(w, s2, s3) would be the root of a subgame in the reduced game, except for
(w, x2, w). Now, for Proposition 15, if the restriction of b to the reduced
game is a SPE of the reduced game, then b is a SPE of the game Γ(3),
provided that Γ(3) indeed has at least one SPE. Structural robustness. The
reduced game is also applied to the study of the structural robustness of the
different equilibrium concept. For example, let b ∈ SPE(Γ(3)). How robust
would this equilibrium be to the structural changes in the game? We sup-
pose that the following rule is valid, in order to encourage early positioning
of candidates. If no candidate has entered the competition after period 2,
then the election is suspended. Would b still be an equilibrium of the new
game? Since no subgame at which the election is suspended belongs to the
reduced game associated with b (they cannot be reached after unilateral de-
viations from b, where two candidates enter already in period 1), the above
change in the rules of the game would have no impact for the profile b. That
is, whether b is an equilibrium outcome or not is independent (robust) from
those changes in the rules of Γ(3) that only affect information sets outside
the reduced game associated with b. Partial-specifications of the game. This
issue is related to the one above. The idea is that essential collections may
provide some information about the equilibrium outcomes of games that are
not completely specified. We suppose that in Γ(3) we have no idea about
how the game unfolds if no player has entered the competition after period
T . Even in this case, we know (by Corollary 9) that, no matter how the game
is defined from that point onwards, the outcome of b is going to be an SPE
outcome. Hence, essential collections help to identify what misspecifications
in the game are irrelevant for different strategies and equilibrium concepts.
Virtual equilibrium concepts. We suppose that there are some subgames of
game Γ(3) for which we do not even know whether a Nash equilibrium exists
or not. Then, it might be that the game Γ(3) has no SPE. The concept of
virtual equilibrium intervenes in studying a game with subgames for which
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we do not even know whether a Nash equilibrium exists or not. A strategy
profile b is a virtual SPE, if it is a SPE of the reduced game associated
with its collection essential for SPE and the game form at hand. The vir-
tual version of any other equilibrium concept is defined analogously. Hence,
for the strategy b to be a virtual SPE it is needed that all the subgames
of the corresponding reduced game have a Nash equilibrium, but we do not
care about this for subgames outside the essential collection associated with
b. Given a virtual equilibrium, we can always replace the non-equilibrium
behavior outside the essential collection by equilibrium behavior (if this ex-
ists) to get an equilibrium in the classic sense. Then, by Proposition 15, if
the set of SPE of the original game is nonempty, the set of SPE outcomes
and virtual SPE outcomes coincides: which justify the name virtual. The
equilibrium notion introduced in Osborne (1993) is extremely close to the
virtual version of SPE. Indeed, Osborne wrote “the advantage of working
with this notion of equilibrium in the game Γ(3) is that it is not necessary . . .
to worry about the existence of an equilibrium, in irrelevant subgames” and
“ the relation between an equilibrum in this sense and a subgame perfect
equilbrium is close: a subgame perfect equilibrium is an equilibrium and
if every subgame has a subgame perfect equilibrium then an equilibrium is
associated with at least one subgame perfect equilibrium”, which is anolo-
gous to what we said above for virtual equilibrium concepts: every EC is a
V EC and, if an EC exists, for each V EC we can find an EC with the same
outcome.
5.6 Essentializing non-belief-based equilibrium con-
cepts
The classic equilibrium concepts not based on beliefs are the Nash equili-
brium, the subgame perfect equilibrium, and the perfect equilibrium. In
this section we present their essentializing, even if the characterizations add
nothing more to common knowledge of each equilibrium concept. We report
these intuitive results not only for completeness, but also to support the ade-
quacy of definitions and to make the readers familiar with the approach and
with the tecniques of the proofs.
We introduce the stronger concept of sufficiency that will be quite useful
to prove the characterization results.
Definition 72. Fix an equilibrium concept EC. Let Γ be a game form and
b ∈ B(Γ). A collection W ⊂ U(Γ) is strongly sufficient for EC, Γ, and b if
it has the following properties:
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i) pi(b) ⊂W , i.e. W contains the path of b.
ii) Let b¯ ∈ B(Γ) and G, G¯ ∈ G(Γ) be such that b ∈ EC(G) and b¯ ∈ EC(G¯).
Then b⊗W b¯ ∈ EC(G⊗W G¯) .
Obviously a strongly sufficient collection is also a sufficient collection.
5.6.1 Nash equilibrium
Let Γ be a game form and b ∈ B(Γ). First, we consider the collection V of
information sets reached after at most one unilateral deviation from b.
V := {u ∈ U(Γ) : ∃i ∈ N, b′i ∈ Bi(Γ) such that u ∈ pi(b−i, b′i)}.
Then, we consider its closure under 4:
W bNE := 〈V 〉.
We note that W bNE ⊃ pi(b) taking b′i = bi and W bNE is a terminal collection.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the definition of W bNE . The collection W
b
NE suffices to
essentialize NE.
Proposition 8. W bNE is the essential collection for NE, Γ, and b.
Proof. First we prove that W bNE is strongly sufficient for NE, Γ, and b.
By definition, choosing b′i = b, we have W
b
NE ⊃ pi(b). Let b¯ ∈ B(Γ) and
G = (Γ, h), G¯ = (Γ, h¯) ∈ G(Γ) be such that b ∈ NE(G) and b¯ ∈ NE(G¯).
We suppose, by contradiction, b⊗ /∈ NE(G⊗). Then, there are a player
i ∈ N and b′i ∈ Bi(Γ) such that h⊗i (b⊗−i, b
′
i) > h
⊗
i (b
⊗). Since W bNE ⊃
pi(b), h⊗i (b
⊗) = hi(b). By definition of W bNE , pi(b
⊗
−i) ⊂ W bNE . Hence,
h⊗i (b
⊗
−i, b
′
i) = hi(b
⊗
−i, b
′
i). Moreover, since(b−i, b
′
i) and (b
⊗
−i, b
′
i) coincide in
W bNE , pi(b−i, b
′
i) = pi(b
⊗
−i, b
′
i). Hence, hi(b−i, b
′
i) = hi(b
⊗
−i, b
′
i) > hi(b
⊗) =
hi(b), contradicting the fact that b ∈ NE(G).
Second, we show that W bNE is a minimal closed and sufficient collection
and thus, essential. By definition, W bNE = 〈W bNE〉. Let W be a sufficient
and closed collection for NE, Γ, and b that does not contain W bNE . By
Lemma 3, since W bNE is terminal, there is z¯ ∈ (W bNE\W )∩Z(Γ). Let i ∈ N
and b′i ∈ B(Γ) such that z¯ ∈ pi(b−i, b′i). Consider the path of information
sets from the root to z¯, {u1, . . . , uk}, i.e., u1 = r(Γ) and uk = z¯. Since W bNE
is closed, {u1, . . . , uk} ⊂ W bNE . Since W is closed, u1 ∈ W and uk /∈ W ,
there is a unique k¯ such that uk¯−1 ∈ W and uk¯ /∈ W . Let G = (Γ, h) be
such that, for each i ∈ N and each z ∈ Z(Γ), hi(z) = 0. Let G¯ = (Γ, h¯)
106 Unilateral Commitments
Ic root
@
@
@
@
@
 
 
 
 
 
 	L R
s
A
A
A
A
A






s
A
A
A
A
A





l r l r
II u
sz1 sz2 sz3 sz4
Γ b = (L, l)
Ic root
ss II u
sz1 sz2 sz3
WNE(b)
Figure 5.7: The collection W bNE .
be such that, for each i ∈ N and each z ∈ Z(Γ), if uk¯ 4 z, h¯i(z) := 1 and
h¯i(z) := 0 otherwise. Note that, since W is closed, h¯i(z) := 1 implies that
z /∈ W . Note that b ∈ NE(G) and G⊗W G¯ = G¯. Since pi(b) ⊂ W , in game
G¯, all the payoffs in pi(b) are 0. Take now bˆ ∈ B(Γ) such that it coincides
with b in W . Then, for each i ∈ N , hi(bˆ) = 0. By construction, there is
z ∈ Z(Γ) such that uk¯ 4 z and z ∈ pi(bˆ−i, b¯i). Hence, hi(bˆ−i, b¯i) > 0 = hi(bˆ),
bˆ /∈ NE(G⊗W G¯), contradicting the sufficiency of W .
In general, W bNE 6= V , as depicted in Figure 5.8. The node x cannot be
reached by unilateral deviations, but x belongs to W bNE . The closedness is
a natural request to an essential collection since it gives to the collection a
structure similar to a game form. In fact, given any game in G(Γ), x is not
relevant to know if there is a NE that is realization equivalent to b. This
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example cannot be trivially adapted, for instance, to SE, since the beliefs
of player III might depend on the behavior at x and hence, adding x to an
essential collection might be natural.
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Figure 5.8: W bNE 6= V .
5.6.2 Essentializing NE in Strategic Form
In the previous section we have essentialized the Nash equilibrium concept
for an extensive game. It is natural to query what happens whether we
make a similar analysis for a strategic game. We are going to show that the
two procedures reach the same conclusion, and, hence, the analysis starting
from strategic form sustains the validity of the other through extensive form.
Using strategic games to identify inessential elements for other equilibrium
concepts like SPE or SE would become very cumbersome.
We consider the two-players strategic gameG = 〈X,Y, f, g〉 in Figure 5.9.
Using the definition of NE, we identify which elements of G are essential to
check if a given strategy profile is a NE. In fact, (B,R) is a Nash equilibrium
for G, since
f(B,R) > f(x,R) ∀x ∈ X
and
g(B,R) > g(B, y) ∀y ∈ Y.
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\II W L C R E
N 0 2 1 0 4 1 1 1 0 3
T 2 1 4 0 3 1 2 1 1 4
M 1 2 0 0 2 1 0 4 2 1
B 2 1 3 0 1 1 2 2 3 0
S 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 4
Figure 5.9: Essentializing NE in strategic game.
Then, all the essential strategy profiles are only shaped like
(x,R), ∀x ∈ X and (B, y), ∀y ∈ Y.
We cannot change these strategy profiles, without the risk of losing the
equilibrium, while the strategy profiles outside the cross, formed by row B
and column R (see figure 5.9), are irrelevant, that is, they do not influence
the fact that (B,R) is a NE.
Note that the restriction of G to the set ({B}×Y )∪ (X×{R}) ⊆ X×Y
is not a game in strategic form. We recall that, in the essentializing pro-
cess with an extensive game, we were looking for “something” very close
to the structure of an extensive game. It is sufficient to work with the
outcomes, corresponding to the selected strategy profiles, in order to recon-
struct “something” very close to a game or to a game form. Note again
that the correspondence that maps each strategy profile into its outcomes is
surjective, but not injective. The following example will clarify better this
statement.
Let us consider the extensive game G depicted in Figure 5.10. The game
has two NE: (E, l) and (L, r). Let b = (L, r), then W bNE = {u, v, z2, z4, z5}.
The game G in strategic form is depicted in Figure 5.11, where the outcomes
corresponding to the terminal nodes in W bNE are underlined. Instead, the
strategy profiles relevant are those inside the cross, formed by row L and
column r (see figure 5.11). It is immediately noted that the strategy profile
(E, l) appears. This happens since, in the node z5, player II does not have
to move and two strategy profiles (E, l) and (E, r) correspond to the same
outcome. It is sufficient to make a quotient, in order to solve the problem.
If the strategy profile b is (E, l), it adds up.
Formally, let G = (Γ, h) be an extensive game, and b ∈ B(Γ) a profile.
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Figure 5.10: G in extensive form.
I
\
\II l r
L 1 1 3 2
R 0 3 1 5
E 2 6 2 6
Figure 5.11: G in strategic form.
Essentializing the NE for the extensive game, we find the collection W bNE .
Let, in parallel, G = 〈X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un〉 and (x1, . . . , xn) be the same
game G and the same profile b in strategic form. Essentializing the NE for
the strategic game, we find the set
P xNE
.
= {(xi, x−i) : xi ∈ Xi, x−i ∈
∏
j 6=i
Xj , i = 1, . . . , n}.
To each terminal node of the collection W bNE , we associate the correspon-
ding outcome and to each outcome the class of equivalence of a strategy
profile (x1, . . . , xn), where we define two strategy profiles equivalent if they
have the same outcome of the game. This way we find the set P xNE of the
essentialized strategy profiles. The equivalent strategy profiles are such that
they prescribe the same actions in the decision-making nodes in W bNE , such
as Proposition 15 establishes. It is no coincidence that we again come across
the theme of the equivalence between two strategy profiles. In fact, we may
tackle in a different way the following Essentializing problem.
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“Given an equilibrium concept EC, an (extensive) game form Γ,
and a (behavior) strategy profile b, identify W , a minimal collection
of information sets of Γ, with the following property:
If a game G has game form Γ and b is an equilibrium of G, then,
whatever changes are made in the payoffs and strategies outside W ,
the outcome of b will be an equilibrium outcome in the resulting
game.”
We rephrase the property in the case of non belief based equilibria.
“If a game G has game form Γ and b is an equilibrium of G, that
is it satisfies the specifications of the concept, then, b⊗W b satisfies
the specifications of the concept and has the same path as b, for
every profile b satisfying the specification of the concept.”
Let us assume, for simplicity, the Nash equilibrium as an equilibrium con-
cept. We essentialize NE, identifying those information sets reachable with
a unilateral deviation from b, that is W bNE . We construct a partition of
strategy profile relating to equivalence relation so defined.
Definition 73. Let Γ be a game form, and b, b¯ ∈ B(Γ). We say that b and
b¯ are realization equivalent, if W bNE = W
b¯
NE.
Then, the following propositions are true.
Proposition 9. If b ∈ [b] and b¯ ∈ [b¯] (where [b] and [b¯] denote, respectively,
the equivalence classes of b and b¯, possibly coincident) then b⊗W bNE b ∈ [b].
Proposition 10. b and b¯ are equivalent if and only if they have the same
actions in the information set in W bNE.
That is, we once more come across the definition of realization equivalence.
The method through partition of profiles supports the results of the Essen-
tializing method, since the first method, starting from the collection of infor-
mation sets, determines the equivalence relation, while the second, starting
from the equivalent realization, obtains the results established in Proposition
15.
5.6.3 Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
A Subgame perfect equilibrium is a solution concept defined in recursive way:
a SPE is a Nash equilibrium which induces a Nash equilibrium in every
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subgame. The same recursion is needed to define the essential collection
W b,ΓSPE . To test if a fixed strategy profile b is a SPE, we restrict it to each
subgame (identified through its root) or, more generally, to each continuation
game.
Given u ∈ U(Γ), let Wu .= {v ∈ U(Γ) : u 4 v} be the continuation game,
and let bu the restriction of b to Wu. In particular, given x ∈ u ∈ U(Γ), bx
denotes the restriction of b to Wu.
Definition 74. A node x ∈ X(Γ) is elemental if either x is a terminal node
or, for each game (Γ, h), a subgame begins at x. 5.
In particular if x is elemental, then ux = x, that is, x is a singleton, where
we recall that
Definition 75. A node x ∈ X(Γ) is a singleton if its information set is
degenerate.
Singleton node and elemental node are two different notions. A singleton
node is a node with no other nodes in its information set. An elemental
node is a singleton which, moreover, has the property that a subgame starts
at this node.
We consider the following construction of nested subsets of U(Γ), that
is, of elemental nodes, each of them identifying a subgame.
• Step 0: X0(b) coincides with the root of Γ.
• Step t: An elemental node x belongs to Xt(b) if there are i ∈ N ,
b′i ∈ Bi(Γ), and y ∈ Xt−1(b) such that x is reached by (b−i, b′i)y.
Then, we consider the limit of these sequence
XSPE(b) := lim
t→+∞X
t(b).
Since the game tree is finite, XSPE(b) is well defined. In other words,
XSPE(b) consists of the elemental nodes that can be reached with a se-
ries of unilateral deviations from b. Step by step, we identify each subgame
and the elemental nodes which we manage to reach. Finally, we close the
collection. Let
W bSPE := 〈XSPE(b)〉.
5The notion of subgame we use is the standard one introduced in Selten (1975).
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We note that we can exchange the order of operations: if first we close each
collection Xt(b) and then we take the limit, the result is invariant. We
observe still that W bSPE is a terminal collection, since 〈X1(b)〉 = W bNE .
We consider, for example, the game G in Figure 5.12 and the profile
b = ((L, l), L). At each step of the procedure, we identify all the sub-
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Figure 5.12: Essentializing SPE.
games of G, that in our example are only two. At step 1, we identify G,
while at step 2 the proper subgame beginning at s. So X0(b) = {root},
X1(b) = {root, z1, s, z2, z4}, X2(b) = {root, z1, s, z2, z4, z3} = Xt(b) for
each t > 3. Now we close the collection, passing from a set of elemental
nodes to a collection of information sets. The collection becomes W bSPE =
{root, z1, s, z2, z4, z3, x, y}. z5 /∈ W bSPE since in non subgame we can reach
this node only with unilateral deviations. We note, further, that W bSPE do
not constitute a game form, since the nodes x, y of the same information set
do not have the same actions.
Proposition 11. W bSPE is the essential collection for SPE, Γ and b.
Proof. First, we show that W bSPE is strongly sufficient for SPE, Γ and b.
Obviously W bSPE ⊃ pi(b). Let b¯ ∈ B(Γ) and G, G¯ ∈ G(Γ) be such that
b ∈ SPE(G) and b¯ ∈ SPE(G¯). We show that b⊗W b¯ ∈ SPE(G⊗W G¯), or,
in short form, that b⊗ ∈ SPE(G⊗). Let x ∈ X(Γ) be an elemental node. If
x /∈ W bSPE , then, since W bSPE is closed, Wux ∩W bSPE = ∅. Since b⊗x = b¯x
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and b¯ ∈ SPE(G¯), b⊗ induces a Nash equilibrium in the subgame of G⊗ that
begins at x. If x ∈W bSPE , by definition of W bSPE , no elemental node outside
W bSPE can be reached with unilateral deviation from b at nodes in W
b
SPE .
Hence, since b⊗x = bx and b ∈ SPE(G), b⊗ induces a Nash equilibrium in
the subgame of G⊗ that begins at x. Hence b⊗ ∈ SPE(G⊗W G¯).
Secondly, we show that W bSPE is a minimal closed and sufficient col-
lection, and, thus, essential. By definition, W bSPE = 〈W bSPE〉. Let W be a
closed and sufficient collection for SPE, Γ, and b that does not containW bSPE .
By Lemma 3, since W bSPE is terminal, there is z¯ ∈ (W bSPE\W ) ∩ Z(Γ).
We consider the elemental nodes in the path from the root to z¯, namely
{x1, . . . , xk}, where x1 = r(Γ) and xk = z¯. By definition W bSPE = 〈W bSPE〉,
so W bSPE is closed and then {x1, . . . , xk} ⊂ W bSPE . But also W is closed,
then for Lemma 3, there is a unique k¯ > 1 such that xk¯−1 ∈W and xk¯ /∈W .
Since W is sufficient, pi(b) ⊂ W and hence, xk¯ ∈ W bSPE\pi(b). Then, there
are i ∈ N , b′i ∈ Bi(Γ), and y ∈ XSPE(b) such that xk¯ is reached by (b−i, b
′
i)y
and not by by. Let G = (Γ, h) be such that, for each i ∈ N and each
z ∈ Z(Γ), hi(z) = 0. Let G¯ = (Γ, h¯) be such that, for each i ∈ N and
each z ∈ Z(Γ), h¯i(z) .= 1 if xk¯ 4 z and h¯i(z) .= 0 otherwise. Since W is
closed, h¯i = 1 implies z /∈ W . Note that b ∈ SPE(G) and G ⊗W G¯ = G¯.
We consider bˆ ∈ B(Γ) such that it coincides with b in W . Then, for each
i ∈ N , hi(bˆ) = 0. By construction, there is z ∈ Z(Γ) such that xk¯ 4 z
that is reached by (bˆ−i, b
′
i)y. Hence, in the subgame of G¯ that begins at y,
payoff 1 is obtained with positive probability instead of getting 0 for sure.
Therefore, bˆ /∈ SPE(G¯) = SPE(G ⊗W G¯), contradicting the sufficiency of
W .
5.7 Perfect equilibrium
Given a game form Γ and a strategy profile b ∈ B(Γ), the unique sufficient
collection for PE, Γ, and b is U(Γ). Therefore, U(Γ) is the essential collection
for PE, regardless of the strategy profile b.
Proposition 12. U(Γ) is the essential collection for PE, Γ and b.
Proof. By definition, U(Γ) is always a closed and sufficient collection. Hence,
it is sufficient to show that U(Γ) is a minimal closed and sufficient collection
and thus essential. Let W be a closed and sufficient collection for PE, Γ and
b, strictly contained in U(Γ). By Lemma 3, since U(Γ) is terminal, there
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is z¯ ∈ (U(Γ)\W ) ∩ Z(Γ) and, in particular, z¯ /∈ pi(b). Let G = (Γ, h) be
such that, for each i ∈ N and each z ∈ Z(Γ), hi(z) .= 0. Let G¯ = (Γ, h¯) be
such that, for each i ∈ N , hi(z¯) .= 1 and hi(z) .= 0 for each z ∈ Z(Γ)\{z¯}.
Note that b ∈ PE(G) and G⊗W G¯ = G¯. Note that G has an unique perfect
equilibrium in which z¯ is reached with probability 1. Hence, if bˆ ∈ B(Γ)
coincides with b in W , since z¯ /∈ pi(b), then bˆ /∈ PE(G¯) = PE(G ⊗W G¯),
contradicting the sufficiency of W.
5.8 Essentializing belief-based equilibrium concepts
In this Section, we head towards some primary concepts for extensive games
with imperfect information. So the main result of this Chapter, that is the
Theorem 19, applies to a wide family of belief-based equilibrium concepts.
The extensive game refinements based on beliefs are principally the se-
quential equilibrium, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the weak perfect
Bayesian equilibrium or weak sequential equilibrium. They require that
each player i assigns to each node x of each his information set u ∈ Ui a
probability, which represents his belief to be in x, provided he is in u. The
previous equilibrium concepts impose different limitations to belief systems.
In principle, they require the beliefs in the equilibrium path are derived by
strategy profile using the theory of conditioned probability, the beliefs out
of the equilibrium path, on the other hand, can be arbitrary, as it happens
for weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, or not, as for sequential equilibrium.
5.8.1 Belief-based equilibrium concepts. A first approach.
Let G = (Γ, h) be an extensive game, (b, µ) an assessment, where b ∈ B(Γ)
is a profile and µ ∈ M(Γ) a belief system. We consider the following con-
struction of nested closed subset of U(Γ). For the sake of exposition, we do
not make explicit the dependence of U t and V t on b and µ.
• Step 0: U0 = 〈pi(b)〉.
• Step t: An information set v ∈ U(Γ) belongs to V t if there are i ∈ N ,
b′i ∈ Bi(Γ), and an information set u ∈ U t−1 ∩ Ui(Γ) such that v is
reached with positive probability by (b−i, b′i)u when the probabilities
of the nodes in u are given by µ. Let
U t := 〈V t〉.
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Then, we consider the limit of these sequence
W b,µ := lim
t→+∞U
t.
Since the game tree is finite, W b,µ is well defined. Note that W b,µ is a
terminal collection.
We consider, for example, the game in Figure 5.13 with the assessment
(b, µ), where b = ((L, l), L) and µ(x) = 0 µ(y) = 1. Then the collection
is W b,µ = {r, z1, t, x, z2, y, z4, z5}. In fact, at step 0, U0 = {r, z1}. At
step 1, we have V 1 = {r, z1; t, x, z2}, since t, x, z2 are reached with positive
probability (µ(r) = 1) from ((R, l), L){r} = ((R, l), L), and, closing V 1,
U1 = {r, z1; t, x, z2; y}. At step 2 we have V 2 = {r, z1; t, x, z2, y; z4, z5}, since
z4 is reached with positive probability (µ(y) = 1) from b{x,y} = (l), and z5
is reached with positive probability (µ(y) = 1) from ((L, r), L){x,y} = (r),
and closing V 2, U2 = V 2. For each t > 3 V t = U t = U2. In no way, z3
can be reached from an information set in U2 with unilateral deviations. So
W b,µ = U2.
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Figure 5.13: Example of W b,µ.
Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Definition 76. Let G = (Γ, h) be an extensive game. An assessment (b, µ)
is weakly consistent with Bayes rule if µ is derived using Bayesian updating
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in the path of b.
Definition 77. Let G = (Γ, h) be an extensive game. A Weak Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (or, briefly, WPBE) is an assessment (b, µ) sequen-
tially rational and weakly consistent with Bayes rule.
Let G = (Γ, h) be an extensive game and (b, µ) be an assessment weakly
consistent with Bayes rule. W b,µ is a natural candidate to be a sufficient
collection for WPBE, Γ, and b, but it is not enough. Let us consider, in
Figure 5.13, the game G with the assessment (b, µ), where b = ((L, l), L),
µ(x) = 0, and µ(y) = 1, and in Figure 5.14, the same game G with the
assessment (b, µ¯), where b = ((L, l), L), µ¯(x) = 1, and µ¯(x) = 0.
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Figure 5.14: G (b, µ¯).
We know, beforehand, that the collection W b,µ is W b,µ = U(Γ)\{z3} =
{r, z1, t, x, z2, y, z4, z5}. Since the information set of player 2 is off-path, all
the beliefs in this game are weakly consistent with Bayes rule. Note that
(b, µ) /∈ WPBE(G), and (b, µ¯) ∈ WPBE(G). Then, in order to know that
b ∈ WPBE(G), it does not suffice to look at the payoffs in W b,µ. In fact,
W b,µ is not sufficient for WPBE, Γ, and b. Recall that b ∈WPBE(G).
Now, let us consider, in Figure 5.15, the game G¯ with the assessment
(b, µ¯). That is, G¯ is identical to G, except for the fact that h¯(z3) = (0, 2).
Then, b¯ = ((R, l), R) ∈ WPBE(G¯). Now, let us consider, as depicted
in Figure 5.16, the combination of two games and the combination of two
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assessments. We have: G⊗W G¯ = G¯, b⊗W b¯ = b, and, obviously, µ¯⊗W µ¯ = µ¯.
Again, b⊗W b,µ b¯ = b /∈WPBE(G⊗W b,µ G¯), since, in G⊗W b,µ G¯ the choice
L for player II is strictly dominated and hence no beliefs make that choice
sequentially rational. Similarly, by adequately rearranging the payoffs in the
game G, it can be shown that W b,µ¯ is not sufficient for WPBE, Γ, and b.
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Figure 5.15: G¯ (b¯, µ¯).
Despite of discussion above, the collections W b,µ are the key to essen-
tialize WPBE. Let
Mwc(b) := {µ ∈M(Γ) : (b, µ) is weakly consistent with Bayes rule}.
Now, define the collection W bWPBE :=
⋃
µ∈Mwc(b)
W b,µ. Since the union of
closed and terminal collections is a closed and terminal collection, W bWPBE
is closed and terminal.
Proposition 13. W bWPBE is the essential collection for WPBE, Γ and b.
Proof. This result is a particular case of the general result in Section 5.8.2.
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Figure 5.16: G⊗W G¯ (b⊗W b¯, µ¯⊗W µ¯).
5.8.2 Belief-based equilibrium concepts. A general result.
Let us develop a general approach that concerns several belief-based equili-
brium concepts, but a sequential equilbrium that needs a separate treatment.
Let F be the set of all correspondences that select, for each game form
Γ and each b ∈ B(Γ), a subset of M(Γ) (the set of all beliefs that can be
defined for Γ) 6. Let Γ be a game form, b ∈ B(Γ), and G ∈ G(Γ). Let
f ∈ F . We say that b is sequentially rational under f in game G, denoted
by b ∈ SRf (G), if there is µ ∈ f(Γ, b) such that the assessment (b, µ) is
sequentially rational. The above definition can be used to account for most
belief-based solution concepts:
• Sequential rationality: fSR(Γ, b) :=M(Γ).
• WPBE: fWPBE(Γ, b) := {µ ∈M(Γ) : µ is derived by Bayes rule inpi(b)} =
Mwc(b).
• SE: fSE(Γ, b) := {µ ∈M(Γ) : µ is consistent with b}.
• Moreover, also the different versions of perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
that have been discussed in literature, can be defined as sequentially
6More formally, let A denote the set of all pairs (Γ, b), where Γ is a game form and
b ∈ B(Γ). Then, F .= {functions from A to 2M(Γ)}.
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rational under some f ∈ F .
Given f ∈ F , a game form Γ, and b ∈ B(Γ), define the collection
W bf :=
⋃
µ∈f(Γ,b)
W b,µ.
Note that, in particular,
W bfWPBE = W
b
WPBE .
Since the union of closed and terminal collections is a closed and terminal
collection, all the W bf collections are closed and terminal.
Lemma 6. Let f, f ′ ∈ F be such that, for each Γ and each b ∈ B(Γ),
f(Γ, b) ⊂ f ′(Γ, b).
Then, for each game G,
SRf (G) ⊂ SRf ′(G).
Proof. Straightforward.
The next auxiliary lemma plays an important role in the proofs of the
results in this section. Let u, v ∈ U(Γ).
Lemma 7. Let f ∈ F . Let Γ be a game form and b ∈ B(Γ). Let W ⊂ U(Γ)
be a closed collection containing pi(b) such that W bf\W 6= ∅, Then, there
are i ∈ N , u˜ ∈ W ∩ Ui(Γ), u˜ ∈ W bf\W , µ˜ ∈ f(Γ, b), xu˜ ∈ u˜, xv˜ ∈ v˜, and
b˜i ∈ Bi(Γ) such that
i) xu˜ ≺ xv˜ (and hence, v˜) is reached with positive probability under µ˜ by
(b−i, b˜i)u˜.
ii) let {x1 = xu˜, . . . , xl = xv˜} be the path from xu˜ to xv˜. For each l¯ < l,
uxl ∈W .
Proof. By Lemma 3, there is z ∈ (W bf\W ) ∩ Z(Γ). Let µ˜ ∈ f(Γ, b) such
that z ∈ W b,µ˜. Recall the iterative definition of W b,µ˜. Since U0 ⊂ 〈pi(b)〉
and pi(b) ⊂ W = 〈W 〉, then U0 ⊂ W . Hence, there is t > 1 such that
z ∈ U t \ U t−1. Let ut := z. We now proceed backwards to identify the
information sets used to reach ut. Since ut ∈ U t \ U t−1, there is vt ∈
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V t \ U t−1 such that ut 4 vt (indeed, since ut = z ∈ Z(Γ), in this first step
vt = ut). Since vt ∈ V t \ U t−1, there are it ∈ N , btit ∈ Bit(Γ), and ut−1 ∈
(U t−1 \U t−2)∩Uit(Γ), 7 such that vt is reached with positive probability by
(btit , b−it)ut−1 . Hence, we can define a sequence {u0, v1, u1, . . . , vt, ut}, where
u0 ∈ 〈pi(b)〉. Then, u0 ∈ W and, since ut /∈ W , W = 〈W 〉 and ut 4 vt,
we have that vt /∈ W . Similarly, for each t′ ∈ {0, . . . , t}, if ut′ /∈ W , then
vt
′
/∈ W . Let t¯ := min
t′∈{0,...,t}
{t′ : ut′−1 ∈ W and vt′ /∈ W}. Define i := it¯,
u˜ := ut¯−1, and b˜i := ut¯it¯ . Let x¯ ∈ vt¯ be such that x¯ is reached with positive
probability under µ˜ by (b˜i, b−i)u˜. Let xu˜ be the node in u˜ such that xu˜ ≺ x¯.
Let {u˜ = w0, w1, . . . , wk = vt¯} be the path of information sets from xu¯ to
x¯. All the information sets in {u˜ = w0, w1, . . . , wk = vt¯} are reached with
positive probability under µ˜ by (b˜i, b−i)u˜. Since w0 ∈ W , wk /∈ W , and
W = 〈W 〉, there is a unique k¯ such that wk¯−1 ∈ W and wk¯ /∈ W . Now
let us define v˜
.
= wk¯ and let xv˜ be the node in the path from xu˜ to x¯ that
belongs to v˜. So defined, it is clear that u¯ ∈ W ∩ Ui, v˜ ∈ W b,µ˜, and hence,
v˜ ∈W bf \W . i) and ii) follow from the construction.
For our general result, we need to restrict to a subset of F .
Definition 78. A function f ∈ F is regular if, given b, b¯ ∈ B(Γ), the
following properties hold.
i) for each µ ∈ f(Γ, b) and each µ¯ ∈ f(Γ, b¯), µ ⊗W bf µ¯ ∈ f(Γ, b ⊗W bf b¯),
and, conversely,
ii) for each µ¯ ∈ f(Γ, b ⊗W bf b¯), there is µ ∈ f(Γ, b) such that µ¯ and µ
coincide in W bf .
In words, the beliefs inside W bf do not impose any restrictions in the
beliefs outside W bf and vice versa. According to the above definition, f
SE
fails to be regular (see Example in SubSection 5.8.3) and hence, sequential
equilibrium needs to be studied on his own 8. Nonetheless, sequential ratio-
nality, WPBE, and many natural refinements of the latter can be defined
through regular functions 9 .
7If t = 1, then U t−2 = U−1 := ∅
8Moreover, also the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as defined in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991b) for multistage games with observed actions, fails to be regular.
9For instance, Kreps and Wilson (1982) defined an equilibrium concept called extended
subgame perfect equilibrium, a refinement of WPBE that imposes the use of Bayes rules
off the equilibrium path, and hence, refines SPE as well. This equilibrium concept can be
defined using regular functions.
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Lemma 8. Let f ∈ F be regular. If b and b¯ coincide in W bf , then W bf = W b¯f .
Proof. Note that b¯ = b ⊗W bf b¯. We prove first that W
b
f ⊂ W b¯f . Suppose,
on the contrary, that there is u ∈ W bf \ W b¯f . Take i ∈ N , u˜ ∈ W b¯f ∩ Ui,
v˜ ∈W bf \W b¯f , µ˜ ∈ f(Γ, b), and b˜ ∈ Bi(Γ) as in Lemma 7 . Since f is regular,
there is µ¯ ∈ f(Γ, b¯) that coincides with µ˜ in W bf . Since bW bf = b¯W bf and
W bf = 〈W bf 〉, for each w ∈ U(Γ) such that w ≺ v˜, bw = b¯w and hence, v˜ is
reached with positive probability under µ˜ by (b˜i, b¯−i)u˜. Therefore, v˜ ∈ W b¯f
and we have a contradiction. Hence W bf ⊂W b¯f .
We prove now that W b¯f ⊂ W bf . Suppose, on the contrary, that there is
u ∈ W b¯f\W bf . Take now i ∈ N , u˜ ∈ W bf ∩ Ui, v˜ ∈ W b¯f\W bf , µ˜ ∈ f(Γ, b¯), and
b˜i ∈ Bi(Γ) as in Lemma 7. Since f is regular, there is µ ∈ f(Γ, b), that
coincides with µ˜ in W bf . If we had bW b¯f
= b¯
W b¯f
, we could continue as above.
Yet, we just know that b
W b¯f
= b¯
W b¯f
. From ii) in Lemma 7, all the information
sets in the path from xu˜ to xv˜ belong to W
b
f . Hence, by i) in Lemma 7, if
b and b¯ coincide in W bf , v˜ is reached with positive probability under µ by
(b−i, b˜i)u˜ and we can derive the same contradiction as before.
Theorem 19. Let f ∈ F be regular. W bf is the essential collection for
SRf ,Γ, and b.
Proof. First, we show that W bf is a strongly sufficient collection for SR
f ,
Γ, and b. By definition of strongly sufficient collection, pi(b) ⊂ W bf . Let
b¯ ∈ B(Γ) and G = (Γ, h), G¯ = (Γ, h¯) ∈ G(Γ) be such that b ∈ SRf (G) and
b¯ ∈ SRf (G¯) respectively. We claim that (b⊗, µ⊗) ∈ SRf (G⊗). Since f is
regular, (b⊗, µ⊗) ∈ f(Γ, b⊗). We show now that it is sequentially rational.
Let first u ∈ U(Γ). There are two possibilities: u /∈W bf or u ∈W bf . Let u /∈
W bf . For each z ∈ Z(Γ) such that u ≺ z, z /∈ W bf since W bf = 〈W bf 〉. Hence
h⊗(z) = h¯(z). Therefore, since b¯ ∈ SRf (G¯), b⊗ is sequentially rational
at u in G⊗. Let now u ∈ W bf . By definition of W bf , as far as beliefs in
f(W, b) are considered, no terminal node outside W bf is reached with positive
probability after unilateral deviations from b at information sets in W bf .
Besides, by Lemma 8, W bf = W
b⊗
f and hence, those terminal nodes are not
reached either when the beliefs in the information sets in W bf are taken from
f(W, b⊗). Hence, since b ∈ SRf (G), b⊗ is sequentially rational at u in G.
Then, b⊗ ∈ SRf (G⊗).
Now let us show the second condition, that is W bf is a minimal closed and
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sufficient collection and thus essential. By definition, W bf = 〈W bf 〉. Let W
be a closed and sufficient collection for SRf , Γ, and b that does not contain
W bf . By Lemma 3, since W
b
f is terminal, there is z¯ ∈ (W bf \W ) ∩ Z(Γ). Let
µ ∈ f(Γ, b) be such that z¯ ∈ W b,µ. Take i ∈ N , u˜ ∈ W ∩ Ui, v˜ ∈ W bf \W ,
µ˜ ∈ f(Γ, b), , b˜i ∈ Bi(Γ), xv˜, and xu˜ as in Lemma 7. Since xv˜ is reached
with positive probability under µ˜, by (b˜i, b−i)u˜, µ˜(xu˜) > 0. Let c˜ denote the
choice at xu˜ that is in the path to xv˜. We distinguish two cases, regardless
of whether u˜, and v˜ are singleton and whether v˜ is or is not a terminal node.
Case i): bi(c˜) = 0, i.e., according to b, choice c is never made. Then, v˜ is not
reached with positive probability under µ˜ by bµ˜. Let G = (Γ, h) the game
such that i) (b, µ˜) ∈ SRf (G) and ii) given a choice c 6= c˜ at u˜, conditional on
u˜ being reached, c is strictly dominated by c˜ in all nodes of u˜ but xu˜. Since
µ˜(xu˜) > 0, i) and ii) are compatible. Let G¯ = (Γ, h¯) the game such that,
for each j ∈ N and each z ∈ Z(Γ), h¯j(z) .= MG if xv˜ 4 z and h¯j(z) .= hj(z)
otherwise. Recall that MG
.
= max
i∈N,z∈Z(Γ)
|hi(z)| + 1. Since v˜ /∈ W and
W = 〈W 〉, for each z ∈ Z(Γ) such that v˜ ≺ z, we have z /∈ W . Now,
b ∈ SRf (G) and SRf (G¯) 6=, just take any strategy profile with payoff MG.
Let us claim that if bˆ ∈ B(Γ) coincides with b in W , then bˆ /∈ SRf (G⊗W G¯),
where G⊗W G¯ = G¯. By construction, in the game G¯, conditional on u˜ being
reached, c˜ is strictly dominant at u˜. In fact, to play b˜i(u˜) at xu˜ leads to a
payoff of MG. Since u˜ ∈ W , b˜i(c) = 0 and b˜W = bW , b˜ is not sequentially
rational at u˜. Case ii): bi(c˜) = 0, i.e., v˜ is reached with positive probability
under µ˜ by bu˜. Let G = (Γ, h) be the game such that i) (b, µ˜) ∈ SRf (G) and
ii) there is a choice c 6= c˜ at u¯ such that, conditional on u˜ being reached, c
strictly dominates c˜ in all nodes of u˜ but xu˜. Let G¯ = (Γ, h¯) be such that for
each j ∈ N and each z ∈ Z(Γ), h¯j(z) .= −MG if xv˜ 4 z and h¯j(z) .= hj(z)
otherwise. The remaining proof is analogous to case i).
Corollary 7. U(Γ) is the essential collection for SR, Γ, and b.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 19 and from the fact f(Γ, b) =M(Γ).
Corollary 8. Let f, f ′ ∈ F be regular and let Γ and b ∈ B(Γ) be such that
f(Γ, b) ⊂ f ′Γ, b). Then WSRf (Γ, b) ⊂WSRf ′ (Γ, b).
U(Γ) is the essential collection for SR, Γ, and b.
The above Corollary and Lemma 6 imply that the following relation
holds. Let EC1 and EC2 be two belief-based equilibrium concepts such
that, for each game G,
EC1(G) ⊂ EC2(G),
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then, for each game form Γ and each strategy profile b ∈ B(Γ),
WEC1(Γ, b) ⊂WEC2(Γ, b).
For example, let us just think of SR and WPBE.
5.8.3 Strong sufficiency and sequential equilibrium
The example below shows that fSE is not regular and that W bSE needs not
be a strongly sufficient collection for sequential equilibrium.
We consider the game G ∈ G(Γ) in Figure 5.17. Let b = (L,L, (L,L)),
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Figure 5.17: G (b, µ).
then the assessment (b, µ) is consistent if and only if µ(a) = 1, µ(b) = µ(c) =
0, µ(x) = µ(x¯), µ(y) = µ(y¯), and (b, µ) is sequentially rational if and only if
µ(x) 6 12 , µ(x¯) 6
2
5 . Now, W
b
SE is the collection that consists of removing
the upper information set of player III and the four terminal nodes that
come after it. More formally, W bSE = U(Γ)\Wx, where Wx .= {v ∈ U(Γ) :
ux 4 v}. Let µ ∈ Mcons(b) be such that µ(x) = µ(x¯) = 0. So defined,
(b, µ) ∈ SE(G). Now, let us take the game G¯, depicted in Figure 5.18,
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with the profile b¯ = b. Let µ¯ ∈ Mcons(b) = Mcons(b¯) such that µ¯(x) = 1
µ¯(x¯) = 1. So defined, (b¯, µ¯) ∈ SE(G¯). We consider now, in Figure 5.19, the
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Figure 5.18: G¯ (b¯, µ¯).
game G⊗ = G⊗W G¯ with the assessment (b⊗, µ⊗). Since b⊗ = b⊗W b¯ = b,
Mcons(b⊗) =Mcons(b). Therefore, since (µ⊗W µ¯)(x) = 1 6= (µ⊗W µ¯)(x¯) =
0, µ⊗ is not consistent with b⊗. Hence, (b, µ ⊗W µ¯) /∈ SE(G⊗). Since
µ ∈ Mcons(b) = fSE(Γ, b), µ¯ ∈ fSE(Γ, b¯), and µ⊗ /∈SE (Γ, b⊗), we have
shown that fSE is not regular.
5.9 Decomposition of a game with respect to a
collection
In this Section we introduce a decomposition of a game useful to characterize
the essential collections for sequential equilibrium in Section 5.10 and also
for the analysis in Section 5.11.
Let Γ be a game form, b ∈ B0(Γ), G = (Γ, h), and W ⊂ U(Γ). With
respect to the closed collection W , the game G is decomposable in two
games, the reduced game GW , containing the information sets in W , and its
complementary game G(−W, b), containing the information sets in U(Γ)\W .
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Figure 5.19: G⊗W G¯ (b⊗W b¯, µ⊗W µ¯).
The reduced game GW is important since to check, whether a profile is an
equilibrium of original game G, it is necessary and sufficient to check only
on the reduced game.
To the construction of GW , we are interested in ΓW , obtained by re-
striction of Γ to X(W ), with the addition of some artificial terminal nodes,
necessary to ensure that ΓW is a game form. For example, we consider the
game in Figure 5.7. If we reduce Γ to the nodes in X(W ) without adding
any extra nodes, in the information set u the number of choices available to
player II would not be the same for the different nodes.
Figures 5.20 and 5.21 illustrate how decompose the game with respect
to a collection.
For the sole purpose of construction, we distinguish between three sets
of nodes: X(W), X(-W), and A(W ). X(W ) and X(−W ) are the sets of
nodes whose information sets are, respectively, in and out of the essential
collection W , while A(W ) is the set of nodes to be added, that is, A(W )
contains the nodes in X(−W ) with no predecessors in X(−W ).
X(W )
.
= {x ∈ X(Γ) : ux ∈W},
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X(−W ) .= X(Γ)\X(W ),
and
A(W )
.
= {x ∈ X(−W ) : x ≺ y ⇒ y ∈ X(W )}.
Definition 79. Let Γ be a game form, G = (Γ, h), and W ⊂ U(Γ). The
reduced game form ΓW is characterized in the following way:
i) the set of nodes is X(ΓW )
.
= X(W ) ∪A(W ),
ii) the set of information sets is U(ΓW )
.
= (U(W ) ∩W ) ∪A(W ),
iii) the terminal nodes are Z(ΓW )
.
= (Z(W ) ∩W ) ∪A(W ), and
iv) all the other elements are defined restricting Γ to X(W ) in the natural
way.
Now, we can define the reduced game. Let M ∈ R be a fixed constant.
We can take M = MG, but the choice of the payoff for terminal nodes
outside W is irrelevant for the analysis, as the choice of setting equal all the
payoffs is irrelevant.
Definition 80. Let Γ be a game form, G = (Γ, h), and W ⊂ U(Γ). The
reduced game is GW = (ΓW , hW ), where hW (z) = h(z) if z ∈ Z(ΓW ) ∩W
and hW (z) = (M, . . . ,M) if z ∈ Z(ΓW ) \W .
We discuss the importance of the reduced games in Section 5.11.
Now, we construct the complementary game. We need to fix a strategy
profile b ∈ B0(Γ). For each x ∈ A(W ), let p(x, b) denote the probability
that x is reached given b and conditional on X(−W ) being reached. Now,
we use b and the node in X(−W ) to define the complementary game form
Γ−W,b and the complementary game G(−W, b) = (Γ−W,b, h−W,b), as depicted
in Figures 5.20 and 5.21.
Definition 81. Let Γ be a game form, b ∈ B0(Γ), G = (Γ, h), and W ⊂
U(Γ). The complementary game form Γ−W,b is characterized in the following
way:
i) the root is a node r−W /∈ X(Γ),
ii) the set of nodes is X(Γ−W,b)
.
= X(−W ) ∪ r−W ,
ii) for each x ∈ A(W ) there is an arc from r−W to x, and the correspon-
ding choice has probability p(x, b),
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iii) the terminal node is Z(Γ−W,b)
.
= Z(Γ) ∩X(−W ), and
iv) all the other elements are defined restricting Γ to X(Γ−W,b) in the
natural way.
Definition 82. Let Γ be a game form, b ∈ B0(Γ), G = (Γ, h), and W ⊂
U(Γ). The complementary game is G(−W, b) = (Γ−W,b, h−W,b), where, for
each z ∈ Z(Γ−W,b), h−W,b = h(z).
Note that, given b, b¯ ∈ B0(Γ), G(−W, b) and G(−W, b¯) only differ in the
probabilities of nature move at the root. The games G(W, b) are crucial to
prove Proposition 14 below.
5.10 Sequential equilibrium
Proposition 14. W bSE is the essential collection for SE, Γ, and b.
Proof. First we show that W bSE is a sufficient collection for SE, Γ, and
b. By definition pi(b) ⊆ W bSE . Let G = (Γ, h), G¯ = (Γ, h¯) ∈ G(Γ) be
such that b ∈ SE(G). We show that there is bˆ ∈ SE(G⊗) that coincides
with b in W bSE . Since b ∈ SE(G), there is µ ∈ Mcons such that (b, µ)
is sequentially rational. Hence there is a sequence (bn)n∈N of completely
mixed strategies converging to b such that the associated consistent beliefs,
namely (µn)n∈N, converge to µ. For each bn ∈ B0(Γ) let us consider the
complementary game, so we have a sequence of games (G¯(−W bSE , bn))n∈N.
Let n ∈ N and u be an information set of G¯(−W bSE , bn), formed by nodes in
A(W bSE). By definition, the beliefs induced by nature move at r−W bSE in u
coincide with µn. For each n ∈ N, let (b¯n, µ¯n) be a sequential equilibrium of
G¯(−W bSE , bn). The sequence (b¯n, µ¯n)n∈N has a convergent subsequence. We
assume, without loss of generality, that the sequence itself converges to (b¯, µ¯).
We claim that (b⊗W bSE b¯, µ⊗W bSE µ¯) is a sequentially rational and consistent
assessment. Consistency. Let Γn be the game form of G¯(−W bSE , bn). By
definition, for each n, n¯ ∈ N, B0(Γn) = B0(Γn¯). Let B¯0 .= B0(Γn). Each
b¯n is a sequential equilibrium of G¯(−W bSE , bn). Hence, for each n ∈ N,
there is {b¯n,k}k∈N ⊂ B¯0 converging to bn, and such that associated beliefs
(satisfying Bayes rule) converge to µ¯n. Hence, for each n ∈ N, there is
g(n) ∈ N such that ‖ b¯n − b¯n,g(n) ‖6 1n . Then, ‖ b¯n − b¯n,g(n) ‖6‖ b¯n − b¯n¯ ‖
+ ‖ b¯n¯ − b¯n,g(n) ‖6‖ b¯n − b¯n¯ ‖ + 1n . Hence, since b¯n −→ b¯, (b¯n,g(n))n∈N −→ b¯.
The convergence result for the corresponding beliefs, namely (µ¯n,g(n))n∈N,
to µ¯ is analogous. Our construction ensures that, for each n ∈ N and
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each x ∈ A(W bSE), µn(x) = µ¯n(x) and µ(x) = µ¯(x), i.e. the beliefs match
in A(W bSE). Hence, for each n ∈ N, the beliefs associated with bn ⊗W bSE
b¯n,g(n) ∈ B0(Γ) are µn ⊗W bSE µ¯n,g(n). Therefore, the consistency of (b⊗W bSE
b¯, µ ⊗W bSE µ¯) is obtained by considering the sequence (bn ⊗W bSE b¯n,g(n))n∈N.
Sequential rationality. The sequential rationality in the information sets in
W bSE immediately follows from the sequential rationality of (b, µ) in G and
the fact that, according to µ, no node outside W bSE can be reached with
unilateral deviations from information sets W bSE and hence, the payoffs at
all the terminal nodes, that can be reached by unilateral deviations from
information sets in W bSE , are given by h. Similarly, only terminal nodes
outside W bSE can be reached with unilateral deviations from the information
sets outside W bSE and hence, the payoffs are given by h¯. Thus, since all the
(b¯n, µ¯n)n∈N are sequentially rational also the limit, (b¯, µ¯), is sequentially
rational.
Second, since W bSE = W
b
fSE
, the proof is analogous to the one for W bf
in Theorem 19 (the regularity of f was not needed to show that W bf is
minimally sufficient).
It can be easily verified that
WSPE ⊂WSE ,
hence, combining the result in Sections 5.6 and 5.8, we have:
WNE ⊂WSPE ⊂WSE ⊂WWSPE ⊂WSR = WPE = U.
5.11 Reduced Game and its Applications
In this Section we present some applications of the concepts of sufficient and
essential collections. All of them are based on the reduced games defined in
Section 5.9.
Proposition 15. Let EC be an equilibrium concept, Γ a game form, and
b ∈ B(Γ) a strategy profile. Let G = (Γ, h) ∈ G(Γ) be such that EC(G) 6= ∅.
Let W be a closed collection sufficient for EC, Γ, and b. Then,
there is bˆ ∈ EC(G) such that bˆW = bW if and only if bW ∈ EC(GW ).
Moreover, since pi(b) ⊂W ,
b and bˆ are realization equivalent.
Proof. We suppose there is bˆ ∈ EC(G) such that bˆW = bW and we prove
that bW is an equilibrium concept of the reduced game GW . We consider
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G¯ ∈ G(Γ) a game with constant payoff (M, . . . ,M). Since bˆW = bW and
W is sufficient for EC, Γ, and b, then, for Lemma 4, W is sufficient for
EC, Γ, and bˆ. Hence, there is b∗ ∈ EC(G ⊗W G¯) such that b∗W = bˆW .
Since in game G⊗W G¯, all the payoffs outside W coincide with (M, . . . ,M),
it is straightforward to check that bW ∈ EC(Γ). Now, we suppose that
bW ∈ EC(Γ) and we prove that there is bˆ ∈ EC(G) such that bˆW = bW .
We consider the game G∗ = (Γ, h∗), so defined: h∗(z) .= h(z) for each
z ∈ Z(Γ)∩W and h∗i (z) .= M for each z ∈ Z(Γ)\W and each i ∈ N . Since all
the players are indifferent among the choices outside W and bW ∈ EC(GW ),
we have b ∈ EC(G∗). By definition G∗⊗W G = G. Since W is sufficient for
EC, Γ, and b and EC(G) 6= ∅, there is bˆ ∈ EC(G) that coincides with b in
W and moreover, since pi(b) ⊂W , bˆ is realization equivalent to b.
The above result provides a first application of sufficient collections.
Given a strategy profile b and a closed and sufficient collection W for b,
if bW is an equilibrium of the reduced game, then the outcome of b is an
equilibrium outcome in the original game. If bW is not an equilibrium out-
come of the reduced game, then no equilibrium of the original game will
coincide with b in W . In particular, the reduced game associated to the
essential collection would be the simplest among the games associated with
b. Quite generally, the reduced game associated with an essential collection
is simpler than the original game. Recall the discussion in the motivation
section and refer to the game in Figure 5.23. Beyond the immediate appli-
cation described above, the reduced games can also be applied in different
directions. We discuss two of them in the remainder of this section.
5.11.1 Structural robustness and partially-specified games
In the previous Section we have analyzed what happens when we reduce a
game to the essential collection. In this Subsection, we change direction since
we extend the reduced game. In order to measure the structural robustness
of essentializing equilibrium concept process, we will compare the reduced
game and the reduction of its extension.
Let G = (Γ, h) be a game, W ∈ U(Γ) a closed collection. Let Ω(Γ)
denote the set of game forms such that if Λ ∈ Ω(W ), then W ⊂ U(Λ), W is
closed in Λ and the nodes in W that are terminal in Γ are also terminal in Λ
10. Now, let G(W ) denote the set of games Gˆ = (Λ, hˆ) such that Λ ∈ Ω(W )
and hˆ(z) = h(z), for each z ∈ W ∩ Z(Γ). We consider, for example, the
10In a nutshell, Λ is made attaching a game tree to the root of W .
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game GW in Figure 5.21.c. Clearly, GW ∈ G(W ) and each game in G(W ) is
defined from GW by adding new branches to the nodes in A(W ). Those with
payoff (M,M,M) also belong to G(W ). The new branches can intersect each
other, but cannot intersect W , otherwise W would not be a closed collection
in the resulting game form. In particular, also the game G belongs to G(W ).
We refer to the elements of G(W ) as extension of GW .
Remark 9. Given an equilibrium concept EC, let Γ be a game form and W
be a closed collection. In the previous sections we have seen how to construct
the reduction Γw. Now we expand Γ to Λ ∈ Ω(W ). From definition of Ω(W )
and ΓW it follows ΓW = ΛW , that is the corresponding reduced forms,
associated with W , coincide.
In the remainder of this section EC refers only to the equilibrium con-
cepts whose essential collections we have characterized in Sections 5.6 and
5.8, that is NE, SPE, PE, and WPBE, SR, SE.
Proposition 16. Given an equilibrium concept EC, let Γ be a game form,
b ∈ B(Γ), and Λ ∈ Ω(WEC(Γ, b)). If b¯ ∈ B(Λ) is such that b and b¯ coincide
in WEC(Γ, b), then
WEC(Γ, b) = WEC(Λ, b¯),
i.e., the essential collection coincide.
Proof. We can show that WEC(Γ, b) is sufficient for EC, Λ, and b¯ using
the same arguments in the sufficiency part of the proof that WEC(Γ, b)
is sufficient for EC, Γ, and b, replacing clearly Γ and b with Λ and b¯.
Hence WEC(Λ, b¯) ⊃ WEC(Γ, b). Similarly, we can show that WEC(Λ, b¯)
is sufficient for EC, Γ, and b. Hence WEC(Λ, b¯) ⊂ WEC(Γ, b). Therefore
WEC(Γ, b) = WEC(Λ, b¯).
Now, let us simplify the notation, replacing WEC with W . Let W be the
essential collection for EC, Γ, and b. Let G¯ be an extension of GW and let
b¯ a strategy in G¯ that coincides with b in W . Then, the next result shows
that, an equilibrium of the reduced game is the reduction of a given game.
Thus, to check whether a profile of an extension game is an equilibrium,
equivalent to a fixed equilibrium profile, it is sufficient to check it in the
reduced game.
Corollary 9. Given an equilibrium concept EC, let G(W ) be the set of the
extensions of a reduced game GW = (ΓW , hW ), let b ∈ B(ΓW ) be such that
WEC(Γ, b) = W , let G¯ = (Λ, h) ∈ G(W ) and b¯ ∈ B(Λ) be such that b = b¯W .
Then,
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i) WEC(Λ, b¯) = W .
ii) If b ∈ EC(GW ), then there is bˆ ∈ EC(G¯) such that bˆW = b¯W = b.
iii) If b /∈ EC(GW ), then there is no bˆ ∈ EC(G¯) such that bˆW = b¯W = b.
In the following Subsubsections 5.11.1 and 5.11.1 we describe two appli-
cations of Corollary 9.
Structural robustness
The first to use Structural robustness was Kalai (2005, 2006). Kalai studied
the robustness of Nash equilibrium in large games when similar changes are
made in the underlying games. Our approach allows us to study how robust
the different equilibrium concepts are with respect to structural changes in
the game. Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al.(2009) have already provided an illustration
of this fact when comparing SE and WPBE in the Licensing game.
Let EC be an equilibrium concept, G = (Γ, h) an extensive game, and
b ∈ EC(G). We assume to modify the game G by some changes in Γ or
by some changes in h, without eating into the path of b. We denote G¯
the modified game. It is natural to ask whether the outcome of b is an
equilibrium outcome for EC in G¯ or not. Essential collections are very
useful here.
We suppose we have characterized the essential collections for EC. Then,
if the changes in G affected neither WEC(Γ, b) nor the payoffs in its terminal
nodes, b is indeed an equilibrium outcome for EC in G. In fact, in the latter
case, G¯ ∈ G(WEC(Γ, b)), so Corollary 9 implies the desidered result.
The structural changes in a game can be of different nature, since they
can: affect payoffs, change the sets of strategies, change the information
available to the players, account for addiction, elimination, or merging of
players, enlarge or reduce the game, and so on. . . If these changes do not
affect the essential collection associated to a given equilibrium profile b, its
outcome will be an equilibrium outcome also in the modified game. On
the other hand, if the changes affected the essential collection, whether the
outcome of b remains an equilibrium outcome or not will depend on the
specific payoffs of the games at hand.
Therefore, if the essential collections associated with an equilibrium con-
cept EC1 are always smaller than the ones associated with EC2, then EC1 is
more robust to structural changes than EC2. The latter statement and the
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inclusion relations obtained for the essential collections analyzed in Sections
5.6 and 5.8, imply that SR and PE are the less robust equilibrium concepts
followed, in this order by WPBE, SE, SPE, and SR. The Licensing Game
in Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al.(2009) exemplified this fact for SE and WPBE.
Remark 10. We make ourselves plain, when we say that SE is structurally
more robust than WPBE. Let G be a game and the strategy profile b be
a SE. From the above discussion it follows that, after any change in G
that does not affect the essential collection for SE, Γ, and b, the outcome
b remains a SE outcome in the modified game. No further calculation is
needed, regardless of the actual payoffs of the modified game. On the other
hand, we suppose b is just a WPBE, but not a SE. Then, the latter changes
might have affected the corresponding essential collection for WPBE, which
is not smaller than the one for SE, b might not be a WPBE outcome
anymore. Yet, our statement is mute about changes inside the essential
collections. Indeed, since SE is more demanding than WPBE, it is natural
to think that SE will be less robust to changes inside the essential collection.
Partially-specified games
As also discussed in Kalai (2005, 2006), the idea of structural robustness
is very related to the possibility of dealing with partially-specified games.
Let Gp = (Γ, h) be a partially-specified game, i.e. it lacks a full description
of Γ or some payoffs are unknown. Can we still say something about the
equilibria of this game? Maybe. We suppose there is a possibly partially-
specified strategy b ∈ B(Γ) such that WEC(Γ, b) can be characterized and
the corresponding reduced game is completely specified. Then, if bWEC(Γ,b) ∈
EC(GpWEC(Γ,b)), we know that, for whatever specification of the unknown
elements of Gp, there is bˆ ∈ EC(Gp) that is realization equivalent to b, i.e.
the outcome of b will be an equilibrium outcome of any game satisfying the
partial specifications of Gp. A situation as the one described above may
arise even in very simple settings. We present now a simple example.
Example 4. We consider the partially-specified game G = (Γ, h) in Figure
5.22 below. We do not know how the game continues after node x. It may be
that x is a terminal node, or we know the subgame beginning there, but that
it is too complicated for its sequential equilibria to be found. And it might
also be that we do not know anything at all about how the game follows once
x is reached. In any case, W = {u, v, z1, z2, z3} is the essential collection for
SE, any such Γ and any strategy in which players I and II play L1 and L2
at their initial information sets. Hence, since b = (L1, L2) ∈ SE(GW ), there
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is a sequential equilibrium of G in which L1 and L2 are played, leading to
the payoff vector (1, 1).
5.12 Virtual Equilibrium Concepts
In the previous sections we worked on games for which the existence of
analyzed equilibrium concepts was assured. In this section we widen the
scope of the enquery also to games without equilibria, for example games
with non-compact sets of strategies, or discontinuous payoff functions, or
games in which only pure strategies are possible. In order to guarantee the
existence of an equilibrium, we introduce a new concept for extensive games:
the virtual equilibrium concept, shortly V EC. Once we have essentialized
an equilibrium concept 11, we define virtual equilibrium concept the strategy
profile which, restricted to essential collection, is an equilibrium concept.
Let us consider, for instance, the concept of SPE and the corresponding
V SPE. The virtual subgame perfect equilibrium is based on the same sim-
ple idea of SPE. The subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten (1965)) discards
those NE which are only possible if some players give credit to irrational
plans of others. That is, a SPE is a Nash equilibrium which induces a
Nash equilibrium in every subgames. In the same way, we can define the
virtual subgame perfect equilibrium, as a NE which induces a NE in every
subgame relevant or essential for a given strategy profile, and, more in ge-
neral, the virtual equilibrium concept as a profile that is EC in the essential
collection.
The V SPE has the same effect as subgame perfection, but, it has the
advantage, over the SPE concept, in that V SPE exists in many games
which do not have SPE. Hence, it is especially useful when dealing with
extensive games having large trees, since there are many extensive games
without SPE, but with sensible equilibria. For instance, the proper subgame
of MP in Example 5 is irrelevant for the strategy profile (L1, l1, L2, l2) and
it lacks Nash equilibria.
Now, we formalize our assertions. Let EC be an equilibrium concept, Γ
a game form, b a strategy profile, and WEC(Γ, b) the essential collection.
Definition 83. A strategy profile b is a virtual equilibrium concept (shortly
11To essentialize an equilibrium concept means to assign, to each pair (Γ, b), the essential
collection WEC(Γ, b).
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V EC) of an extensive game G = (Γ, h), if
bWEC(Γ,b) ∈ EC(GWEC(Γ,b)).
We denote V EC(G) the sets of V EC of the extensive game G.
The definition implies that, for each extensive game G,
EC(G) ⊆ V EC(G),
and
EC(G) 6= ∅ ⇒ EC(G) = V EC(G).
In fact, if the set of EC(G) is nonempty, the Proposition 15 provides that,
for each b ∈ V EC(G), there is bˆ ∈ EC(G), realization equivalent to b, which
justifies the name virtual. More exactly, the following statements hold.
Proposition 17. Let b, b¯ ∈ B(Γ) be two strategy profile of G = (Γ, h), and
b⊗ .= b⊗WEC(Γ,b) b¯. Then,
i) the payoffs associated with b and b⊗ coincide, since they define the
same path,
ii) if b ∈ V EC(G), then b⊗ ∈ V EC(G), and
iii) if b ∈ V EC(G) and b¯ ∈ EC(G), then b⊗ ∈ EC(G).
The profile b⊗ inherits the virtual properties from b, that is to be an equi-
librium only in the essential collection, and from b¯ the property to be an
equilibrium in the remaining part of game. Given a virtual equilibrium, we
can always replace the non-equilibrium behavior outside the essential collec-
tion by an equilibrium behavior (if this exists) to get an equilibrium in the
classic sense. Hence, if the original game has some equilibrium, the sets of
equilibrium outcomes and virtual equilibrium outcomes coincide. But, that
is not always true. There can be games in which the set of virtual equilibria
is nonempty where there is no equilibrium, as illustrated by the following
example.
Example 5. We consider the extensive game G depicted in Figure 5.23
and we restrict the attention to pure strategies. Let b = ((L1, l1), (L2, l2))
be the strategy profile, but we might apply the same argument to b =
((L1, r1), (L2, l2)), or b = ((L1, r1), (L2, r2)). The subgame that begins in
x, after playing (R1, R2), is not essential for (Γ, b), since two deviations
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are needed to reach it. We consider the reduced game GWSPE(Γ,b), with
M = MG, depicted in Figure 5.24. Clearly, b restricted to GWSPE(Γ,b) is a
SPE of GWSPE(Γ,b) and, hence, b is a V SPE(G). However, the game G does
not have any SPE in pure strategies, but the equilibrium b is “sensible”. A
sensible equilibrium, in the spirit of SPE, has the following meaning. The
players cannot use backwards induction to solve game G, because the proper
subgame does not have any NE. Still, we suppose the players keep on with
backwards induction and insist on assigning payoffs at that subgame and
then go backwards in the tree. Then it does not matter what payoffs they
assign to that subgame, they would find that b is a solution of the game.
The following result is an immediate consequence of the corresponding
characterizations of the essential collections for NE, SR, and PE. The
virtual versions of these equilibrium concepts coincide with the non-virtual
versions.
Corollary 10. For each game form Γ and each game G ∈ G(Γ), we have
NE(G) = V NE(G), SR(G) = V SR(G), and PE(G) = V PE(G).
Nonetheless, for other equilibrium concepts, the virtual version can lead
to reasonable equilibrium behavior in settings where the classic equilibrium
concepts do not exist. See, for example, 5.23. Sometimes, the set of equilib-
ria is empty. For example, since the payoff functions are discontinuous, as it
happens in the Licensing game in Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2009), the payoffs
are unbounded. The second version of the Licensing game, LGm has some
V SE, but SE is not even defined.
Finally, the virtual subgame perfect equilibrium is applied to derive a
folk theorem in a repeated games setting in which the set of subgame perfect
equilibrium may be empty. We refer the reader to Garc´ıa-Jurado I. and
J.Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2006) for the proof of the results.
Remark 11. Virtual equilibria remind the trimmed equilibria introduced
in Groenert (2007). Although born from the same ideas, there are some
differences between the two equilibrium concepts, since the approaches were
different. First of all, the analysis in Groenert (2007) concerns the trimmed
versions of subgame perfect equilibrium and weak perfect equilibrium. Fur-
ther, for each assessment (b, µ) with µ ∈Mwc(b), the author identifies those
information sets that are irrelevant to check whether (b, µ) ∈ WPBE, i.e.
those outside W b,µ. Instead, our process of essentializing identifies, for each
strategy profile b, those information sets irrelevant to check if (for whatever
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beliefs) b ∈WPBE, i.e. those information sets outside ⋃
µ∈Mwc(b)
W b,µ. Also,
the analysis in Groenert (2007) focuses on the definition of trimmed equilib-
ria and there is no closedness requirement involved. Hence, the differences
between the final equilibrium concepts. In fact, a virtual WPBE is always
a trimmed WPBE, but there can be trimmed WPBE that are not virtual
WPBE.
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Figure 5.20: Decomposition of a game with respect to a closed collection.
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